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UNBUNDLING FAIR USES
Pamela Samuelson*
The copyright fair use caselaw is more coherent and more predictable
than many commentators seem to believe. Fair use cases tend to fall into
common patterns, or what this Article calls policy-relevant clusters. The
policies underlying modern fair use law include promoting freedom of
speech and of expression, the ongoing progress of authorship, learning,
access to information, truth telling or truth seeking, competition,
technological innovation, and the privacy and autonomy interests of users.
If one analyzes putative fair uses in light of cases previously decided in the
same policy cluster, it is generally possible to predict whether a use is likely
to be fair or unfair. Policy-relevant clustering is not a substitute for
appropriate consideration of the statutory fair use factors, but it provides
another dimension to fair use analysis that complements the four-factor
analysis and sharpens awareness about how the statutory factors,
sometimes supplemented by other factors, should be analyzed in particular
contexts.
Parts I through V mainly provide a positive account of how fair use has
been adjudicated in a variety of contexts and suggestions about factors that
should be given greater or lesser weight in certain fair use policy clusters.
Its articulation of the policy-relevant clusters into which the fair use cases
typically fall should not, however, be understood as attempting to limn the
outer bounds of fair use or to foreclose the development of new policy-
relevant clusters. This Article concludes by offering a more normative
account of fair use as an integral and essential part of U.S. copyright law
that can, in fact, encompass the wide range of fair uses discussed, by
recapping the key lessons from this Article's qualitative assessment of the
fair use caselaw, and by pointing to some encouraging trends in recent
cases.
* Richard M. Sherman Distinguished Professor of Law, Berkeley Law School. I wish to
thank Fordham Law School for the opportunity to give the Levine Lecture, which presented
the ideas developed in this Article, especially Benjamin Zipursky for his helpful comments.
I also wish to thank for their comments Barton Beebe, Bob Berring, Ann Brick, Paul Geller,
Mark Gergen, Daniel Gervais, Neil Netanel, David Nimmer, Aaron Perzanowski, Matthew
Sag, Jason Schultz, and Fred von Lohmann, as well as my colleagues in the Copyright
Principles Project who have helped me refine my ideas, and Jesse James and Tom Kearney
for heroic research assistance.
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INTRODUCTION
Fair use has been invoked as a defense to claims of copyright
infringement in a wide array of cases over the past thirty years, ' including
when someone has drawn expression from an earlier work in order to
parody it,2 quoted from an earlier work in preparing a new work on the
same subject, 3 published a photograph as part of a news story,4 made a
time-shifted copy of television programming, 5 photocopied a document for
submission as evidence in a litigation,6 reverse engineered a computer
program to get access to interface information, 7 cached websites to facilitate
faster access to them,8 or provided links to images available on the
Internet, 9 just to name a few. 10
1. Fair use originated through judicial interpretation. See, e.g., WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE
FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW (2d ed. 1995) (discussing the origins of fair use).
Fair use was first codified in the Copyright Act of 1976. See Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 107, 90
Stat 2541, 2546 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006)). Section 107 has three
main components: (1) a statement that the fair use of a copyrighted work is not an
infringement; (2) a list of six illustrative purposes that may qualify as fair uses (criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research); and (3) a set of four factors
that courts should take into account when considering whether use of a protected work is
fair: (a) the purpose of the defendant's use (including whether it is for commercial or
noncommercial purposes), (b) the nature of the copyrighted work, (c) the substantiality of
the taking, and (d) the potential for harm to the market for the work. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
Section 107 also makes clear that other factors can be taken into account and that the
unpublished status of a work does not preclude finding a use to be fair. Id.
The commentary on fair use is vast, and, while this Article cites many articles, it is
not possible to give credit in this paper to all the thoughtful contributions that have been
made by my colleagues, so I apologize in advance if I have neglected to cite all significant
writings on this subject.
2. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
3. See, e.g., New Era Publ'ns Int'l v. Carol Publ'g Group, 904 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1990).
4. See, e.g., Niiiiez v. Caribbean Int'l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2000).
5. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
6. See, e.g., Sturgis v. Hurst, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1444 (E.D. Mich. 2007).
7. See, e.g., Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992),
amendedby 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 78 (9th Cir. Jan. 6, 1993).
8. See, e.g., Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006).
9. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2007).
10. My colleague Peter Menell has pointed out that there are at least three different
realms in which fair use operates. One is fair use caselaw on which this Article mainly
concentrates; a second is the ordinary activities of the public, whose frequent unauthorized
uses of copyrighted materials are not routinely challenged by copyright owners; a third is
intra- or inter-copyright-industry licensing practices. Fair use arguably has the broadest
scope in the second realm and the narrowest scope in the third realm, but the scope of fair
2009] 2539
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A well-recognized strength of the fair use doctrine is the considerable
flexibility it provides in balancing the interests of copyright owners in
controlling exploitations of their works and the interests of subsequent
authors in drawing from earlier works when expressing themselves, as well
as the interests of the public in having access to new works and making
reasonable uses of them. II
Fair use is, however, often decried for the unpredictability said to attend
the fact-intensive, case-by-case nature of fair use analysis and/or to result
from the lack of judicial consensus on the fundamental principles that
underlie fair use.12 Some commentators have proposed to "fix" fair use by
establishing a low-cost administrative tribunal so that putative fair users
could explain uses they wished to make of another author's work and get
feedback from the tribunal about whether the use is fair. 13 Another has
suggested that the U.S. Copyright Office be given more rule-making
authority to develop fair use guidelines or create new exceptions. 14 Still
others have recommended bright-line, quantitative safe harbors for common
kinds of appropriations (e.g., so many seconds of a song, so many words
from a text).' 5 A fourth approach has been to articulate "best practices"
guidelines for groups of creators who typically reuse parts of previous
works in developing new ones (e.g., documentary filmmakers). 16 Many
commentators have also urged that courts take into account some factors
not set forth in § 107, the fair use provision of the Copyright Act of 1976
(1976 Act), 17 including the likelihood of market failure, i8 the plaintiffs
use in the caselaw realm is nonetheless significant-both in itself and in the role it plays in
informing the zone of fairness in the second and third realms.
11. See, e.g., Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82
B.U. L. REV. 975, 977 (2002) (discussing the two competing public interests).
12. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSiG, FREE CULTURE: How BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY
AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 187 (2004)
(characterizing fair use as "the right to hire a lawyer"); Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use,
85 N.C. L. REV. 1087, 1090 (2007); Pierre N. Leval, Comment, Toward a Fair Use Standard,
103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1106 (1990); David Nimmer, "Fairest of Them All" and Other
Fairy Tales of Fair Use, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at 263, 280 (noting
the "malleability" of fair use factors); see also NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT'S
PARADOX 66 (2008) ("Given the doctrine's open-ended, case-specific cast and inconsistent
application, it is exceedingly difficult to predict whether a given use in a given case will
qualify.").
13. See, e.g., Carroll, supra note 12, at 1090-91; David Nimmer, A Modest Proposal to
Streamline Fair Use Determinations, 24 CARDOzo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 11 (2006).
14. See, e.g., Joseph P. Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. REV. 87 (2004).
15. See, e.g., Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 VA. L.
REV. 1483, 1489, 1511-18 (2007).
16. See, e.g., CTR. FOR SOC. MEDIA, DOCUMENTARY FILMMAKERS' STATEMENT OF BEST
PRACTICES IN FAIR USE (2005), available at http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/resources/
publications/statement -of best-practices in_fair_use.
17. Most other countries do not have a general fair use defense to copyright
infringement, although they tend to set forth with some specificity exceptions and limitations
on copyright for particular kinds of uses. See, e.g., Council Directive 2001/29/EC, art. 5, On
the Harmonization of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information
Society, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10 (setting forth permissible exceptions and limitations to
copyright in the EU). An advantage that lists of exceptions have over fair use is that they are
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rationale for insisting that the use must be licensed,1 9 chilling effects on free
speech,20 chilling effects on innovation,2 1 the impact of network effects, 22
whether the defendant's use was reasonable and customary in her field of
endeavor, 23 how "old" the work is,24 distributive values, 2 5 and even the
fairness of the use.26
This Article argues that fair use law is both more coherent and more
predictable than many commentators have perceived once one recognizes
that fair use cases tend to fall into common patterns, or what this Article
will call policy-relevant clusters. 27 The policies underlying modem fair use
more specific and predictable; however, fair use has an advantage over exceptions lists in
that it is more flexible and adaptable over time.
18. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon & Daniel Bahls, The Public's Right to Fair Use:
Amending Section 107 to Avoid the "Fared Use" Fallacy, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 619, 622-23,
628-31 (discussing the proper role of market failure).
19. See, e.g., James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property
Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882 (2007) (arguing that fair users frequently request licenses simply to
avoid litigation, which in turn increases the scope of the right expected by copyright
holders).
20. See, e.g., Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Breathing Space, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS
429, 451 (2007) ("[P]rotecting free speech interests requires us not to be content with the
mere existence of [free speech] safeguards, but to think seriously about mechanisms for
reducing the chilling effect of uncertainty .... ").
21. See, e.g., Fred von Lohmann, Fair Use as Innovation Policy, 23 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 829, 863 (2008).
22. See, e.g., Frank Pasquale, Breaking the Vicious Circularity: Sony's Contribution to
Fair Use Doctrine, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 777, 802-05 (2005).
23. See, e.g., Michael Madison, Rewriting Fair Use and the Future of Copyright Reform,
23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 391, 409-10 (2006).
24. See, e.g., Justin Hughes, Fair Use Across Time, 50 UCLA L. REV. 775 (2003)
(arguing that the scope of fair use should increase as a copyrighted work ages).
25. See, e.g., Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Distributive Values in Copyright, 83 TEX.
L. REV. 1535 (2005) (discussing distributive concerns).
26. See, e.g., Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair's Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103
HARV. L. REV. 1137, 1138 (1990) (arguing that the doctrine of fair use should be "an
exemption from copyright infringement for uses that are fair").
27. I am not the first person to suggest that fair uses tend to fall into clusters. Alan
Latman's 1958 study of fair use set forth eight clusters of fair uses: (1) incidental uses; (2)
review and criticism; (3) parody and burlesque; (4) scholarly works and compilations; (5)
personal and private uses; (6) news; (7) use in litigation; and (8) use for nonprofit or
government purposes. ALAN LATMAN, FAIR USE OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, STUDY No. 14,
COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS,
TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHTS, S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG. 3, 8-14 (Comm.
Print 1960). Latman noted that there were no cases on uses 2, 5, and 7, yet he believed that
it was well-accepted that such uses would often be fair. Id. William Patry's treatise clusters
fair uses by having chapters on fair use cases involving biographies and historical works;
public figures and public information; criticism, parody, and fictional characters;
reprographic duplications; and off-the-air taping. See PATRY, supra note 1, chs. 4-8. More
recently, Michael Madison proposed eight categories of fair uses: (1) journalism and news
reporting; (2) parody and satire; (3) criticism and comment; (4) scholarship and research; (5)
reverse engineering; (6) legal and political argument; (7) storytelling; and (8) comparative
advertising, information merchants, and personal use. Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-
Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1525, 1645-65 (2004); see also
Paul Goldstein, Fair Use in Context, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 433, 439-41 (2008) (suggesting
that fair use cases tend to fall into clusters, but not attempting a systematic study of fair use
clusters).
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law include promoting freedom of speech and of expression, the ongoing
progress of authorship, learning, access to information, truth telling or truth
seeking, competition, technological innovation, and privacy and autonomy
interests of users. If one analyzes putative fair uses in light of cases
previously decided in the same policy cluster, it is generally possible to
predict whether a use is likely to be fair or unfair.28 Policy-relevant
clustering is not a substitute for appropriate consideration of the statutory
fair use factors, but it provides another dimension to fair use analysis that
complements the four-factor analysis and sharpens awareness about how
the statutory factors, sometimes supplemented by other factors, should be
analyzed in particular contexts.
This Article builds on Barton Beebe's recent empirical study of fair use
decisions under the 1976 Act.29 Its qualitative assessment of the fair use
28. The only clusters of fair use cases in which it is quite difficult to predict whether
uses are likely to be fair is in the educational and research use clusters where judges have
tended to take starkly different perspectives on fair use defenses in these settings, as Part III
explains. I recognize that the risk of a wrong guess on fair use is worrisome because
litigation can be very costly and courts have broad discretion to award substantial damages if
a use is ruled unfair. If a copyright owner has registered its work within three months of the
work's first publication, an unsuccessful defendant may have to pay not only its own
attorney's fees and a monetary award to the plaintiff, but also the plaintiff's attorney's fees.
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 412, 504-505 (2006).
29. See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978-
2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549 (2008). The principal "leading cases" to which Barton Beebe
refers are the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984), and Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985). Beebe was kind enough to provide me with a spreadsheet
of the cases he studied. I proceeded to read all of these cases in the order in which they had
been decided, as well as collecting fair use decisions issued since then and rereading some
pre-1976 Act cases with which I had been familiar. As I read the cases, I took notes on
different kinds of uses I found. Because I had been studying fair use cases for many years, I
expected to find cases that clustered around free speech and free expression uses of
copyrighted materials; productive uses of parts of previous works in nonfiction works, such
as biographies and documentaries; reverse engineering to achieve interoperability;
comparative advertising; and personal use facilitations. But I tried to keep an open mind
about uses that I had not previously noticed. There were some surprises--especially in the
litigation use cases discussed in Part IV.B. Roughly fifteen percent of the 300-some
opinions studied were not "real" fair use cases, most often because they involved ordinary
infringement claims as to which a fair use defense was implausible, but sometimes because
the main issue in the case was something other than fair use. For examples of the former,
see Palmer v. Garner, No. 05-95-PA, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13044, at *4 (D. Or. Mar. 3,
2006) (not fair use to construct homes designed by plaintiff); Lindal Cedar Homes, Inc. v.
Ireland, No. 03-6102-TC, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18878, at *14-18 (D. Or. Sept. 14, 2004)
(not fair use to construct custom homes from plans); Antioch Co. v. Scrapbook Borders, Inc.,
291 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Minn. 2003) (not fair use to copy stickers of everyday objects in
competing book); Dahlen v. Michigan Licensed Beverage Ass 'n, 132 F. Supp. 2d 574 (E.D.
Mich. 2001) (not fair use to copy layout and text of poster on driver rights); Broadcast
Music, Inc. v. Blueberry Hill Family Restaurants, Inc., 899 F. Supp. 474 (D. Nev. 1995) (not
fair use to perform music in family restaurant); and Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v.
Russian Kurier, Inc., 886 F. Supp. 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (not fair use to copy verbatim
many articles from Russian newspapers). An example of the latter is Greenberg v. National
Geographic Society, 244 F.3d 1267 (1 1th Cir. 2001), in which fair use was raised as a
defense, but the main issue-whether a digital product was a privileged "revision"--
concerned a different issue. This is consistent with Beebe's conclusion that "if we exclude
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caselaw provides support for Beebe's key conclusion that "much of our
conventional wisdom about [U.S.] fair use case law, deduced as it has been
from the leading cases, is wrong." 30 Courts do not, for instance, routinely
"stampede" to conclusions in favor of or against fair use, as some
commentators have suggested;31 the commerciality of a use "ha[s] no
significant influence on the outcome;" 32 copying an entire work is "far from
dispositive;" 33 reversal rates in fair use cases are not abnormally high; 34 and
win rates for fair use defenses in most policy-relevant clusters are generally
quite high.35 This Article also concurs in Beebe's conclusion that "the mass
of nonleading cases has shown itself to be altogether worthy of being
followed." 36
Unbundling fair uses into policy-relevant clusters will not cure all of fair
use's ills, 37 but unbundling will provide courts with a more useful and
nuanced tool kit for dealing with the plethora of plausible fair uses than can
be achieved merely by focusing on the four factors set forth in the statute.
These are the purpose of the defendant's use, the nature of the copyrighted
work, the substantiality of the taking, and the potential for harm to the
work's market.38
the 42 opinions that devoted less than 10% of the opinion to the fair use issue... , we
quickly come to a very respectable [fair use] win rate in the remaining opinions of 45.5%."
Beebe, supra, at 581. I have omitted the ordinary infringement or other issue-dominant
cases from the policy cluster analysis in this Article and have focused instead on cases in
which the fair use defense was at least somewhat plausible, even if it ultimately failed to
persuade the court.
30. Beebe, supra note 29, at 554. Beebe characterizes the leading cases' approach as
anecdotal, likens it to the "great men" approach to history, and concludes that it is
"fundamentally flawed-both as a descriptive and as a prescriptive enterprise." Id. at 553
(citation omitted); see also id. at 62 1. Contrary to the leading cases' conventional wisdom,
Beebe found that, for instance, "a finding that the plaintiffs work was [for a noncommercial
purpose] appeared strongly to influence a court to find fair use," whereas "the data suggest
that a finding that the defendant's use was for a commercial (rather than noncommercial)
purpose had no significant influence on the outcome of the [four-factor] test." Id. at 554-56.
This Article's qualitative analysis of the fair use caselaw agrees with Beebe's conclusions as
well.
31. See id. at 555; see, e.g., Nimmer, supra note 12, at 281 ("Courts tend first to make a
judgment that the ultimate disposition is fair use or unfair use, and then align the four factors
to fit that result as best they can.").
32. Beebe, supra note 29, at 556.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 574-75.
35. Id. at 609-10 (noting a 62% win rate for critical fair uses and a 78% win rate for
news reporting fair uses, although lower win rates for educational and research uses).
36. Id. at 622.
37. Particularly in close fair use cases, judges are likely to differ in their predisposition
to err in favor or against fair use defenses; some inconsistency in fair use caselaw is
inevitable. But that does not mean we should not try to find some consistency where it is
there to be found.
38. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). Unbundling fair uses into policy-relevant clusters may also
be useful if some nation eventually challenges the consistency of the fair use doctrine with
U.S. obligations under the Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPs). See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 9,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
20091 2543
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An obvious starting point for any effort to cluster fair uses lies in the
preamble to § 107, which sets forth six favored uses: criticism, comment,
news reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research. Given the considerable
overlap among these uses (e.g., criticism and comment, scholarship and
research), it makes little sense to organize the fair use caselaw around each
of these six uses. Three main policies underlie the six preambular uses:
promoting free speech and expression interests of subsequent authors and
the public, the ongoing progress of authorship, and learning.
Part I discusses the fair use caselaw that implicates First Amendment
freedom of speech and freedom of expression interests of subsequent
authors and the public. 39 Three of the statutorily favored uses-criticism,
commentary, and news reporting-tend to be evident in these cases. This
part distinguishes among transformative uses, productive uses, and
orthogonal uses. 40  Many of the free speech/expression cases involve
IC, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 108 Stat. 4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299
[hereinafter TRIPs], available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/27-trips.pdf
Article 13 of TRIPs requires nations to confine its exceptions and limitations to copyright to
"certain special cases" that do not undermine a normal exploitation of the work or otherwise
interfere with the legitimate interests of rights holders. U.S. commentators have disagreed
about how vulnerable the U.S. fair use defense might be to a charge of violating Article 13.
Cf Ruth Okediji, Toward an International Fair Use Doctrine, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
75 (2000) (suggesting the U.S. fair use defense may not be compatible with TRIPs
obligations); The Patry Copyright Blog, http://williampatry.blogspot.com/2008/04/fair-use-
three-step-test-and-european.html (Apr. 2, 2008, 14:44 EST) (arguing that U.S. fair use is
consistent with TRIPs Article 13). In particular, unbundling fair uses makes it easier to
argue that fair use accommodates a number of "certain special cases" and that the four
factors ensure that this exception does not interfere with a normal exploitation of the work or
with other legitimate interests of rights holders.
39. I recognize that "freedom of speech" and "freedom of expression" are sometimes
used interchangeably, and, in many instances, an author may be exercising both freedoms at
the same time. However, they are sometimes distinct. Nordstrom, Inc. v. PARAN, No. 92-
1349, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9162 (D.D.C. June 26, 1992), which ruled that a protest
group's use of the store's ads to illustrate its reason for believing the store was racist, is, in
my view, a free speech fair use case. Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257
(11 th Cir. 2001), which ruled that the retelling of the plot of Gone with the Wind from a
slave's viewpoint was fair use, implicates Alice Randall's right to freedom of expression.
The First Amendment protects both speech and expression interests of authors. See, e.g.,
NETANEL, supra note 12, at 32-33.
40. As Part I explains, the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,
Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994), defined the word "transformative" broadly to encompass
uses that truly transform expression from one work in making a new work, as well as
iterative copying from a preexisting work in a new work that productively uses that
expression, and iterative copying for a different or orthogonal purpose from the original.
Transformative, productive, and orthogonal uses, while they overlap in some instances, are
nevertheless useful to distinguish in fair use caselaw. The rap parody in Campbell
exemplifies a truly transformative use. Quoting from writings of L. Ron Hubbard in a
critical biography about him in New Era Publications International v. Carol Publishing
Group, 904 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1990), exemplifies a productive use. Copying fifty-one pages
from a book in connection with litigation on the fitness of the author to be a parent, as in
Sturgis v. Hurst, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1444 (E.D. Mich. 2007), is an example of an
orthogonal use. Distinguishing among these types of uses should avoid confusion about
what "transformative" really means and how important it should be in fair use cases. See,
e.g., Goldstein, supra note 27, at 442 (complaining about how blind application of "catch
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transformative parodies or satires. Many others involve productive uses, as
when a second author quotes from an earlier work in order to criticize it or
challenge its author's ideas. Even orthogonal uses (that is, uses for a
different purpose than the original) are sometimes fair when motivated by
free speech/expression considerations. Most uses in the free
speech/expression cluster are fair unless the second author has taken too
much, undermined a core licensing market, or engaged in wrongful acts that
undermined the claim of fair use.
Part II discusses a wide variety of uses that authors typically make of
existing works, including uses for three of the six statutorily favored uses-
research, scholarship, and commentary-that copyright law welcomes in
order to promote the ongoing creation and dissemination of new
knowledge, thereby fulfilling the constitutional purpose of copyright law.
Part II discusses how fair use typically balances interests at stake when
authors make productive uses of earlier works for purposes such as setting
historical context, illustrating some phenomenon being discussed, or
proving an assertion. Part II goes on to identify many other types of uses
that authors typically make of other authors' works and suggests that
authors should have considerable breathing room to make iterative copies
of their own and others' works for reasonable and customary purposes. As
in the free speech/expression cluster of cases, most authorial uses have been
ruled fair unless the putative fair user took more than was reasonable given
her purpose or supplanted demand for the first author's work.
Part III recognizes that research, scholarship, and teaching uses are often
undertaken to promote learning by persons who are neither scholars nor
would-be authors. The legislative history of the 1976 Act indicates that
Congress sought to provide some latitude for learning-related fair uses,
although legislators were aware that fair uses for teaching and research
could, if too broadly construed, undermine incentives to invest in creation
and dissemination of teaching and research materials. Sharply divergent
views on fair use exist in the educational and research use caselaw, and it is
in this cluster that fair uses are least predictable.
Part IV considers three kinds of uses beyond the six purposes set forth in
the preamble to § 107 that were nonetheless in contemplation as possible
fair uses when Congress adopted the 1976 Act. Congress seems, for
instance, to have anticipated that some private or personal uses of
copyrighted works would be fair, even if not done for one of the preambular
purposes. Although the personal use caselaw is somewhat sparse, it and
commentary about it provide some guidance for predicting when personal
uses are likely to be fair. In the personal use context, fair use may promote
privacy and autonomy interests of users. Uses in litigation or for
advertising purposes are also not among the statutorily favored uses. Yet,
phrases" like "transformative use" reflect the "triumph of mindless sound bite over
principled analysis"); Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms
Free Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 537 (2004).
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they too seem to have been in contemplation as possible fair uses, and fair
use defenses have often succeeded in such cases. In litigation use contexts,
fair use fosters truth seeking and truth" telling. In advertising use cases, fair
use fosters effective competition and access to truthful information.
Part V considers the role that fair use has played in adapting copyright
law to uses that Congress did not and could not have anticipated when
enacting the 1976 Act. Sony's Betamax videotape machines, which
allowed purchasers to make private use copies of television programs, were
just being introduced into the market as Congress was finishing up the
copyright revision process. It was also too early in the history of the
computer software industry for Congress in 1976 to have foreseen that
developers of noninfringing programs would sometimes need to reverse
engineer another firm's program in order to make their programs
interoperate with the other firm's program. And the Internet and search
engine technologies had yet to be invented in 1976. Fair use has proven
quite useful in adapting copyright law in response to these and other new
technologies so as to promote competition, technological innovation, and
greater public access to information and ability to make use of content.41
Parts I through V mainly provide a positive account of how fair use has
been adjudicated in a variety of contexts and suggestions about factors that
should be given greater or lesser weight in certain fair use policy clusters. 42
Its articulation of the policy-relevant clusters into which the fair use cases
typically fall should not, however, be understood as attempting to limn the
outer bounds of fair use or to foreclose the development of new policy-
relevant clusters.43
Part VI offers a more normative account of fair use as an integral and
essential part of U.S. copyright law that can, in fact, encompass the wide
range of fair uses discussed in the Article. It also recaps the key lessons
from this Article's qualitative assessment of the fair use caselaw and points
to some encouraging trends in recent cases.
I. FREE SPEECH AND EXPRESSION FAIR USES
The U.S. Supreme Court has characterized fair use as a "built-in"
safeguard in copyright law for mediating tensions between interests of
copyright owners in controlling exploitations of their works and free speech
and expression interests of subsequent authors and members of the public.44
41. See generally Pamela Samuelson, Fair Use For Computer Programs and Other
Copyrightable Works in Digital Form: The Implications of Sony, Galoob and Sega, I J.
INTELL. PROP. L. 49 (1993) (emphasizing flexibility of fair use in adapting copyright law as
to new technological uses of copyrighted works). Part V of this Article discusses the role of
fair use in adapting copyright law to unforeseen uses.
42. For the most part, this Article refrains from speculating about how fair use might
apply in situations that have not been adjudicated.
43. See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 27, at 441 (recognizing the danger of fair use
category ossification).
44. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003); Harper & Row Publishers,
Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985).
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Many commentators believe that fair use is essential to maintaining
compatibility of copyright law and the First Amendment,45 although they
are sometimes skeptical about whether fair use is doing as good a job at this
task as the Supreme Court seems to believe. 46
It is sometimes obvious that copyright is being asserted to suppress free
speech or expression. 47 In Nordstrom, Inc. v. PARAN, 48 for example, a
department store claimed that a protest group infringed copyright because it
distributed leaflets featuring one of the store's ads next to text explaining
why the group thought the store was racist. The court characterized
PARAN's use of the ad as "political speech [that] is protected by the First
Amendment. '49 When the National Rifle Association (NRA) sued the
Handgun Control Federation (HCF) for copying a list of names and
addresses of state legislators compiled by the NRA that HCF distributed to
its members to urge them to lobby in support of the same gun control
legislation that the NRA opposed, 50 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit found fair use because the list "was used primarily in exercising
HCF's First Amendment speech rights to comment on public issues and to
45. See, e.g., Carroll, supra note 12, at 1093 (Eldred recognized "the constitutional
substrate undergirding the fair use doctrine"); Liu, supra note 20, at 432 ("The language in
Eldred indicates that if . . . Congress abolished the fair use defense, this would be
constitutionally problematic."); Stephen M. McJohn, Eldred's Aftermath: Tradition, the
Copyright Clause, and the Constitutionalization of Fair Use, 10 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH.
L. REV. 95 (2003); Tushnet, supra note 40, at 548.
46. See, e.g., NETANEL, supra note 12, at 63 (characterizing fair use as "an exceedingly
feeble, inconstant check on copyright holders' proprietary control").
47. Copyright can, of course, chill free speech and free expression even when copyright
owners do not sue, for a claim of copyright infringement has especially strong chilling
effects on individuals and groups with modest financial resources. See, e.g., MARJORIE HEINS
& TRICIA BECKLES, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, WILL FAIR USE SURVIVE? FREE EXPRESSION
IN THE AGE OF COPYRIGHT CONTROL: A PUBLIC POLICY REPORT 37 (2005); Lawrence Lessig,
Copyright and Politics Don't Mix, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2008, at A29 (giving examples of
speech-suppressing copyright claims asserted as to political ads in recent campaigns).
48. No. 92-1349, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9162 (D.D.C. June 26, 1992).
49. Id. at * 1. The court did not go through a full fair use analysis because the free
speech interests at stake so clearly overrode the copyright interests in the case. See id. at *2.
A fuller analysis is easy to imagine: the purpose of reproducing the ad was noncommercial
and an integral part of critical commentary on the store's policies; ads are not as much at the
core of copyright as other works; the whole of the ad was copied. On the other hand, it was
implausible that the limited reproduction of the ad for purposes of political protest would
harm any actual or potential market for the copyrighted work. Moreover, it is unlikely that
Nordstrom would have been willing to license this use, even if PARAN had asked to do so,
as the ad presumably made the group's critical commentary more powerful.
50. Nat'l Rifle Ass'n v. Handgun Control Fed'n, 15 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. 1994). The three-
page list was published as part of two short National Rifle Association (NRA) newsletters
aimed at persuading members to oppose gun control measures then pending before the Ohio
legislature. See id. at 560. The Handgun Control Federation distributed the list to about 200
of its members urging them to support the same bill as the NRA urged its members to
oppose. See id. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit did not address the lower
court's alternative holding, namely, that there was insufficient originality in the list to
support a claim of copyright. See id. at 562 (failing to address the lower court's alternative
holding in National Rifle Ass 'n v. Handgun Control Federation, 844 F. Supp. 1178, 1180-81
(N.D. Ohio 1992)).
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petition the government regarding legislation. '51  Free speech
considerations were also present in Belmore v. City Pages, Inc.,52 which
ruled that a newspaper's publication of a fable that revealed a police
officer's racist attitudes was fair use. Similarly, in Online Policy Group v.
Diebold, Inc.,53 Online Policy Group asserted that its posting of an email
archive about security problems with electronic voting software was fair
use. The court observed,
The email archive was posted or hyperlinked to for the purpose of
informing the public about the problems associated with Diebold's
electronic voting machines. It is hard to imagine a subject the discussion
of which could be more in the public interest. If Diebold's machines in
fact do tabulate voters' preferences incorrectly, the very legitimacy of
elections would be suspect. 54
In these and other cases, 55 copyright claims seemed to be pretexts for
suppressing free speech. 56
In other free speech/expression fair use cases, however, copyright claims
have been more plausible, and the copyright and the First Amendment
interests at stake were more in equipoise. Part L.A discusses the
transformative use cases. Part I.B focuses on productive uses for purposes
of critical commentary. Part I.C recognizes that some iterative copying for
speech-related purposes may also be fair. Part I.D considers the news
reporting cases. Fair use defenses have often prevailed when a second
author's use implicated free speech and free expression interests. Part I.E
offers suggestions about how courts should weigh certain factors when free
speech and free expression interests are at stake in fair use cases.
A. Transformative Uses
Authors often draw upon preexisting works and transform expression
from them in creating new works that criticize, comment upon, or offer new
51. NRA, 15 F.3d at 562. The court concluded that all factors favored fair use in this
case. See id.
52. 880 F. Supp. 673 (D. Minn. 1995).
53. 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
54. Id. at 1203. Indeed, Diebold's copyright claim was so implausible that the court
ruled that Diebold had violated the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) by giving
notice of infringement when it knew or should have known that its copyright claim was
unsound. See id. at 1204.
55. See, e.g., Payne v. Courier-Journal, 193 F. App'x 397 (6th Cir. 2006) (fair use for a
newspaper to quote from an unpublished children's book written by a convicted rapist);
Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966) (fair use to
publish a critical Howard Hughes biography that drew upon an article of which a Hughes
enterprise had purchased the copyright to sue the biography publisher for infringement);
Super Future Equities, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank Minn., N.A., 553 F. Supp. 2d 680 (N.D.
Tex. 2008) (fair use to post images on the Internet in connection with Super Future Equities'
critical commentary on the bank's business practices); Keep Thomson Governor Comm. v.
Citizens for Gallen Comm., 457 F. Supp. 957 (D.N.H. 1978) (fair use to take fifteen seconds
of the other candidate's song as part of political debate).
56. For an array of other examples, see HEINS & BECKLES, supra note 47.
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insights about those works and the social significance of others'
expressions. 57 Parodies are a classic example.
1. Parodies
The Supreme Court did not explicitly invoke the First Amendment, nor
free speech or expression values, in its most recent fair use precedent,
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.58 Such concerns nonetheless seem to
underlie the Court's ruling that a rap parody version of Roy Orbison's song
"Pretty Woman" could qualify as a fair use of that song. The Court
repeatedly emphasized that parodies are a form of critical commentary on a
first author's work that fair use could protect.59 Criticism and comment are
very much at the heart of speech that is protected by the First
Amendment. 60
Specifically as to "Big Hairy Woman," the Court noted,
2 Live Crew juxtaposes the romantic musings of a man whose fantasy
comes true [in the original song], with degrading taunts, a bawdy demand
for sex, and a sigh of relief from paternal responsibility. The later words
can be taken as a comment on the naivet6 of the original of an earlier day,
as a rejection of its sentiment that ignores the ugliness of street life and
the debasement that it signifies.61
The Court also noted "the unlikelihood that creators of imaginative
works will license critical reviews or lampoons of their own productions" as
a reason to be skeptical about "the very notion of a potential licensing
market 62 when assessing the harm factor. Biting criticism may suppress
demand for the work being criticized, but, unless it usurps demand for the
original, it does not harm the market for the first author's work in a
copyright-significant way.63
Campbell endorsed a sensitive case-by-case analysis in parody cases, in
which all fair use factors had to be considered and weighed in conjunction
with one another and in which the transformative character of a second
57. Transformativeness is not only important in fair use analysis, but also in analysis of
the derivative work right. See R. Anthony Reese, Transformativeness and the Derivative
Work Right, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 467, 467 (2008) (concluding that courts treat
transformativeness differently in each context).
58. 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
59. Id. at 579-80.
60. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (recognizing that
"profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials").
61. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 583.
62. Id. at 592.
63. Id. The Court quoted from Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1986),
regarding the distinction between criticism that suppresses demand and other uses that usurp
demand. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592. "[W]hen a lethal parody, like a scathing theater review,
kills demand for the original, it does not produce a harm cognizable under the Copyright
Act." Id. at 591-92.
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comer's use mattered.64  The accused work would be considered
"transformative" if it "adds something new, with a further purpose or
different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or
message." 65  Parody "has an obvious claim to transformative value"
because "it can provide social benefit, by shedding light on an earlier work,
and, in the process, creating a new one."' 66 The Court emphasized that
transformativeness is important not only in assessing the purpose of the
defendant's use, but also the nature of the work (parodies, for example,
inevitably borrow from well-known expressive works), 67 the amount of the
taking (parodies must take a core part of the first work to conjure it up), 68
and the harm to the market (transformative uses are less likely to usurp the
market for the first work). 6 9
Notwithstanding the Court's unwillingness in Campbell to presume that
parodies are fair, 70 every subsequent parody case has been adjudged a fair
use. 71 Several cases have been more explicit than Campbell about the link
64. See id. at 577-78. Prior to Campbell, there was reason to worry that parodies might
not qualify as fair uses because they are often commercial, they draw upon popular works,
they aim at "the heart" of those works, and Sony and Harper & Row had instructed courts to
presume harm from commercial uses. The Sixth Circuit's decision in Campbell bears
witness that this fear was well-founded.
65. Id. at 579.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 586.
68. Id. at 586-88.
69. Id. at 590-91.
70. The Campbell Court cited approvingly several prior parody cases in which fair use
defenses had succeeded. See id. at 579-80 (citing Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir.
1986) ("When Sunny Sniffs Glue" made fair use of "When Sonny Gets Blue"); Elsmere
Music, Inc. v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 482 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y.), aft'd, 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir.
1980) ("I Love Sodom" television parody skit made fair use of "I Love New York")); see
also H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 65 (1976); S. REP. No. 94-473, at 61 (1975) (recognizing that
parodies may be fair uses). But the Campbell Court also cited MCA, Inc., v. Wilson, 677
F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1981), in which a parody defense was rejected because the reworking of
the plaintiffs song was a broader commentary on 1940s-era society, not a critical
commentary on the plaintiff's work. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580. It did not, however, cite
Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978), which rejected the fair
use defense as to a comic book making fun of Walt Disney characters by depicting them as
dope-smoking hippies. It is far from clear after Campbell that the Air Pirates case would be
decided the same way today as it was in 1978.
71. See, e.g., Lyons P'ship v. Giannoulas, 179 F.3d 384 (5th Cir. 1999) (parody of
Barney the dinosaur assaulted by chicken at sporting event); Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures
Corp., 137 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 1998) (poster parodying famous photo of nude actress held fair
use); Burnett v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 491 F. Supp. 2d 962 (C.D. Cal. 2007)
(parody of an actress's portrayal of a janitor in animated picture was fair use); Mastercard
Int'l, Inc. v. Nader 2000 Primary Comm., Inc., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(Ralph Nader political ad was fair use parody of a MasterCard "priceless" ad); Kane v.
Comedy Partners, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1748 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), affd, 98 F. App'x 73 (2d
Cir. 2004) (brief clip from public access TV show in satirical skit was fair use); Abilene
Music, Inc. v. Sony Music Entm't, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 2d 84 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (granting
summary judgment to Sony for parodic song using three lines from a song); World Wrestling
Fed'n Entm't, Inc. v. Big Dog Holdings, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 2d 413 (W.D. Pa. 2003) (parody
of WWF wrestlers looking like dogs was fair use); Lucasfilm Ltd. v. Media Mkt. Group,
Ltd., 182 F. Supp. 2d 897 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (Starballz movie, a pornographic parody, was
2550 [Vol. 77
UNBUNDLING FAIR USES
between parodic fair uses and First Amendment free speech and free
expression values. 72 Campbell seemingly viewed satires as less worthy of
fair use deference because satires target society at large or some segment of
it, rather than the work being drawn from.73  Yet, satiric uses have
sometimes also been ruled fair. 74 In part because the line between parody
and satire does not shimmer with clarity and because satires too involve the
creative exercise of a second author's imagination, some commentators
have questioned whether the parody/satire distinction is consistent with the
First Amendment values that fair use is supposed to embody. 75
2. Other Transformative Critiques
Parody is not the only type of transformative criticism of an existing
work that may be a fair use. Two artists relied on fair use to fend off
infringement claims arising from their critical transformations of Barbie
dolls, an iconic symbol of a certain form of feminine beauty. 76 Suntrust
Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co. 7 7 is, however, the best example of a
fair use of Star Wars); Williams v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 57 F. Supp. 2d 961 (C.D.
Cal. 1999) (use of clay figure in an Army skit making fun of Navy personnel on TV during a
sporting event was fair use); Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 868
F. Supp. 1266 (N.D. Okla. 1994), aft'd, 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996) (fair use protected
parody baseball cards).
72. See, e.g., Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1264-65 (11 th Cir.
2001) (noting that "copyright does not immunize a work from comment and criticism"
because fair use embodies First Amendment values (emphasis omitted)); Dr. Seuss Enters. v.
Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1400 (9th Cir. 1997) ("Parody is regarded as a
form of social and literary criticism, having a socially significant value as free speech under
the First Amendment."); Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 972 ("[P]arody ... is a vital commodity in
the marketplace of ideas."); Nordstrom, Inc. v. PARAN, No. 92-1349, 1992 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9162 (D.D.C. June 26, 1992) (protestors were expressing First Amendment free
speech rights when distributing leaflets charging the store with racism, so use of ad in leaflet
was fair use).
73. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 581.
74. See, e.g., Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 254-55 (2d Cir. 2006) (satirical use of
portion of photo in collage qualified as fair use); Williams, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 970-71
(satirical use of clay figure in skit during sporting event was fair use); cf Dr. Seuss, 109 F.3d
at 1403 (illustrated book with rhymes on the 0. J. Simpson murder case in the style of Dr.
Seuss's "Cat in the Hat" book held to be unfair use); Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v.
Miramax Films Corp., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1179 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (poster and trailer for Michael
Moore movie that was substantially similar to "Men in Black" poster and trailer was not fair
use as a parody or satire).
75. See, e.g., Liu, supra note 20, at 446-47.
76. See Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 796 (9th Cir. 2003) (fair
use to photograph nude Barbie dolls in sexually suggestive poses seemingly imperiled by
kitchen appliances); Mattel, Inc. v. Pitt, 229 F. Supp. 2d 315 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (denying
Mattel's motion for summary judgment because customized Barbie dolls in sadomasochistic
costumes may be fair use).
77. 268 F.3d 1257. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit struggled over
whether Suntrust involved a parody within the meaning of Campbell. See id. at 1268-69.
Under a narrow interpretation of this term, a second work would not be a parody unless it
was humorous or held the first work up to ridicule. Id. at 1268. This conception of parody
(which Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580, arguably endorsed) would have jeopardized Randall's
defense, for there is nothing remotely funny about The Wind Done Gone (TWDG). See
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nonparodic transformative critique of an earlier author's work that should
qualify as fair use under Campbell.
Suntrust sued Alice Randall and Houghton Mifflin, her publisher, for
copyright infringement because Randall retold the core story of Gone With
the Wind (GWTW) from the slaves' point of view in her book The Wind
Done Gone (TWDG). TWDG appropriated characters, plot sequences, and
major scenes, including some verbatim dialogue, from GWTW; the
defendants claimed fair use. 78
The court in Suntrust began its analysis of Randall's fair use defense by
observing that TWDG is "a specific criticism of and rejoinder to the
depiction of slavery and the relationships between blacks and whites in
GWTW.' '79 Randall's decision to "convey her criticisms of GWTWthrough
a work of fiction" was understandable given that she believed that fiction
would be "a more powerful vehicle for her message than a scholarly
article." 80  TWDG was, the court concluded, highly transformative of
GWTW in recasting numerous scenes and characters and retelling the story
from a radically different perspective. 81  To Suntrust's argument that
Randall took far more than was necessary to conjure up GWTW, the court
responded that "Campbell did not require that parodists take the bare
minimum amount of copyright material necessary to conjure up the original
work."'82 While the amount taken from G WTW was considerable, it should
only be judged excessive if it harmed the market for the work. Randall's
book was unlikely to usurp the market for GWTW, for the two books were
aimed at different audiences. 83 Suntrust had, moreover, failed to show that
Suntrust, 268 F.3d at 1269 n.23 (noting that Michiko Kakutani's review of TWDG
characterized it as "decidedly unfunny"). Under a broader conception of parody, however,
critical transformations such as TWDG could be regarded as parodies, and the Eleventh
Circuit found this second interpretation persuasive. Id. at 1268-69. It is understandable,
though perhaps regrettable, that the Eleventh Circuit felt compelled to shoehorn the Suntrust
dispute into the parody category. Parody is only one of a number of ways that authors can
engage in critical commentary. The court should instead have generalized the Campbell fair
use framework so that it applies to all works that critically transform previous works by
recasting aspects of the first work, remixing expression from it with the second author's
expression, thereby shedding new light on the original and contributing to new perspectives
on its meaning.
78. Suntrust, 268 F.3d at 1259, 1267. Randall and Houghton Mifflin argued that the two
works were not substantially similar, but the Eleventh Circuit disagreed. Id. at 1267.
79. Id. at 1269.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1269-70. Judge Stanley Marcus's concurrence further observed that Randall's
style was "a marked departure from Mitchell's. The Wind Done Gone takes diary form; its
chronology is disjunctive and its language often earthy. It is told from an introspective first-
person point of view. Mitchell's story, by comparison, is a linear third-person narrative, epic
in scope and staid in tone." Id. at 1279.
82. Id. at 1273.
83. Id. at 1275-76.
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TWDG or other works like it would significantly harm the market for
authorized derivatives. 84
A thoughtful concurring opinion observed that Suntrust had in the past
refused to authorize derivative works of GWTW unless the prospective
licensee agreed to not discuss miscegenation or homosexuality, 85 both
which were key parts of Randall's story. Suntrust was obviously free to
preserve GWTW's reputation from such "taint" though its licensing policy,
but "it may not use copyright to shield [GWTW] from unwelcome comment,
a policy that would extend intellectual property protection into the precincts
of censorship."8 6  Copyright law should not "afford [Suntrust] windfall
damages for the publication of the sorts of works that they themselves
would never publish, or worse, grant them a power of indirect
censorship."8 7 This opinion recognized Randall's freedom of expression
interests in depicting miscegenation and homosexuality as plausible parts of
the story.
3. Transformative Adaptations
Sometimes authors transformatively adapt expression from existing
works even when not doing so to criticize the earlier work, as in Campbell
and Suntrust, but rather as an expression of artistic imagination. 88 Blanch v.
Koons89 exemplifies fair use caselaw involving transformative recasting of
expression. In the course of fulfilling a commission for a large painting,
Jeff Koons, a well-known visual artist, selected several photos of women's
legs from popular magazines, including one taken by Andrea Blanch. 90
Koons scanned the photos, loaded them into his computer, manipulated and
edited them, and then digitally superimposed the edited images onto a
84. Id. The court viewed Randall as having made out a prima facie fair use defense,
which it thought Suntrust then had to counter with evidence to show its insufficiency. Id. at
1275 n.31.
85. Id. at 1282 (Marcus, J., concurring).
86. Id. at 1283 (internal quotation marks omitted).
87. Id.
88. Several commentators think that courts should be much more deferential to
borrowing from earlier works as an expression of artistic imagination in copyright cases than
they have been thus far. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE
THRIVE IN THE HYBRID ECONOMY (2008); Julie E. Cohen, Copyright, Commodification, and
Culture: Locating the Public Domain, in THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: IDENTIFYING
THE COMMONS IN INFORMATION LAW 121, 121-66 (P. Bemt Hugenholtz & Lucie Guibault
eds., 2006); David Lange, Reimagining the Public Domain, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Winter/Spring 2003, at 463, 474; Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's
Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (2002). Professor Julie Cohen, in particular, has argued
that artists and authors need to be able to draw upon the cultural landscape in which they
work in the process of creating new works. Cohen does not think it is necessary to call upon
fair use when second comers transformatively recast expression from earlier works. See Julie
E. Cohen, The Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 347, 362-67
(2005) [hereinafter Cohen, Place of User].
89. 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006).
90. Id. at 246.
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background featuring food and pastoral landscapes. 91 Koons then printed
the resulting collages so that assistants could render them in paint on large
canvasses. 92 Two of the eight legs featured in the final painting derived
from Blanch's photo.93 After seeing the resulting painting, Blanch sued
Koons for infringement. 94
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that Koons's use
was fair.95 Blanch's photo was "fodder for his commentary on social and
aesthetic consequences of mass media," for which "the use of an existing
image advanced his artistic purposes. '"96 Although Blanch's photo was a
creative work, the court gave this factor limited weight in view of its
transformativeness, as Koons "comment[ed] on her image's social and
aesthetic meaning rather than ... exploit[ing] its creative virtues. '97 The
amount taken was "reasonable . . . in light of [Koons's] purpose, to convey
the 'fact' of the photograph to viewers of the painting." 98  importantly,
Blanch admitted she had suffered no harm from Koons's use of the photo. 99
The court also noted that "the public exhibition of art is widely and we
think properly considered to 'have value that benefits the broader public
interest."' 100 Because Koons had produced a work of art for public display
at major art galleries, this too favored fair use.
The court in Blanch did not directly consider the freedom of expression
interests of Koons and other neo-pop artists in being able to express
themselves by drawing upon images from popular culture. Yet, it was quite
sympathetic to the artist's explanation for his decision to reuse expression
from the earlier work. This bodes well for fair use as applied to
transformative remixes and mashups created by amateurs, such as
"Brokeback to the Future," which uses music from the movie "Brokeback
Mountain" and clips from "Back to the Future" movies to suggest that the
91. Id. at 247.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 249.
95. Id. at 258.
96. Id. at 253, 255. The court noted that the test for transformative use "almost
perfectly" describes Jeff Koons's work:
[T]he use of a fashion photograph created for publication in a glossy American
'lifestyles' magazine-with changes of its colors, the background against which it
is portrayed, the medium, the size of the objects pictured, the objects' details, and
crucially, their entirely different purpose and meaning-as part of a massive
painting commissioned for exhibition in a German art-gallery space. We therefore
conclude that the use in question was transformative.
Id. at 253.
97. Id. at 257.
98. Id. He copied "only that portion of the image necessary to evoke a certain style of
mass communication." Id. at 258 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 254 (quoting Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 922 (2d Cir.
1994)). The court worked consideration of this factor into its analysis of the first fair use
factor. Id. at 256.
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two male lead characters are in love.' 0 ' Remixes and mashups
recontextualize parts of existing works, thereby shedding new light on and
contributing new insights about the original. 10 2  Less transformative
commercial appropriations are, however, much riskier for artists such as
Koons. 103
B. Productive Uses in Critical Commentary
More common than transformative critiques and adaptations have been
fair use cases in which second comers have iteratively copied some
portion-and occasionally the whole--of another's copyrighted work in
preparing a new work critical of the first author's work. Productive uses of
this sort have often, though not always, been deemed fair uses.10 4 Although
101. See, e.g., CTR. FOR SOC. MEDIA, CODE OF BEST PRACTICES IN FAIR USE FOR ONLINE
VIDEO 8-9 (2008), available at http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/files/pdf/onlinebest_
practices in fair use.pdf (offering guidance for ordinary users who want to make fair use by
remixing or mashing up elements of existing works to make new works); see also Rebecca
Tushnet, User-Generated Discontent: Transformation in Practice, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS
497 (2008) (discussing practices of creative communities as relevant to fair use).
102. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 101, at 504-06. Distributive values may also favor
fair uses when amateur creators make noncommercial remixes and mashups. See, e.g., Van
Houweling, supra note 25. Many studios would, moreover, be unable to give amateurs
permission to engage in remixes and mashups of their content because permitting reuses of
this sort would implicate a web of contractual obligations to stars and other creative
contributors to these works. Transaction costs would overwhelm the ability to clear rights
efficiently.
103. The fair use claim in Blanch v. Koons contrasted sharply, in the court's view, with
Koons's fair use defense in Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S.
934 (1992). Art Rogers sued Koons for infringement for making a sculpture based upon
Rogers's photograph of a couple sitting with a brood of puppies for a series of artistic works
depicting the banality of modem culture. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
ruled that Koons had not made fair use of the photo, in part because Koons had, in its view,
slavishly copied the Rogers photo and because Rogers had licensed some reuses of his
photograph. See id. at 312; see also Campbell v. Koons, No. 91 Civ. 6055, 1993 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3957 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 1993) (sculpture made unfair use of a photograph); United
Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. Koons, 817 F. Supp. 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (sculpture made unfair
use of a cartoon character). These decisions predated Campbell, and the latest Koons
decision is far more receptive to fair use claims as to appropriation art than the earlier Koons
cases were. An excellent recent critique of the earlier Koons decisions can be found in Laura
A. Heymann, Everything Is Transformative: Fair Use and Reader Response, 31 COLUM. J.L.
& ARTS 445, 465 (2008) ("The value of a Jeff Koons sculpture results from the viewer's
desire to be part of the discursive community surrounding the sculpture, not from that
viewer's membership (if it exists) in the community around Art Rogers' photograph.").
104. See, e.g., NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471 (2d Cir. 2004) (posting parts of
NXIVM's proprietary training seminar materials as part of critical commentary by Ross was
probably fair use); Baraban v. Time Warner, Inc., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1759 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (fair use to reproduce a photo first used in an ad for nuclear power in a book
criticizing efforts to portray nuclear energy in positive light); Rotbart v. J. R. O'Dwyer Co.,
34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1085 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (fair use for an editor to publish an article
critical of the plaintiff's presentation, quoting liberally from it); Maxtone-Graham v.
Burtchaell, 631 F. Supp. 1432 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), ajfd, 803 F.2d 1253 (2d Cir. 1986)
(antiabortion book reproducing excerpts from proabortion book deemed fair use); Diamond
v. Am-Law Publ'g Corp., No. 82 Civ. 6273, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20787 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4,
1984), ajfd, 745 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1984) (fair use for a legal magazine to publish a lawyer's
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Campbell's capacious definition of "transformativeness" can encompass
productive uses, it is appropriate to distinguish transformative critiques,
such as parodies, from productive uses for critical commentary. Doing so
raises awareness that some iterative copying in a second work may qualify
as fair use; it also averts overloading the word "transformative" with too
many meanings.
Typical of the productive criticism fair use caselaw is New Era
Publications International v. Carol Publishing Group.10 5 New Era owned
copyrights in many works authored by L. Ron Hubbard, the controversial
founder of the Church of Scientology. After a former member of this
church wrote a highly critical biography of Hubbard that included 121
passages from 48 of the latter's works, New Era sued the author and his
publisher for infringement and the defendants claimed fair use. 106
The purpose of the use in New Era was critical commentary. The works
from which the critical biographer had drawn were largely factual and
informational, which favored fair use. Of the 48 works alleged to be
infringed, the court concluded that only miniscule uses had been made of
25; 23 others were short works; and less than 10% of each had been
copied. 10 7 The author had, moreover, filed an affidavit explaining in detail
his reasons for each quote in the book, such as "illustrating the alleged gap
between the official version of Hubbard's life and accomplishments, and
what the author contend[ed] [were] the true facts." 10 8  Quoting from
Hubbard's work was said to be necessary to conjure up the original. 109
The Second Circuit characterized as "unthinkable" the claim that the
critical biography of Hubbard would undercut the market for an authorized
favorable biography quoting from the same works. 110 Indeed, a critical
biography might well stimulate interest in an authorized biography."'1
Even if a "devastating critique" of Hubbard's life might dampen interest in
a New Era-authorized book, copyright law does not redress such harm. 112
The court did not directly invoke the First Amendment, but New Era raises
free speech and free expression concerns that favored a finding of fair use
and cautions against generalized claims of harm to the market in critical
commentary cases.
letter to the editors, even though lawyer tried to restrict permission to publish on condition
that whole letter be published if any part was). But see Lish v. Harper's Magazine Found.,
807 F. Supp. 1090 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (unfair to publish 1206 words from an author/professor's
letter to prospective students, which represented 52% of the text of this letter, even though
done for the purpose of criticism).
105. 904 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1990).
106. See id. at 154.
107. See id. at 158.
108. Id. at 159.
109. See id.
110. Id. at 159-60.




C. Iterative Copying for Orthogonal Speech-Related Purposes
It is sometimes necessary, in order to make an effective critical
commentary, to make or publish iterative copies of the whole or significant
parts of a copyrighted work for a very different (i.e., orthogonal) speech-
related purpose than the original. Although Campbell defines
"transformative" in a way that encompasses uses for different purposes,
copyright law will be more comprehensible and coherent if iterative
copying for orthogonal purposes is distinguished from truly transformative
uses of prior works.
One recent example is Savage v. Council on American-Islamic Relations,
Inc.,' 13 which ruled that the Council on American-Islamic Relations
(CAIR) had made fair use of a conservative talk show host's radio
programs when it posted on its website copies of anti-Islamic statements
made by Michael Savage on his programs as well as a four-minute audio
segment from the programs. CAIR posted the excerpts and audio to
criticize Savage's views, to organize a boycott of the program, and to raise
money to support its pro-Islamic activities. The court observed that "it was
not unreasonable for defendants to provide the actual audio excerpts, since
they reaffirmed the authenticity of the criticized statements and provided
the audience with the tone and manner in which plaintiff made the
statements."1 4 Savage relied upon Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral
Majority, Inc.,' 1 5 an earlier orthogonal use for speech-related purposes case.
The dispute in Hustler arose because Jerry Falwell and the Moral
Majority organization he led became very upset when Hustler magazine
published a mock Campari ad that depicted Jerry Falwell as recalling his
first drunken sexual encounter with his mother in an outhouse. 116 Words
were inadequate to illustrate how outrageous the ad was, so the Moral
Majority mailed copies of the mock ad to its membership urging them to
contribute to a fund to support Falwell's lawsuit against Hustler for libel
and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 117 Hustler sued them for
copyright infringement; they claimed their use was fair. "18
Because the Moral Majority raised almost $1 million from this campaign,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit initially regarded the
copying as presumptively unfair, 1 9 but the presumption was overcome in
part because the Moral Majority's purpose in mailing copies of the Hustler
mock ad to its supporters was to help Falwell "defend himself against...
113. 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1730 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
114. Id. at 1736.
115. 796 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1986) (cited in Savage, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1733).
116. Id. at 1150.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1152. Presumptions of harm are as inappropriate in orthogonal use cases, such
as Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., as they are in truly transformative use
cases. See, e.g., N.fiez v. Caribbean Int'l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2000) (court did
not invoke the commercial harm presumption even though the copying was iterative, but
orthogonal to the photographer's intended market).
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derogatory personal attacks." 120 They had only used what was "reasonably
necessary to make an understandable comment" about the Hustler mock
ad.121 The Moral Majority was not selling copies of the Hustler parody, nor
were they using the mock ad in a manner that Hustler was likely to
license.' 2 2 Hence, there was no harm to the market of concern to copyright
law in this case.
D. Uses for News Reporting Purposes
News reporting is among the highly valued uses in First Amendment
law, 123 as well as among the six favored preambular uses. Although
putative fair users for news reporting purposes typically make productive
uses of others' works, news reporting cases warrant separate treatment from
other productive use cases for three reasons. First, there is often a strong
public interest in access to newsworthy information, and sometimes the first
author's expression is, in fact, the news. Second, licensing markets tend to
be more common among purveyors of news than in other productive use
settings, and this affects harm analysis in news reporting cases. Third,
publishers of news typically want to scoop other news entities' reporting on
the same story, which may affect the first publication interests of the news
utterer.
Although news reporting fair use defenses sometimes succeed, 124 they
have sometimes foundered when (1) the news entity systematically took
more than was necessary to cover the news; (2) the news entity's use
undermined the plaintiffs core licensing market; or (3) the news entity
engaged in wrongful conduct. 125 Studying the cases aids understanding as
120. Hustler, 796 F.2d at 1153.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1155-56.
123. See, e.g., N.Y. Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (news reporting about
study concerning Vietnam War policy protected by the First Amendment); Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (striking down statute that suppressed free speech rights of
newspapers).
124. See, e.g., N6ifiez v. Caribbean Int'l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2000) (fair use
to publish a photo of Miss Puerto Rico as part of coverage about whether the photo was
pornographic); Diamond v. Am-Law Publ'g Corp., 745 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1984) (fair use to
publish excerpts of a letter, even though the author had conditioned permission to publish on
publication of the whole letter); Nat'l Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. Buci Television, Inc.,
118 F. Supp. 2d 126 (D. Mass. 2000) (fair use to broadcast excerpts of a video in critical
commentary); Michaels v. Internet Entm't Group, Inc., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1891 (C.D.
Cal. 1998) (broadcast of excerpts from a video of a celebrity couple having intercourse held
fair use because of newsworthiness); Rotbart v. J. R. O'Dwyer Co., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1085 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (fair use to quote liberally from a presentation in an article criticizing
the presentation).
125. Defendants in two of the news-related cases raised First Amendment defenses on top
of their fair use defenses. In Harper & Row, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 559-
60 (1985), the Court cast doubt on whether the First Amendment could ever be asserted as a
defense to copyright claims if the use was deemed unfair as a matter of copyright law. See
also L.A. Times v. Free Republic, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1453, 1472-73 (C.D. Cal. 2000)
(rejecting a First Amendment defense to infringement for posting "biased" news articles on a
website and encouraging readers to offer critical comment on them).
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to why news-related fair use defenses are riskier than other free
speech/expression-related uses.
1. Systematically Taking Too Much
Wainwright Securities, Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp.]26 is typical
of the cases in which the systematic appropriation of arguably small quanta
of copyrighted research or news material has been ruled unfair. Wainwright
prepared in-depth analytical reports evaluating markets and firms in various
industries and made predictions about whether investments in those firms
would be sound. 127 Wall Street Transcript (WST), a weekly financial
newsletter, obtained copies of Wainwright reports and regularly quoted
from their penultimate paragraphs. 128 WST claimed this was fair use
because its purpose was news reporting, the reports were informational,
only small parts were taken, and WST believed Wainwright's clients would
still be willing to pay for the in-depth research that underlay its
conclusions.' 29 The Second Circuit found for Wainwright because the
newsletter was systematically taking qualitatively substantial portions of its
reports and because Wainwright asserted that its clients would be less
willing to pay for the reports if they could get the penultimate paragraphs
from the WST, dressed up as news. 130
Wainwright was influential in another systematic appropriation of news
case, Los Angeles Times, Inc. v. Free Republic.13 1 Free Republic operated
an online bulletin board established to allow its conservative Republican
members to illustrate and object to liberal bias of leading newspapers. 132
To show this bias, members posted the full text of news articles that had
recently appeared in the Los Angeles Times and Washington Post and
invited commentary about the bias. 133
126. 558 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1977). For related cases, see Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v.
Comline Business Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 1999) (commercial service held as an
infringer for multiple appropriations from Japanese news stories, from which the service
claimed to have only abstracted and copied facts, but which were substantially similar in
expression to the Japanese stories); Chicago School Reform Board of Trustees v. Substance,
Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 919 (N.D. I11. 2000) (not fair use for a newspaper to reproduce
substantial portions of standardized exam questions in articles questioning the test's
validity); Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 886 F. Supp. 1120
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (not fair use to republish Russian news articles in a U.S.-based newspaper);
Radji v. Khakbaz, 607 F. Supp. 1296 (D.D.C. 1985) (not fair use to serialize portions of a
former Iranian ambassador's book in a newspaper).




131. 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1453 (C.D. Cal. 2000). Free Republic appealed to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, but the parties settled while the case was pending on
appeal. See Arthur Bright, LA Times v. Free Republic, CITIZEN MEDIA LAW PROJECT, June
10, 2008, http://www.citmedialaw.org/threats/la-times-v-free-republic#description.
132. See Free Republic, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1455-56.
133. Id. at 1456.
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Free Republic's fair use argument initially seemed quite strong: its
purpose was to spur critical commentary; news is intrinsically factual and
there is a public interest in broad fair uses as to it; only particular articles,
not the whole of the newspapers, were copied, and these were selected
because of perceived bias. 134  It was, moreover, unlikely that the
newspapers would license such uses, and besides, these papers had already
posted the stories online for anyone to see without charge.135
Free Republic had, however, promoted the site as a place to read news
stories of current interest, 136 not just stories that demonstrated liberal bias.
Members frequently posted these articles with little or no commentary, and
hence, Free Republic's use was not or only minimally transformative. 137
The systematic nature of the postings of the whole texts of news articles
from other sites disfavored fair use. 138 Free Republic did not have to post
whole articles in order for its members to engage in critical commentary.' 39
Summaries, excerpts, and links to online versions of the articles on host
sites were alternative ways to achieve their objectives. 140 The Times and
the Post argued that Free Republic's postings were interfering with their
efforts to monetize online versions of their newspapers by advertising and
charging fees for access to stories no longer on the papers' sites, as well as
with licensing markets with other sites (Why would anyone pay for reposts
of the articles if he/she could follow Free Republic's example and get them
for free?). 14 1
2. Interfering with a Core Licensing Market
The Los Angeles News Service (LANS) won several infringement cases
against other news broadcasters because the unlicensed users had interfered
with its core licensing market. ' 42 LANS sued Reuters for making tapes of
134. Id. at 1459.
135. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment
Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 354, 357 (1999)
(criticizing the L.A. Times v. Free Republic decision).
136. Free Republic, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1461.
137. Id. at 1460.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1462-63.
140. The L.A. Times lawsuit was settled with Free Republic's agreement to link and
excerpt stories, rather than posting whole articles. See Stipulation for Entry of Amended
Final Judgment, Free Republic, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1453 (No. 98-7840), available at
http://www.citmedialaw.org/sites/citmedialaw.org/files/2002-06-1 I -Stipulation%20for%20
Entry%20oP/o20Amended%2OFinal%20Judgment%20Against%2OFree%20Republic.pdf.
141. Free Republic, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at'1464-66.
142. See L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int'l, Ltd., 149 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 1998);
L.A. News Serv. v. KCAL-TV Channel 9, 108 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 1997) (reversing grant of
summary judgment to defendants for unauthorized broadcast of videotapes of Reginald
Denny beating); L.A. News Serv. v. Tullo, 973 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1992) (television clipping
service did not make fair use of news); see also Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v.
Am. Broad. Cos., 621 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1980) (unfair to broadcast portions of a university's
video about an athlete in the sports program because such videos are typically licensed);
Fitzgerald v. CBS Broad., Inc., 491 F. Supp. 2d 177, 189 (D. Mass. 2007) ("CBS's use of the
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portions of its video footage of the beating of Reginald Denny during the
1992 race riots in Los Angeles. 14 3  Although the beating video was
unquestionably newsworthy and Reuters was transmitting it for purposes of
news reporting, the Ninth Circuit had very little sympathy for Reuters's fair
use defense, emphasizing instead Reuters's commercial purpose and the
nontransformative nature of Reuters's use of the tapes. 144 Although
Reuters showed only a small portion of the video, the part shown was
qualitatively substantial. 145 The court noted that Reuters and LANS were
both in the business of licensing audiovisual materials to reporting
organizations, and "[w]hen such an organization buys footage from Reuters,
it does not need to purchase it from LANS."'146 Hence, Reuters's fair use
defense failed.
Yet, LANS did not win every challenge to unauthorized broadcasts of the
Denny beating. Several years later, a court found fair use when Court TV
broadcast a few seconds of the Denny beating video in connection with its
news coverage of the trial of Denny's assailants. 147 Recognizing that
images of the Denny beating had been seared into the public's collective
memory of the L.A. riots, 148 the court perceived Court TV's use of images
from the tape to be more transformative than Reuters's use had been. Court
TV was more selective in what it broadcast, some images were part of a
montage, and the story was about the trial of those who beat Denny, not
about the beating itself.' 49 The court pointed out that LANS's argument
that the few seconds shown on Court TV were "the heart" of the video was
inconsistent with its previous stance that forty-five seconds of the nine-
minute video were the heart of the work. 150 The court doubted that Court
TV's use had harmed the market for or value of the LANS footage. 15 1
photographs is paradigmatic of the only market the photographs could reasonably have");
McClatchey v. Associated Press, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1190 (W.D. Pa. 2007) (unfair use
because AP distributed photo to firms most likely to be potential customers); New Boston
Television, Inc. v. Entm't Sports Programming Network, Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 755 (D.
Mass. 1981) (not fair use to excerpt highlights of sports programming and distribute them
via cable network).
143. Reuters, 149 F.3d at 990.
144. Id. at 993-94.
145. Id. at 994.
146. Id.
147. L.A. News Serv. v. CBS Broad., Inc., 305 F.3d 924 (9th Cir.), amended and
superseded on other grounds, L.A. News Serv. v. CBS Broad., Inc. 313 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir.
2002).
148. Id. at 929.
149. Id. at 938-40.
150. Id. at 940-42 (internal quotation marks omitted).
151. Id. at 942. "Court TV was not competing with LANS to show riot coverage, or even
breaking news of the same general type .... Moreover, this incident presented no apparent
effort to evade licensing outright." Id. By the time of this trial, the "hot news" nature of the
LANS' video-the period in which its commercial value would have been at its peak-had,
moreover, died down considerably. Id.
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An orthogonal news use of a photograph was ruled fair in Ntifiez v.
Caribbean International News Corp.152  Sixto Ntifez, a professional
photographer, had taken several pictures of a young woman for her
modeling portfolio.' 53 After she was named Miss Puerto Rico, some of
Ntfiez's photographs came to light and generated controversy because she
was undressed in them. 154 To cover the controversy about whether the
pictures were or were not pornographic, El Vocero published some of them,
and Nfifiez sued for copyright infringement. 155
El Vocero was, of course, a commercial enterprise, and in putting
Ntifez's photos on the front page, it was seeking to maximize revenues.
Although there is no newsworthiness exception to copyright
infringement, 156 "the pictures [in this case] were the story," and "[i]t would
have been much more difficult to explain the controversy without
reproducing the photographs." 157 The paper also conducted interviews
about the photographs and commented on the controversy, so it was not just
using the photos for sensational purposes. 158  Ntfiez had also shot the
photos for a purpose orthogonal to El Vocero's, and this difference in
purpose persuaded the court to consider the newspaper's use of the photos
as transformative. 159 Anything less than reproducing the whole photo
"would have made the picture useless to the story,"'160 and the court
concluded that news use of the photos was unlikely to harm Nftfiez's
market. 161 The photographer had, after all, taken the pictures with the
expectation that they would be given out for free, and low-resolution
reproductions in the newspaper were, moreover, unlikely to satisfy demand
for the original photographs, and might, in fact, stimulate it. 162
152. 235 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2000). For related cases, see National Ass'n of Government
Employees v. BUCI Television, Inc., 118 F. Supp. 2d 126 (D. Mass. 2000) (newspaper made
fair use of a portion of a television program in covering a controversy), and Michaels v.
Internet Entertainment Group, Inc., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1891 (C.D. Cal. 1998)
(broadcaster made fair use of clips from a video of a celebrity having sex in course of news
coverage about it).
153. Nz fez, 235 F.3d at 21.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 22. Courts have sometimes been reluctant to recognize a news reporting
exception to copyright claims because this might encourage newspapers to manufacture
news in order to justify what would otherwise be infringement, and because journalists and
news photographers have to be able to make a living, and a news exception from copyright
protection would undermine this goal. Id.
157. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 23. The pictures in the newspaper were iterative copies of the original. Nfiiez
v. Caribbean International News Corp. is better understood as an orthogonal use case, not as
a transformative use case.
160. Id. at24.
161. Id.




A news reporting purpose has sometimes been outweighed by "bad acts,"
such as obtaining wrongful access to a text and scooping its author's right
of first publication, as in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enterprises.163 In this case, an editor of a weekly news magazine, The
Nation, obtained unauthorized access to a prepublication copy of the
memoirs of Gerald Ford that Harper & Row was about to publish. 164 He
quickly read through the memoirs, found parts that discussed Ford's
decision to pardon Richard Nixon, selected 300 words to quote, and
paraphrased other passages in a 2250 word article for The Nation, which it
defended as fair use. 165
When the case came to the Supreme Court, the Justices all agreed that
The Nation's purpose was news reporting and that fair use was a doctrine
that mediated tensions between copyright and the First Amendment. 166 But
in almost every other respect, the majority and dissenting opinions
disagreed about The Nation's fair use defense.
The majority opinion emphasized the commercial nature of The Nation's
appropriation and elevated a dictum from an earlier case-that commercial
uses of copyrighted materials should be presumed unfair-to a seemingly
hard and fast (un)fair use rule. 167 It disparaged The Nation's intent to
"scoop" other news magazines by quoting from the memoirs before their
publication. 168 Further polluting the fair defense was that the editor had
"knowingly exploited a purloined manuscript."' 169  These subfactors
outweighed the news reporting purpose. The unpublished nature of the
memoirs also weighed heavily against fair use. 170  Although Victor
Navasky had quoted only 300 words from a 200,000 word manuscript, the
163. 471 U.S. 539 (1985). Harper & Row is not the only case that involved claims of
improper conduct by the defendant or unauthorized use of unpublished materials. See, e.g.,
Nat'l Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. BUCI Television, Inc., 118 F. Supp. 2d 126 (D. Mass.
2000) (defendant's conduct ultimately found fair); Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d
90 (2d Cir. 1987) (unauthorized use of unpublished materials ultimately found unfair).
164. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 543.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 561, 590 (news reporting purpose); id. at 559-60, 580-83 (discussing fair use
and exclusion of ideas and facts).
167. Id. at 562 (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
451 (1984)). The endorsement of this presumption set in motion an unfortunate trend in the
caselaw that culminated in the Campbell decision's repudiation of the presumption, at least
in cases in which the second comer's use was transformative. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 584-85 (1994).
168. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562. The majority also perceived The Nation to have
manufactured a news event rather than simply covering it.
169. Id. at 563.
170. Id. at 595 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Subsequent caselaw, took this second
presumption against fair use to heart. See e.g., Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90,
95 (2d Cir. 1987). Heeding concerns expressed by historians, biographers, and other authors
of nonfiction works, Congress was ultimately persuaded to amend 17 U.S.C. § 107 to
provide, "The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such
finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors."
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quotes were qualitatively substantial because The Nation published "the
most powerful passages" from the book.' 7' Time magazine's cancellation
of its plans to publish excerpts from the Ford memoirs was "clear-cut
evidence of actual damage."' 72 And if such uses became widespread, they
would have an adverse effect on the potential market for works such as
Ford's memoirs. 173
The dissenting opinion expressed grave concern about the impact of the
majority's ruling on "the broad dissemination of ideas and information
copyright is intended to nurture."1 74 The editor had not copied the structure
of the memoirs nor, with the exception of a few telling quotes, Ford's
literary style. 175 At most, the magazine had "paraphrased disparate isolated
sentences" 176 and quoted some statements made by others or in government
documents in which Ford could claim no copyright. 177 Most of the article
reported previously unpublished facts in which Ford also had no copyright
interest.' 78
The dissent pointed out that § 107 specifically mentions news reporting
as a paradigmatic fair use. 179 The Nation had not plagiarized the memoirs
nor tried to disguise plagiarism as news, but had rather made a productive
use of the memoirs in preparing the article about them.180 The dissent
thought it was a mistake to weigh The Nation's commercial purpose so
heavily, given that virtually all news reporting is done for profit, 181 and
objected to the majority's characterization of The Nation as a thief, for "the
most that can be said is that The Nation made use of the contents of the
manuscript knowing the copyright owner would not sanction the use." 182
Journalists constantly try to scoop one another, 183 so this intent was not
malignant.
Taking 300 words from a 200,000 word manuscript was, moreover, a
quantitatively small appropriation, especially given that "the quotes are
drawn from isolated passages in disparate sections of the work."' 84
Qualitatively, Navasky's quoting was also modest, as "[m]uch of the quoted
material was Mr. Ford's matter-of-fact representation of the words of others
171. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 565.
172. Id. at 567.
173. Id. at 568 (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc, 464 U.S. 417,
451 (1984)).
174. Id. at 579 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also id. at 605 (pointing to risk that the
Court's ruling would stifle "robust debate of public issues that is the 'essence of self-
government' (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964))).
175. Id. at 584-87.
176. Id. at 586.
177. Id. at 585 n.9.
178. Id. at 583.
179. Id. at 591.
180. Id. at 591 &n.15, 592.
181. Id. at 592.
182. Id. at 593.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 598.
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in conversations with him; such quotations are 'arguably necessary
adequately to convey the facts." ' 8 5 Only six of the quotes were "rich in
expressive content," but quoting these sentences was not excessive or
inappropriate, given the news reporting purpose. 186
The dissenters gave little weight to Time's cancellation of the contract to
publish excerpts, pointing to the Second Circuit's conclusion that Time had
cancelled the deal for another reason.' 87 They were also skeptical of the
majority's prediction that ruling in The Nation's favor would be harmful to
Ford and his publisher or would set a precedent that would undermine the
ability of copyright owners to benefit from popular interest in a public
figure's works.' 88
Subsequent developments suggest that the Court in Harper & Row may
have overreacted to The Nation's misdeeds. In Campbell, for instance, the
Court repudiated Harper & Row's general endorsement of a presumption of
harm as to commercial uses. 189 Congress also repudiated the Harper &
Row presumption of unfairness for use of unpublished works. 190
Subsequent decisions have also taken a more sympathetic view toward First
Amendment concerns in news reporting fair use cases than Harper & Row
did. 191 Yet, this decision continues to cast a pall over efforts to raise First
Amendment concerns in news-related fair use cases. 
192
E. Weighing Factors in the Free Speech/Expression Fair Use Cases
In the free speech/expression cases, fair use should not be disfavored
when the defendant is a commercial actor, as the overwhelming majority of
fair use cases in which free speech and expression values were apparent
have involved commercial defendants. Commercial actors are as entitled as
noncommercial actors to engage in free speech and expression.
Although some fair use cases mention the First Amendment, free speech
and expression values, and the public interest in airing divergent points of
185. Id. (quoting from the majority opinion).
186. Id. at 598-600. "Had these quotations been used in the context of a critical book
review of the Ford work, there is little question that such a use would be fair . I.." d. at 601.
187. Id. at 602-03 (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d
195, 208 (2d Cir. 1983)).
188. Id. at 602-04; see also id. at 597 n.21. The Nation's receipts from newsstand sales
of the issue in question were $418. Harper & Row, 723 F.2d at 198. Time's readership was
unlikely to have been unwilling to buy the issue in which the Gerald Ford excerpts appeared
simply because The Nation had published its article on the book. People who buy Time or
subscribe to it do not typically read the left-wing Nation magazine (and vice versa); Time
was, in fact, willing to publish the excerpts even after The Nation published its article,
although Time wanted to push up the publication date. Id. at 199.
189. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
190. In 1992, Congress amended § 107 of the Copyright Act to make clear that "[t]he fact
that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made
upon consideration of all the above factors." See Pub. L. No. 102-492, 106 Stat. 3145 (1992)
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006)); see also supra note 170.
191. See supra notes 55, 124.
192. The most obvious example is Los Angeles Times v. Free Republic, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1453, 1472-73 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
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view, 193 courts in future cases should be bolder and more explicit in their
willingness to consider these concerns in weighing fair use claims within
this cluster. Courts should also be on the lookout for assertions of
copyright that are motivated by a desire to censor points of view with which
the rights holder disagrees or to achieve noncopyright goals such as
protecting the rights holder's privacy or reputation. 194  Courts should
further pay attention to whether a ruling in a copyright owner's favor will
have a chilling effect on free speech and free expression activities by other
authors, speakers, and publishers. 195  Courts should also recognize the
freedom of expression interests of those who artistically recast iconic
figures, as in the Mattel cases. 196 Such transformative uses shed new light
on existing works and allow culture to evolve.
While it is often necessary to copy a prior work's expression to parody it,
parody is not the only kind of transformative or productive use as to which
reproducing qualitatively significant parts may be necessary to engage in
criticism, commentary, or news reporting. Sometimes a second comer
needs to reuse parts of earlier works to prove a point to an audience, as in
Hustler,197 to offer a different perspective on the earlier work, as in
Suntrust,198 or to demonstrate that a work's author is unworthy of respect,
as in New Era. 199
Courts should give greater weight to the public's interest in access to the
information the defendant's use would make available. Harper & Row cast
some doubt on how much weight should be given to the public interest in
fair use cases, 200 but that decision should not be understood as saying that
the public interest in access to the defendant's work is irrelevant, but only
193. See, e.g., Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1263-65 (11 th Cir.
2001).
194. See, e.g., id. at 1282-83 (trustee's interests in avoiding the depiction of
miscegenation and homosexuality in subsequent works not a reason to deny fair use);
Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 116 n.7 (2d Cir. 1998) (reputational
interests of a photographer as to her celebrity clients not cognizable as copyright harms);
Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 309, 311-12 (2d Cir. 1966)
(Howard Hughes's interests in maintaining privacy not a sound reason to deny fair use for
borrowing by a biographer).
195. See, e.g., Liu, supra note 20, at 435-38 (pointing out that courts in defamation cases
take this factor into account when assessing liability for speech acts).
196. See Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 806 (9th Cir. 2003);
Mattel, Inc. v. Pitt, 229 F. Supp. 2d 315 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
197. See supra notes 117-22 and accompanying text.
198. Suntrust, 268 F.3d at 1265.
199. New Era Publ'ns Int'l v. Carol Publ'g Group, 904 F.2d 152, 154 (2d Cir. 1990).
200. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985) ("It
is fundamentally at odds with the scheme of copyright to accord lesser rights in those works
that are of greatest importance to the public. . . . [T]o propose that fair use be imposed
whenever the social value [of dissemination] . . . outweighs any detriment to the artist[]
would be to propose depriving copyright owners of their right in the property precisely when
they encounter those users who could afford to pay for it." (second, third, and fourth
alterations in original) (quoting Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural
and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1600,
1615 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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that it should not override all other considerations, as the Court's later
Campbell decision makes clear.20 1 Particularly in cases involving free
speech and free expression values, courts can and should give more
consideration to the public interest in access to the defendants'
expression .202
Consistent with First Amendment values, courts should also heed market
failure-based arguments that licensing markets are unlikely to develop to
authorize critical commentary or unwelcome transformations. 20 3 Courts
should consider whether a copyright owner's unreasonable withholding of a
license for critical commentary or news purposes or its insistence on
unreasonable terms might, in conjunction with other factors, weigh in favor
of fair use. Effective critical commentary may have a debilitating effect on
the market for the criticized work, but this is not the kind of market harm
that courts should consider as disfavoring fair use. Yet, when critical
commentary or news reporting stimulates demand for the original, courts
should consider this as favoring fair use. Campbell rightly recognized that
a putative fair user's request for a license may be motivated by a desire to
avoid litigation, rather than being a concession that the use should have
been licensed. 204
Because fair use is the main mechanism in copyright law for balancing
free speech/expression interests of second comers and the public against the
commercial interests of authors and commercial exploiters, 20 5 it would be
consistent with the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence for courts to
require plaintiffs to show actual harm to their markets or at least a
meaningful likelihood of harm if the defendants were permitted to make
specific uses when free speech/expression interests are clearly present. 20 6
Although Harper & Row has had a greater dampening effect on fair use
defenses in news-related cases than is desirable,207 courts should continue
201. However, Campbell endorsed considering the public interest in access to the
defendant's work as a factor that should be considered in fair use cases. See Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 n.10 (1994) (quoting Leval, supra note 12, at
1132). Other fair use decisions have done so. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
202. The public interest should not, of course, override all other considerations. Public
interest defenses were unsuccessfully raised in some cases involving test materials. See, e.g.,
Chi. Sch. Reform Bd. of Trs. v. Substance, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 919 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (not fair
use to publish a school board's tests to generate debate over the tests' validity); Coll.
Entrance Examination Bd. v. Pataki, 889 F. Supp. 554 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (not fair use for state
to mandate that standardized tests be made publicly available).
203. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592 ("[T]he unlikelihood that creators of imaginative works
will license critical reviews or lampoons of their own productions removes such uses from
the very notion of a potential licensing market.").
204. Id. at 585 n.18; see also Gibson, supra note 19, at 890-901.
205. The idea/expression distinction is, of course, another copyright doctrine that
mediates tensions between the First Amendment and copyright values. See, e.g., Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003). However, authors rarely claim that the copying of ideas
or information constitutes infringement; in practice, fair use is the most important
mechanism in U.S. copyright law for balancing First Amendment and copyright interests.
206. See, e.g., Liu, supra note 20, at 448.
207. See supra notes 167-70 and accompanying text.
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to consider whether systematic appropriations of key parts of others'
publications pose risks of market-destructive consequences, as in
Wainwright;20 8 whether a defendant's uses are interfering with core
licensing markets for the plaintiffs' works, as in some of the L.A. News
cases;20 9 and whether wrongful acts have allowed an unfair "scooping" of
the author's first publication, as in Harper & Row.210 Without protection
against these kinds of uses, there may well be too little incentive to invest in
creation of newsworthy content.
Even if a free speech/expression use is ultimately deemed infringing,
perhaps the defendants should only have to pay actual damages (e.g., a
reasonable license fee), 2'1 rather than being subject to a large award of
statutory damages. 212 This option would be more consistent with First
Amendment-tailored rules in other bodies of law that regulate speech.213
II. AUTHORSHIP-PROMOTING FAIR USES
Some overlap inevitably exists between putative fair uses that implicate
free speech/expression values and uses that this part regards as authorship-
promoting. 214 Free speech/expression values are most obvious in fair use
cases involving parodies and other critical commentary; this is in part
because rights holders may be asserting copyright to suppress the critique.
Free speech and free expression values are also implicated when later
authors reuse parts of existing works in a neutral way or to praise them. It
should not, however, be necessary to justify every authorial use of earlier
authors' works as First Amendment-protected before the use can be
adjudged fair.215 The First Amendment is not the only, and perhaps not
208. See supra notes 126-30 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 142-51 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 163-88 and accompanying text.
211. Campbell endorsed the idea of awarding compensatory damages in lieu of injunctive
relief in close, but ultimately unsuccessful, fair use cases. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 n.10 (1994).
212. See generally 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §§
14.01-.04 (2008) (comparing remedies including actual damages, disgorgement of
defendant's profits, and statutory damages).
213. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh & Brett McDonnell, Freedom of Speech and Independent
Judgment Review in Copyright Cases, 107 YALE L.J. 2431 (1998) (discussing the relevance
of First Amendment procedural rules for copyright).
214. Nor do I mean to suggest that all fair use cases must fall within only one of the
categories I have identified. A second author may have made free expression uses of some
parts of another author's work and productive uses of other parts. It will also sometimes be
unclear whether a use is for free expression purposes or just a productive use; the fact that
lines are sometimes difficult to draw does not mean one should not try to draw them,
especially when, in many cases, this distinction will be relatively straightforward.
215. Other constitutional values may arise in some fair use cases. Iterative copies that
authors make for private study purposes, for example, may implicate privacy rights. While it
may be a stretch to say that private study copies are within the penumbra of constitutional
privacy rights, privacy values may nonetheless be significant in some authorial fair use
cases. See, e.g., Cohen, Place of User, supra note 88, at 349-50.
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even the most significant, constitutional provision that underlies fair use in
copyright law.
Fair use promotes the constitutional purposes of copyright by allowing
second authors to make productive uses of earlier works, drawing upon
expression from them in a way that advances the "progress of Science and
useful Arts. ' 216 Fair use "'permits ... courts to avoid rigid application of
the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity
which that law is designed to foster."'' 217 Society benefits when scholars
and other authors make fair uses, for, if "the scholar forgoes the use of a
prior work, not only does his own work suffer, but the public is deprived of
his contribution to knowledge. The scholar's work, in other words,
produces external benefits from which everyone profits. ' 218 It is thus
unsurprising that five of the six favored uses in § 107-criticism, comment,
news reporting, scholarship, and research--directly promote the ongoing
progress of authorship and knowledge creation. 219
This part discusses several types of uses that authors routinely make of
copyrighted works that may qualify as fair. Part II.A discusses cases that
analyze whether a second author's productive use of another author's works
is fair. The overwhelming majority of the productive use cases turn on
whether the subsequent author took too much from a first author's work or
invaded a core licensing market. Part II.B discusses other types of uses that
authors frequently make, and need to make, of preexisting works. 220
Among the many reasonable and customary fair uses of copyrighted works
regularly undertaken by authors are taking detailed notes on an earlier
author's work to analyze it, taking photographs of sculptures on which an
author will be writing a commentary, and maintaining a portfolio of one's
own work to show to new clients.
216. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422
U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (noting that the goal of copyright is to "promot[e] broad public
availability of literature, music, and the other arts"). Copyright's goal overlaps with and
complements the First Amendment's goal of fostering "the widest possible dissemination of
information from diverse and antagonistic sources." See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 266 (1964) (quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)).
217. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (quoting Stewart v.
Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990)). It is well-recognized that "in literature, in science and in
art, there are, and can be, few, if any, things, which, in an abstract sense, are strictly new and
original throughout. Every book in literature, science and art, borrows, and must necessarily
borrow, and use much which was well known and used before." Emerson v. Davies, 8 F.
Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4436).
218. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 477-78 (1984)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Harry Blackmun thought that without this social benefit,
fair use should not apply. Id.
219. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006); see also supra note 1.
220. For example, 17 U.S.C. § 107 refers to research and classroom teaching as other
purposes for which fair use may be available; such uses are likely to involve iterative
copying. In other countries, private study and research copying is dealt with through
personal use or fair dealing exceptions to copyright. See LATMAN, supra note 27, at 25
(discussing fair dealing and personal use exceptions in foreign countries).
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Agents of authors may also need to rely on fair use as a shelter for
authorship-promoting activities, such as when a research assistant makes
photocopies of pages from a book for a scholar's research, a dean
authorizes copying of a scholar's articles in support of a promotion case, or
a gallery selling the author's work makes an illustrated brochure. Iterative
copies such as these may not always be fair use-but often they will and
should be, because they promote authorship, other interests of authors,
and/or the ongoing advance of knowledge.
A. Productive Uses
Authors make many types of productive uses of other authors' works.
Productive users typically use copyrighted materials to engage in social,
political, or cultural commentary, to illustrate an argument or prove a point,
to provide historical context, to prepare reference works, and/or as
incidental byproducts of capturing some media content in the process of
filming something else. 221 Productive uses of copyrighted materials may
also include memorializing, preserving, or rescuing an experience, event, or
cultural phenomenon. 222 As long as productive users are careful about how
much they take from copyrighted works in relation to their purpose,
productive uses are likely to be fair.223 Of the productive use cases in
which the uses have been deemed unfair, virtually all involved taking more
than was justifiable in light of the purpose or supplanting a market that the
first author was entitled to control. 224
221. CTR. FOR SOC. MEDIA, supra note 16.
222. CTR. FOR SOC. MEDIA, supra note 101, at 7-9. Noncommercial posting of content
may also be important to launch discussion about it. Id.
223. See, e.g., Norse v. Henry Holt & Co., 991 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1993), remanded to 847
F. Supp. 142 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (fair use to quote from letters in a biography); Wright v.
Warner Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1991) (biographer made fair use of a deceased
author's writings); Narell v. Freeman, 872 F.2d 907 (9th Cir. 1989) (fair use to quote and
paraphrase some portions of a historical work on Jews in San Francisco in a novel); Kramer
v. Thomas, No. CV 05-8381 AG, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96714 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2006)
(use of part of video footage in a DVD on how to raise money for film projects held fair
use); Williamson v. Pearson Educ. Inc., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1723 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (fair
use to quote and paraphrase text from a General George S. Patton, Jr. biography in a
corporate leadership book); Penelope v. Brown, 792 F. Supp. 132 (D. Mass. 1992) (fair use
to quote and paraphrase scholarly work on syntax and diction in author's nonfiction work on
writing); Rokeach v. Avco Embassy Pictures Corp., 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 155 (S.D.N.Y.
1978) (movie made fair use of quotes from a research report on delusional statements made
at a mental hospital).
224. See, e.g., Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Passport Video, 349 F.3d 622, 629 (9th Cir.
2003) (excessive use of entertainment video footage in a documentary); Rogers v. Koons,
960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992) (sculpture based on a photograph); Warner Bros. Entm't Inc. v.
RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (excessive quoting and paraphrasing in a
reference work); Byrne v. British Broad. Corp., 132 F. Supp. 2d 229 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (fifty-
second use of a song in unrelated news story); Psihoyos v. Nat'l Exam'r, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1766 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (photo in magazine); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v.
Showcase Atlanta Coop. Prods., Inc., 479 F. Supp. 351 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (stage version of a
parody/satire of Gone with the Wind).
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1. Uses in Social or Cultural Commentary
Documentary filmmakers often engage in social or cultural commentary,
and, in so doing, they may "quote" from earlier works, whether they be
texts, music, photographs, or video. The more substantial the use and the
more prominently the prior work's expression is featured, the less likely a
use is to be fair, but reusing short sequences can sometimes be a very
important contribution to the work's message. In Lennon v. Premise Media
Corp.,225 for example, a documentarian used fifteen seconds of John
Lennon's song "Imagine" in a film about the theory of intelligent design as
an alternative to the Darwinian conception of evolution. The film is critical
of scientists for having closed minds about-indeed, attempting to suppress
serious discussion about-intelligent design as an explanation of the origin
of life and the world in which it flourishes.226 Ten words from the Lennon
song-"Nothing to kill or die for / And no religion too"-were used in the
film in conjunction with interviews of speakers who expressed negative
views about religion and expressed hope that science will diminish the role
of religion in society.2 27 Lennon's widow sued the filmmaker for copyright
infringement. 228 The court ruled the filmmaker's use of Lennon's song was
fair because Premise was using part of an earlier work as fodder for social
commentary, the use was reasonable in light of the filmmaker's purpose, 229
and the court was unconvinced the use would harm the market for more
traditional licensing of the song.230
2. Uses to Support an Argument or Prove a Point
Authors sometimes need to use expression from earlier works to support
an argument or prove a point. In such cases, the earlier expression becomes
a "fact" that must be conjured up as evidence. 231 A classic instance is Time,
Inc. v. Bernard Geis Associates.232 Bernard Geis published a book by
Josiah Thompson, Six Seconds in Dallas, that sought to prove Thompson's
theory that Lee Harvey Oswald was not the lone gunman responsible for
assassinating President John F. Kennedy.2 33 After Time refused to license
twenty frames from the Zapruder film for the book, Thompson and Geis
225. 556 F. Supp. 2d 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
226. Id. at317-18.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 316.
229. Id. at 326-27.
230. Id. at 327.
231. See Arica Inst., Inc. v. Palmer, 761 F. Supp. 1056 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), affd, 970 F.2d
1067 (2d Cir. 1992) (fair use for psychology professor to reproduce the nine-pointed star
surrounded by a circle that Arica's founder had used to depict ego fixations of humans and
how to cure them).
232. 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
233. Id. at 131-32.
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arranged for sketches of the frames to be published in the book in order to
prove Thompson's theory. 234
The court concluded that the defendants had made fair use of the frames,
in part because "[t]here is a public interest in having the fullest information
available on the murder of President Kennedy." 235  It agreed with
Thompson that the sketches made his theory about the assassination easier
to understand.236 People would buy Thompson's book to learn about his
theory of the assassination, not to see sketches of the Zapruder frames. 237
Time's refusal to license use of the frames on any terms cut in favor of fair
use, especially after Time refused Geis's offer to surrender all profits from
the book to pay for its use of the photos.238
3. Uses to Ground One's Commentary
Some uses of prior works are necessary to enable the reader or viewer to
have a fuller understanding of the phenomenon on which a second author
wants to comment. An example is Haberman v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,239
which involved the reproduction of two works of art in connection with a
commentary on them. James Haberman, a professional artist and
photographer, made and sold copies of these works as photographic works
of art and as postcards.240 Hustler published small-sized images of them
along with a short positive comment on them. 241 The court's fair use
analysis took into account that the "works in question are graphic and
unusual... [and] could not be adequately described by words."242 Also
234. Id. at 135, 137-38. A factor that cut against Josiah Thompson's fair use defense is
that he had obtained copies of the Zapruder frames while working at Life magazine, knowing
that making copies of the frames was contrary to his employment agreement. See id. at 135-
36. Yet several Life editors knew of this copying and did not object. Id.
235. Id. at 146. While the court did not invoke the First Amendment in its analysis of the
fair use defense, some commentators have viewed Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Associates as
an example of fair use being used to vindicate First Amendment interests. See, e.g., Robert
C. Denicola, Copyright and Free Speech: Constitutional Limitations on the Protection of
Expression, 67 CAL. L. REV. 283, 300-01 (1979) ("It is hard to imagine a more compelling
case for requiring free access to a copyrighted work. A President had been murdered. The
official report on his death [had been met] with a rising tide of skepticism and suspicion. To
have a meaningful public debate, it seemed crucial to test and illustrate opposing theories
against the actual visual record of the events.").
236. See Geis, 293 F. Supp. at 146.
237. Id.
238. Id. Time's refusal to license also undercut its harm to the market argument, as there
was no market for these frames. See id.
239. 626 F. Supp. 201 (D. Mass. 1986). James Haberman also sued Hustler for
defamation and invasion of privacy because he did not want his works to appear in Hustler
and thought the unauthorized appearance of his works there would harm his reputation.
These concerns also permeated his copyright claim, for the court went on at some length
about why it should not take into account the merits or quality of Hustler magazine. Id. at
208-10.
240. Id. at 204-05; see also id. at 217-18 (reproducing the works as exhibits to the
decision).
241. Id. at 205-06.
242. Id. at 212.
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significant was that Hustler had attributed Haberman as the author and even
provided his address for readers who might want to purchase copies of his
works, 243 and indeed sales of the two works in question had risen
substantially after Hustler's publication of the images. 244 The court ruled
that Hustler's use had been fair.
4. Uses to Set Historical Context
Authors of nonfiction works may also use copyrighted materials as a way
to set historical context. In Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley
Ltd.,245 for instance, a book about the Grateful Dead featured a
chronological time line with "a collage of images, text, and graphic art
designed to simultaneously capture the eye and inform the reader. ' '246 It
included seven small-scale images of Grateful Dead concert posters in
which the Bill Graham Archives owned copyrights. 247 Dorling Kindersley
initially sought to license rights to the images, but because it thought the
Archives was asking an unreasonable price, Dorling Kindersley reproduced
the images without permission. 248  The Archives then sued Dorling
Kindersley for infringement, and Dorling Kindersley asserted fair use.249
The Second Circuit noted that biographical works and cultural histories,
such as this one, were types of works that typically "require incorporation
of original source material for optimum treatment of their subjects. '250
Dorling Kindersley used the images "as historical artifacts to document and
represent the actual occurrence of Grateful Dead concert events featured on
Illustrated Trip's timeline." 251 This was transformative because it was
"plainly different" from the original purpose for which the posters were
created. 252 Dorling Kindersley also melded the images into a collage with
commentary that enhanced the reader's understanding of the Grateful Dead
chronology. 253 Illustrated Trip did not need to discuss the artistic merits of
the posters to make its use productive. 254
The Archives argued that other factors disfavored fair use because the
posters were creatively expressive, seven entire works had been exactly
copied, and it had lost licensing revenues.255 The Second Circuit disagreed.
The artistic character of the posters did weigh against fair use, but the court
243. Id. at 211.
244. Id. at 212-13. The court was not persuaded that Hustler's use had interfered with
any licensing market either. Id.
245. 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006).




250. Id. at 609.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 609-10.
254. Id. at611.
255. Id. at 612-14.
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gave this less weight because Dorling Kindersley wasn't trying to exploit
the poster images as artistic works, but rather to illustrate historical
context. 25 6 The reduced size of the images neutralized the amount copied
factor because "the visual impact of their artistic expression is significantly
limited" by the reduced size; moreover, displaying small images was
necessary to achieve the cultural history objectives of the Illustrated
Trip.257 Dorling Kindersley's use of the posters had no effect on the
Archives' primary market, i.e., selling originals and copies of the posters. 258
The potential for harm to derivative markets had, of course, to be
considered, but the Second Circuit emphasized that this principle should be
applied cautiously. 259 Otherwise, every use that a plaintiff might want to
license would establish harm to a market and fair use would be impossible
to prove. Copyright owners cannot, the court concluded, preempt markets
for productive uses of their works, such as Dorling Kindersley's use of the
posters as part of its cultural history of this famous band.260
Documentary filmmakers have often made similar fair uses of preexisting
materials to set historical context or illustrate a phenomenon on which their
films are focused. 261 However, some fair use defenses have faltered when
the filmmakers made too extensive use of earlier materials. 262
5. Reference Works
Steven Vander Ark is a serious fan of Harry Potter books, so much so
that he has devoted hundreds of hours to compiling an online information
resource that he calls the Harry Potter Lexicon. J. K. Rowling, author of
the Harry Potter books, has given Vander Ark an award for the Lexicon and
admitted that she herself has used his lexicon to remind herself of some
details from previous novels. When Vander Ark contracted with RDR
Books to publish a print version of a substantial portion of this online
resource, Rowling sued RDR and him for copyright infringement, and they
asserted fair use as a defense.263
The trial court accepted that the Lexicon was a reference work that
included entries for many types of information in the Harry Potter books,
such as kinds of spells cast, magical devices, different types of creatures,
256. Id. at 612-13.
257. Id. at 613.
258. Id. at 614.
259. Seeid. at 614-15.
260. Id.
261. See, e.g., Hofheinz v. Discovery Commc'ns, Inc., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1845
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (fair use to use excerpt from a horror film in a documentary about how such
films depicted aliens); Hofheinz v. A & E Television Networks, 146 F. Supp. 2d 442
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (fair use to include a short clip of a movie in a TV biography of a film star);
Hofheinz v. AMC Prods., Inc., 147 F. Supp. 2d 127 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (fair use to show clips
of horror films in documentary about filmmaker and his studio).
262. See, e.g., Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Passport Video, 349 F.3d 622 (9th Cir. 2003)
(reuse of video clips of Elvis were too extensive to qualify for fair use).
263. See Warner Bros. Entm't v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
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biographical details about characters, games played in the books, and the
like.264 "Each entry... gathers and synthesizes pieces of information
relating to its subject that appear scattered across the Harry Potter novels,"
including "descriptions of the subject's attributes, role in the story,
relationship to other characters or things, and events involving the
subject. '265  For many entries, Vander Ark provided citations to the
relevant passages in the Harry Potter books. The court was persuaded that
Vander Ark's use of fictional facts from the books was transformative in
that it served "the practical purpose of making information about the
intricate world of Harry Potter readily accessible to readers in a reference
guide." 266
The main problem with Vander Ark's fair use defense was that the
Lexicon had extensively quoted from or closely paraphrased expressive
phrasings from the Harry Potter books and copied even more heavily from
licensed companion books.267 Although the court recognized that "[t]o
fulfill its purpose as a reference guide to the Harry Potter works, it is
reasonably necessary for the Lexicon to make considerable use of the
original works," 268 it ruled that the Lexicon had copied more than was
reasonable, especially from the companion books. Because of their
different purposes, the Lexicon would not supplant demand for the Harry
Potter books. Publication of the Lexicon seemed likely, however, to harm
the market for the companion books in view of the Lexicon's wholesale
appropriation from them.269 The court did not accept Rowling's assertion
that she was entitled to control the market for reference works on Harry
Potter books.270
After Vander Ark removed some verbatim copying from the text of his
lexicon and RDR withdrew its appeal to the Second Circuit, RDR
announced its intent to publish a new version of the Lexicon that Rowling
and Warner Brothers regard as acceptable. 271 Reference works such as the
Lexicon improve public access to knowledge about the works they reference
and thereby promote the progress of science, even when an author of the
referenced works objects.
6. Incidental Uses
Photographers, filmmakers, and videographers sometimes incidentally
capture copyrighted material in the course of preparing a new work. A
264. Id. at 540-44.
265. Id. at 525.
266. Id. at 541.
267. Id. at 546-48.
268. Id. at 546.
269. Id. at 550. The court also speculated that the Lexicon's publication of songs and
poems in the Harry Potter books might harm a derivative market for licensing publication of
those works, even though there was no supporting testimony as to this market. Id. at 551.
270. Id. at 550.
271. See Posting of Anthony Falzone to The Center for Internet and Society,
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/node/5960 (Dec. 6, 2008, 11:49 AM).
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magazine might, for example, publish a photograph of someone's home that
displays in the background a poster or stuffed animal.272  A news
cameraman might film a local festival for the evening news and incidentally
capture part of a performance of a song.273 A young mother might make a
videotape to show her young child dancing and might post it on YouTube
so that remotely located members of her family can see the video. 274
Incidental uses may sometimes be de minimis uses for which fair use
analysis should be unnecessary, 275 but some incidental uses are suitable for
fair use analysis. Yet, the more central to the second work's message or the
more extensive the exposure of the copyrighted work in the second work,
the less likely the use is to be fair.276
B. Other Customary Authorial Uses
Many customary uses of previous works that authors routinely make
involve iterative copying, especially those connected to the preparation for,
and execution of, projects that will eventually result in productive uses of
parts of others' works. Many authors may take extensive notes, either by
direct quotation or close paraphrases, from earlier authors' works, 277
photocopy articles or pages of books written by others on the same
subject, 278 scan photographs to manipulate them, sketch the work of artists
272. See, e.g., Pro Arts, Inc. v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., Nos. 85-3022, 85-3041, 1986 U.S.
App. LEXIS 19428, at *1 (6th Cir. Mar. 25, 1986) (incidental use of poster in a photo
advertisement); Gordon v. Nextel Commc'ns, Inc., No. 00-73201, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
25048 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 13, 2001) (incidental use of a drawing of a dental procedure in an
ad for telecomm services); Higgins v. Detroit Educ. Television Found., 4 F. Supp. 2d 701
(E.D. Mich. 1998) (incidental use of a song in an educational program); Jackson v. Warner
Bros., Inc., 993 F. Supp. 585 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (incidental use of lithographs in a movie);
Sandoval v. New Line Cinema Corp., 973 F. Supp. 409 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), affd, 147 F.3d 215
(2d Cir. 1998) (fleeting use of photos in a movie); Amsinck v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 862
F. Supp. 1044 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (incidental teddy bear in a film).
273. See, e.g., Italian Book Corp. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 458 F. Supp. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
274. See, e.g., Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
Materials about this case are available at Electronic Frontier Foundation, Lenz v. Universal,
http://www.eff.org/cases/lenz-v-universal (last visited Mar. 24, 2009).
275. See, e.g., Sandoval, 147 F.3d 215 (background use of photos in film was de minimis
use); see also Andrew Inesi, A Theory of De Minimis and a Proposal for Its Application in
Copyright, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 945 (2006).
276. See, e.g., Ringgold v. Black Entm't Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 1997)
(unfair to prominently feature poster of a quilt nine times during a television program).
277. Preparatory quoting or paraphrasing in the note-taking and other early stages of the
creation process is likely to be much more extensive than quoting or paraphrasing in the final
product, as the second author ingests the first author's work and develops ideas for what
quotes should be put in final product. This kind of quoting has long been considered fair
use. See, e.g., Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1353 (Ct. Cl. 1973),
aff'd by an equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975).
278. See id. at 1353-54 (fair use for governmental libraries to photocopy medical journal
articles for research purposes); see also Duffy v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 4 F. Supp. 2d
268, 274-75 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (fair use for the author of a book to have photocopied pages
from a book by a previous author as she was preparing a similar work). But see Am.
Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994) (unfair use for a commercial
firm's research scientists to photocopy technical articles for archival purposes). Williams &
2576 [Vol. 77
UNBUNDLING FAIR USES
whose work inspires them, take clips from movies to study a
cinematographer's manner of filming certain types of landscapes, record
their own or others' performance of another author's song in order to
understand it better, draw an architect's buildings to write an analysis of his
style, photograph paintings to study an artist's techniques, or scan a large
number of items on a particular subject to decide which of them should later
be used to illustrate a point,279 just to name a few.
If uses of these sorts are deemed unfair, fewer works of authorship will
be created, and those that are would be less engaged and engaging because
of the isolation that an overly strict copyright regime would impose.
Hardest hit would be individual authors working in noninstitutional
settings, for they would be unable to efficiently negotiate licenses with
other authors and publishers to allow them to undertake ordinary acts of
copying that are as essential to the life of authorship as breathing air is to all
humans.
Even authors who have assigned copyrights in their works to others to
enable commercial exploitations should be able to make some fair uses of
their own works in pursuit of their professional and artistic futures. They
should, for example, be able to make copies of their own work to build their
portfolios, 280 to show their portfolios to prospective clients or others to
demonstrate their creative output,281 to provide copies of their work to
others in connection with grant applications or assessments of the merits of
their work,282 and the like. Author-assignors should not, of course, be
entitled to recreate and resell to others new instances of the work whose
copyright they assigned or close approximations of it.
28 3
There is very little caselaw on the copyright implications of making these
kinds of iterative uses of other authors' works. Any society committed to
promoting an abundance of authors and works of authorship must provide
breathing room for iterative copying that is a necessary part of authorial
work. 284
Wilkins Co. v. United States and American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc. are discussed
infra Part III.
279. See, e.g., Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 247-48 (2d Cir. 2006) (Koons digitally
scanned many photographs of women's legs for artistic project).
280. See, e.g., Fleming v. Miles, 181 F. Supp. 2d 1143, 1152-53 (D. Or. 2001) (fair use
for artist to make copies of her work for her portfolio and to show the portfolio to
prospective clients).
281. Id.
282. Id. at 1153 (entry of a work in a design contest was fair use).
283. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Self-Plagiarism or Fair Use?, COMM. ASS'N FOR
COMPUTING MACHINERY, Aug. 1994, at 21 (discussing caselaw and principles).
284. I strongly agree with Rebecca Tushnet that iterative copying can and often does
serve First Amendment as well as copyright values and that the caselaw that emphasizes
"transformativeness" undervalues the expressive significance of some iterative copies. See
Tushnet, supra note 40, at 558-67.
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C. Weighing Factors in Authorial Fair Use Cases
In the authorial fair use cases, courts have generally weighed the
statutory fair use factors in a careful manner. They have generally given
relatively little weight to the commercial purpose of a second author's
productive use of an earlier author's work, and considerable weight instead
to commentary and other favored purposes. Courts should, however, be
more willing to recognize that productive, as well as transformative, uses of
preexisting works implicate freedom of expression interests of follow-on
authors. Also welcome would be more explicit attention to the public
interest in having access to works that productively use earlier works.
Except in cases involving digital sampling of sound recordings,285 courts
have become more receptive to "quoting" from songs, pictures, and
videos, 286 although they do not always characterize the takings as quoting.
Courts should, however, be more willing to consider whether a second
author's use is reasonable and customary in the authorial community in
which he or she creates. It was common to take custom into account in fair
use cases prior to the 1976 Act; 287 there is nothing in the legislative history
of this Act that repudiates custom as a factor. Its resurrection as part of
purpose analysis would be a sound development since copyright law should
accommodate practices that contribute to the availability of new works of
authorship. 288
A close study of the authorial fair use cases reveals that in order to
comment on an earlier work, second authors sometimes need to conjure up
the earlier work by reproducing all or part of it. Although the Supreme
Court did justify conjuring up in the parody context, it failed to recognize
that conjuring up is needed in other contexts as well. For example, to prove
his theory of the Kennedy assassination, Thompson needed to reproduce
frames from the Zapruder film in his book. Necessity should not always be
285. Courts have been quite hostile to digital sampling of copyrighted music. See, e.g.,
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005). Most
commentators have been critical of Bridgeport and other antisampling decisions. See, e.g.,
Jeremy Beck, Music Composition, Sound Recordings and Digital Sampling in the 21st
Century: A Legislative and Legal Framework to Balance Competing Interests, 13 UCLA
ENT. L. REv. 1 (2005).
286. See, e.g., Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley, Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir.
2006) (fair use of graphic work in nonfiction book); Lennon v. Premise Media Corp., 87
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1489 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (fair use of clip from sound recording in
documentary); Hofheinz v. AMC Prods., Inc., 147 F. Supp. 2d 127 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (fair use
of clips from movies).
287. LATMAN, supra note 27, at 15 ("At times, custom or public policy defines what is
reasonable.").
288. See, e.g., Madison, supra note 27. I do not mean to suggest that just because a use is
customary, it is necessarily fair; however, the more customary the use in authorial
communities, the more likely it should be tolerated as necessary to promote ongoing
authorship. I also recognize the dangers of reliance on custom, since an abundance of
caution may cause some to license who should rely on fair use. See, e.g., Jennifer Rothman,
The Questionable Use of Custom in Intellectual Property, 93 VA. L. REv. 1899 (2007).
However, I agree with Madison that the fairness and reasonableness of an author's reuse of
earlier works should be judged in part on authorial community standards.
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necessary to justify conjuring up-several of the productive use cases
focused on whether the second author's use was reasonable in light of her
productive purpose, not on whether the use was absolutely necessary.
Changes in size, scale, resolution, and context also seem to be important in
authorial fair use cases in judging the substantiality of the taking. The
defendant's willingness to attribute the contributions of the first author to
the subsequent work has also sometimes favored fair use in authorial fair
use cases. 289 Some commentators have suggested that fair use should be
broader as to "older" works, particularly those whose authors may be
difficult to track down, are out of print, or otherwise no longer
commercially exploited. 290
Judges in authorial fair use cases have usually been careful in analyzing
the harm factor. Heeding Campbell,291 they have generally been cautious
about imputing harm when a second author has made transformative or
productive uses of a first author's work. They seem to recognize the
circularity problem that has given rise to the "risk aversion and rights
accretion" phenomenon. 292 Courts in recent cases have sometimes taken
into account how proximate or remote the second author's market is to the
markets the first author is exploiting or is likely to exploit, as well as the
foreseeability of a second author's use in a first author's calculations about
her market.293 An unreasonable refusal to license a use, as in Geis,294 or to
license the use on reasonable terms, as in Bill Graham Archives,295 has
sometimes favored fair use. Although courts have not generally analyzed
this in market failure terms, some commentators have identified market
failure as a basis for ruling in favor of fair use in such cases. 296
This is not to say that all factors relevant to authorial fair use defenses cut
only in favor of fair use. Drawing expression from unpublished or
unfinished works is likely to cut against fair use.297 Quoting or closely
289. Cf Greg Lastowka, Digital Attribution: Copyright and the Right to Credit, 87 B.U.
L. REV. 41, 84 (2007) (arguing for attribution as a factor in fair use analyses). Failure to
attribute may similarly cut against fair use, although not heavily so because U.S. copyright
law does not protect attribution interests of authors (except as to certain works of visual art).
290. See, e.g., Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Time: A Proposal, 101 MICH. L. REV. 409
(2002); William F. Patry & Richard A. Posner, Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the Wake
of Eldred, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1639 (2004).
291. See supra notes 58-69 and accompanying text.
292. See Gibson, supra note 19 (arguing that risk aversion drives licensing, which in turn
plays a role in defining the scope of the right, leading to a feedback loop that expands private
rights and contracts public privileges).
293. See, e.g., Ty, Inc. v. Publ'ns Int'l, Ltd., 292 F.3d 512 (7th Cir. 2002) (collectors
guide in different market than beanie babies); Calkins v. Playboy Enters. Int'l, Inc., 561 F.
Supp. 2d 1136 (E.D. Cal. 2008) (high school photographer had not anticipated market for
Playboy's much later use of photo). See generally Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability
and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009).
294. See supra notes 232-38 and accompanying text.
295. See supra notes 245-60 and accompanying text.
296. See, e.g., Gordon & Bahls, supra note 18, at 629-32.
297. Harper & Row established the unpublished status of works as a factor tending to
negate fair use. See supra note 170 and accompanying text; see also Salinger v. Random
House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987) (unpublished nature of letters from which biographer
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paraphrasing many highly expressive passages also tends to weigh against
fair use. 298 Preparing detailed plot summaries of popular entertainment
programming tends to be unfair because the summaries heavily draw on
expression from those programs and occupy a foreseeable proximate
market.299 Trivia games, such as the Seinfeld Aptitude Test, drawn from
commercially successful television program dialogue and details, have
similarly been regarded as unfair.300 And of course, taking more expression
than is necessary or reasonable in light of one's purpose and supplanting
demand for the original is likely to doom a second author's fair use
defense. 30 1
III. USES THAT PROMOTE LEARNING
Teaching, scholarship, and research are three of the six favored uses in
the preamble to § 107.302 Congress thus considered learning as one of the
societal purposes that fair use was intended to promote. The constitutional
purpose of copyright is to promote the dissemination of knowledge, and
courts have repeatedly said that promoting public access to knowledge is
quoted weighed against fair use). While courts are generally unsympathetic to the use of
copyright claims to protect noncopyright interests of authors, they are sometimes willing to
do this as to works that were prepared for private use only. See, e.g., Michaels v. Internet
Entm't Group, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 823 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (enjoining Internet distribution of
video showing celebrity couple having intercourse which they filmed for personal use).
Professor William Fisher has argued that publication of unfinished works should similarly
negate fair use. See William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV.
L. REV. 1659, 1773-74 (1988). I agree that this should cut against fair use, although none of
the studied fair use opinions involved unfinished works.
298. See, e.g., Warner Bros. Entm't v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 542 (S.D.N.Y.
2008); Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Passport Video, 349 F.3d 622, 629 (9th Cir. 2003). This
too seems to be an aftermath of Harper & Row, for the Court in that case emphasized that
Victor Navasky had quoted the most moving passages of the book. Harper & Row
Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564 (1985).
299. See, e.g., Twin Peaks Prods. Inc. v. Publ'ns Int'l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366 (2d Cir. 1993)
(detailed plot summaries of Twin Peaks television programs with extensively quoted
dialogue); Toho Co. v. William Morrow & Co., 33 F. Supp. 2d 1206 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (plot
summaries of Godzilla movies); Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Carol Publ'g Group, 11 F.
Supp. 2d 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (Star Trek plot summaries).
300. See Castle Rock Entm't v. Carol Publ'g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998).
301. See supra notes 267-69.
302. The Senate report on the 1976 Act discusses at some length factors that would tip in
favor of fair use or against in educational and research settings. See S. REP. No. 94-473, at
63-67 (1975). This report also considered preservation as another learning-related use that
may favor fair use. See id. at 66; see also Sundeman v. Seajay Soc'y, Inc., 142 F.3d 194 (4th
Cir. 1998) (scholar working for nonprofit foundation made fair use of an unpublished
manuscript written by well-known deceased author when she copied it in order to study its
contents without damaging the original). Congress also contemplated that some iterative
copying of protected works would be fair use if done to promote greater access to works by
blind people, whether by preparing Braille editions or preparing talking books. See S. REP.
No. 94-473, at 66. These considerations were also endorsed in the House report. See H.R.
REP. No. 94-1476, at 66-73 (1976). The principal difference between the House and Senate
reports as to fair use was that the House report incorporated two sets of negotiated guidelines
for educational fair uses of copyrighted works. Id. at 68-71.
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the primary goal of copyright, 30 3 so it is unsurprising that Congress would
have considered that teaching, research, and scholarly uses, especially those
conducted in noncommercial settings, often would be fair.
30 4
Although research and scholarship sometimes directly lead to creation of
new works of authorship that add to the store of knowledge, researchers,
teachers, and scholars routinely make copies of preexisting materials, even
when this is not directly connected to the creation of new works. A scholar-
teacher may, for example, make a copy of a relevant article to prepare for
an upcoming class or simply to learn more about a new development in her
field. But nonscholarly teachers may also qualify for learning-related fair
uses, 30 5 as may students who photocopy news articles, take pictures of
images they like, or otherwise copy materials in preparing to write a term
paper or the like.30 6 Section 107 even offers some room for teachers and
students to make multiple copies for classroom use.307
303. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (Congress empowered to enact copyright
legislation "[t]o promote the [p]rogress of Science"); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (promoting public access to knowledge as principal
purpose of copyright); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948);
Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932); see also Kenneth D. Crews, The Law of
Fair Use and the Illusion of Fair-Use Guidelines, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 599, 607 (2001) ("The
framers of the U.S. Constitution clearly intended that the law of copyright ... would be
tailored to serve the advancement of knowledge.").
304. A small number of cases decided prior to the 1976 Act involved copying for
educational purposes. See, e.g., Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777, 778-80 (8th Cir. 1962) (not
fair use for choral director to make 48 photocopies of new arrangement of copyrighted music
for his students); Macmillan Co. v. King, 223 F. 862, 867 (D. Mass. 1914) (not fair use for
tutor to prepare and distribute memoranda for students that reproduced parts of an assigned
economics textbook). Library and educational use copying of copyrighted materials was the
subject of one of the studies undertaken as part of the copyright revision process. See BORGE
VARMER, PHOTODUPLICATION OF COPYRIGHTED MATERIALS BY LIBRARIES, STUDY No. 15,
COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS,
TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHTS, S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG. (Comm. Print
1960). During the time that the copyright revision legislation was pending, educators and
librarians sought a much broader and more specific exception to allow reproductions for
teaching, scholarship, and research purposes. See PATRY, supra note 1, at 273-74. However,
this proved to be unacceptable to author and publisher groups. See id. at 273-75. Congress
left the debate over these issues to be worked out in the context of fair use. Yet, it also
created exceptions for classroom performance of certain protected works, see 17 U.S.C. §
110(l) (2006), and for certain kinds of library uses, see id. § 108.
305. See, e.g., Sony, 464 U.S. at 455 n.40 ("A teacher who copies to prepare a lecture is
clearly productive. But so is a teacher who copies for the sake of broadening his personal
understanding of his specialty."); H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 68-69 (fair use for teacher to
photocopy article from periodical, short story, chapter from book, etc to prepare for class).
306. See, e.g., CONSORTIUM OF COLL. & UNIV. MEDIA CTRS., FAIR USE GUIDELINES FOR
EDUCATIONAL MULTIMEDIA § 2.1 (1996), available at http://depts.washington.edu/uwcopy/
UsingCopyrightlGuidelines/Fair.php.
307. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 ("including multiple copies for classroom use"). Guidelines on
making multiple copies for classroom use were negotiated in the mid-1970s between
publishers and a coalition of educational and library organizations. Such uses are fair when
they are relatively brief and spontaneous (e.g., a news article on a topic relevant to that day's
class), do not exceed certain cumulative limits, and identify the copyright owner. See, e.g.,
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 21, REPRODUCTION OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS BY
EDUCATORS AND LIBRARIANS 7-8 (1995). These guidelines played an important role in the
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There is relatively little caselaw on fair use in educational or research
settings.308 In the few litigated cases, however, fair use defenses have
rarely succeeded. 309 One possible explanation for the paucity of such cases
may be that copying for learning-related purposes is often done in private,
settlement of a lawsuit brought by the Association of American Publishers (AAP) against
New York University (NYU) and some of its professors for unlawful photocopying of
copyrighted materials for classroom use. See Crews, supra note 303, at 639-41. As part of
the settlement, NYU agreed to adopt the negotiated guidelines for educational uses as fair
use guidelines to which it and its faculty were bound. Id. This was unfortunate because these
guidelines had initially been intended to be a minimum statement of fair use in educational
contexts, not a statement of the maximum scope. Id. After the NYU settlement, the AAP
sent hundreds of cease and desist letters to other universities in an effort to persuade them,
often successfully, to conform their photocopying practices to the negotiated guidelines. See
id. In two other cases, Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Services, Inc., 99
F.3d 1381, 1390-91 (6th Cir. 1996), and Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F.
Supp. 1522, 1535-37 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), courts gave the negotiated guidelines some weight in
deciding that institutional coursepack copying was unfair. Kenneth Crews believes that the
guidelines should be given relatively little weight in any litigated educational fair use case,
as they are not rooted in the law of fair use, but are only a statement about uses that
publishers are publicly willing to tolerate. Crews, supra note 303, at 692-96.
308. Most of the cases and law review commentary focus on learning-related fair uses in
nonprofit educational contexts. See, e.g., Ann Bartow, Educational Fair Use in Copyright:
Reclaiming the Right to Photocopy Freely, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 149 (1998); Crews, supra
note 303; infra note 309. Occasionally, however, learning-related fair uses have occurred in
corporate contexts. See, e.g., Compaq Computer Corp. v. Ergonome, Inc., 387 F.3d 403 (5th
Cir. 2004) (computer firm's use of four illustrations to show proper hand positions to avoid
repetitive stress injury was fair use); Coates-Freeman Assocs., Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 792 F.
Supp. 879 (D. Mass. 1992) (fair use to reproduce chart depicting leadership styles for use
within the firm).
309. See, e.g., Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir. 1983) (not fair use for teacher
to copy cake decorating instructions from plaintiffs pamphlet for use by her students); Nat'l
Ass'n of Bds. of Pharmacy v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1683, 1703-04 (M.D. Ga. 2008) (not fair use to reproduce test questions to sell to others);
Bosch v. Ball-Kell, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1713 (C.D. Ill. 2006) (not fair use for substitute
teacher to reproduce and teach from a fired teacher's notes); Educ. Testing Serv. v. Simon,
95 F. Supp. 2d 1081 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (not fair use to copy "hot" questions from standard test
for preparatory course); Ass'n of Am. Med. Coils. v. Mikaelian, 571 F. Supp. 144 (E.D. Pa.
1983) (not fair use to copy questions from Medical College Admissions Test for a course
designed to prepare students to take this exam); Encyclopedia Britannica Educ. Corp. v.
Crooks, 447 F. Supp. 243 (W.D.N.Y. 1978), after trial on the merits, 542 F. Supp. 1156
(W.D.N.Y. 1982) (not fair use for a nonprofit service to tape broadcast television programs
of educational value for distribution to schools); see also Mulcahy v. Cheetah Learning LLC,
386 F.3d 849 (8th Cir. 2004) (denying summary judgment to the plaintiff on a fair use
defense for a test preparation manual that incorporated material from the defendant copyright
owner's handbook); Bridge Publ'ns, Inc. v. Vien, 827 F. Supp. 629 (S.D. Cal. 1993)
(copying of L. Ron Hubbard lectures for commercial educational use not fair), vacated, 53
F.3d 344 (Fed. Cir. 1994); PATRY, supra note 1, at 210-12 (discussing settled publisher
lawsuits against educational institutions for unauthorized photocopying). But see Newport-
Mesa Unified Sch. Dist. v. State of Cal. Dept. of Educ, 371 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (C.D. Cal
2005) (fair use for state to authorize copying of test protocols for parents of special
education students); Rubin v. Brooks/Cole Publ'g Co., 836 F. Supp. 909 (D. Mass. 1993)
(use of "love scale" in social psychology was fair use as to past uses). Williams & Wilkins
Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), affd by an equally divided court, 420
U.S. 376 (1975), discussed supra notes 277-78 and infra notes 315-19, 342 and




noncommercial settings. This makes detection of infringement difficult.
The costs of enforcement or of attempting to license many of these uses
would be far greater than the economic returns likely to result.3 10 Much of
such copying, moreover, may be reasonable and customary uses that would
pass muster as fair uses, 311 and publishers seem to have recognized and
accepted this.
More controversial than individual student or teacher copying has been
institutional copying on behalf of users in the name of education or
research. Controversy over this type of fair use facilitation was well
underway during the 1970s when copyright legislation was pending. 312
Indeed, enactment of copyright revision bills was held up for several years
because of strong differences of opinion about the legitimacy of library
photocopying for researchers and other uses of new technologies (e.g.,
whether inputting the text of a work into a computer would infringe
copyright). 313 In 1974, Congress broke the legislative logjam by spinning
out certain new technology issues to be addressed by the National
Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works
(CONTU). 314
Even before CONTU began its deliberations, a lawsuit testing the legality
of library photocopying on behalf of researchers was winding its way
through the courts. In Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States,315 a major
publisher of medical research journals sued the United States government
for copyright infringement, alleging that the library of the National
Institutes of Health and the National Library of Medicine were
systematically infringing copyrights by photocopying articles for medical
researchers who requested copies.316
Williams & Wilkins won in the initial round of this lawsuit, but appellate
review led to a 4-3 ruling in favor of the government's fair use defense. 317
The majority placed considerable weight on the benefits to the progress of
310. Market failure arising from high transaction costs may explain why certain
educational uses should be fair. See Gordon, supra note 200, at 1620-21. But see Carol M.
Silberberg, Preserving Educational Fair Use in the Twenty-First Century, 74 S. CAL. L. REV.
617, 618 (2001) (expressing concern that courts will give too much emphasis to licensing as
a solution to market failure in educational settings).
311. See, e.g., Bartow, supra note 308, at 227-30; Carroll, supra note 12, at 1114-17.
312. See, e.g., PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE
CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 78-164 (1994) (discussing the heated copyright debate over private
copying for research and educational purposes in the 1960s and 1970s).
313. See, e.g., PATRY, supra note 1, at 203 ("Educational reprography was the single most
contentious issue in attempts to codify the doctrine of fair use during the mid-1960s and
1970s."). For a thorough discussion of this controversy and the computer use controversy,
see id. chs. 11-12.
314. See Act of Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-573, § 201, 88 Stat. 1873, 1873-74.
315. 172 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 670 (Ct. Cl. 1972), rev'd, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), a/fd
by an equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975).
316. The evidence showed that the National Institutes of Health had made 930,000
photocopies of articles from scientific journals in 1970, and, in 1968, the National Library of
Medicine had received 127,000 requests for interlibrary loans. Id. at 673-74.
317. See Williams & Wilkins, 487 F.2d at 1345-63.
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science arising from the National Institutes of Health and the National
Library of Medicine photocopying program and on limits that the libraries
placed on copying on behalf of medical researchers. 318 Although the
Supreme Court decided to hear this case, the Court split 4-4 on the merits in
1975,319 thereby affirming the ruling on fair use copying by libraries of
scientific articles for research patrons. When Congress passed the 1976
Act, it did not overturn this decision. 320 Although CONTU later offered
some guidelines about library photocopying for interlibrary loans, 321 it did
not attempt to resolve the broader controversy over photocopying for
educational and research purposes. 322
While teachers, students, scholars, and other researchers would for
obvious reasons prefer liberal fair use rules as to educational and other
learning-related uses,323  publishers of educational materials have
understandably worried that very liberal fair use rules would undermine
sales of books, journals, and other materials and the development of new
licensing markets that advances in technology have made possible. 324 If
there is no limit, for example, on the ability of teachers or photocopy shops
318. Id. at 1356-57. "There is no doubt in our minds that medical science would be
seriously hurt if such library photocopying were stopped." Id. at 1356. The libraries would,
for instance, copy only one article from any particular journal per request and would not fill
requests for articles from "widely available" journals. Id. at 1348-49. Crews asserts that
these limits "greatly influenced the court's ruling." Crews, supra note 303, at 657.
319. Williams & Wilkins, 420 U.S. at 376. The Court was also deeply split about personal
use copying of television programs for time-shifting purposes in Sony Corp. of America v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). Williams & Wilkins and Sony are similar
in that copies were being made for consumptive, rather than directly productive, purposes;
the whole of protected works were copied; many such copies were made; copyright owners
were suing in order to establish new licensing markets; and the Court was deeply split over
whether the uses were fair. The split judicial reactions in Williams & Wilkins, as well as in
the Texaco and Michigan Document cases discussed infra, are akin to those of Justice John
Paul Stevens's majority and Justice Blackmun's dissent in Sony, which I discuss at some
length in Pamela Samuelson, The Generativity of Sony v. Universal: The Intellectual
Property Legacy of Justice Stevens, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 1831 (2006).
320. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 307. The 1976 Act provided that nonprofit
library and educational users who had a good faith belief that their copying was fair use
would be treated as innocent infringers and gave courts discretion to reduce or remit
damages in such cases. See Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 504(c), 90 Stat 2541, 2585 (1976)
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2006)).
321. See NAT'L COMM'N ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL
REPORT ch. 4 (1979) [hereinafter CONTU REPORT] (recommending guidelines for copying
for purposes of making interlibrary loans). Crews notes that the National Commission on
New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU) guidelines used principles from
Williams & Wilkins. Crews, supra note 303, at 658.
322. However, CONTU resolved the inputting of copyrighted works into a computer
issue in favor of the publishers. CONTU REPORT, supra note 321, ch. 3.
323. See, e.g., Silberberg, supra note 310, at 617-19.
324. See, e.g., PATRY, supra note 1, at 276 (quoting a letter by a publisher witness who
made a similar proposal at a congressional hearing). A contemporary controversy is whether
universities infringe by permitting or encouraging faculty to post assigned readings on
password-protected websites for enrolled students. See Publishers Sue Georgia State U. for
Copyright Infringement, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 16, 2008, http://chronicle.com/news/
article/4319/publishers-sue-georgia-state-u-for-copyright-infringement. This issue has been
debated since the mid-1990s. See Crews, supra note 303, at 627-29.
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to make multiple copies of copyrighted materials for classroom purposes,
teachers and their students will enjoy the benefits of access to these works
without paying for them, and the photocopy-shop will make money from
reproducing the materials with no payments to publishers. 325 Similarly,
without some limitations on the ability of libraries and other research
institutions to make copies of articles for patrons, publishers feel at risk of
losing substantial revenues, including for new licensing schemes for these
uses.326
Two cases decided in the 1990s, American Geophysical Union v. Texaco,
Inc.327 and Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Services,
Inc.,328 tested the limits of systematic institutional research and educational
use copying.329 In Texaco, a divided Second Circuit ruled that the archival
copying of scientific and technical articles by commercial research
scientists was not fair use, in substantial part because the Copyright
Clearance Center had been established to license for-profit subscribers, such
as Texaco, whose researchers wanted to make copies of articles from the
journals.330 In the Michigan Document case, a divided Sixth Circuit held
that a for-profit photocopy service infringed copyrights when it photocopied
book chapters, articles, and other copyrighted materials in professor-
assembled coursepacks. 33 1
Texaco and Michigan Document have caused a good deal of agitation and
anxiety in educational, library, and research communities, 332 because they
contribute to fears that publishers are pushing for a rule that if a use can be
licensed, it must be licensed, 333 which educators and librarians tend to think
325. See, e.g., Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1531-36
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (unfair for Kinko's to make photocopies of articles and excerpts from
copyrighted books in compiled coursepacks for students).
326. See, e.g., Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 929-31 (2d Cir.
1994) (the existence of a new licensing market for photocopying by a commercial firm's
researchers given weight in ruling against fair use).
327. Id. The Second Circuit chose not to address whether copying by a researcher
himself would be fair use. Id. at 916. The Second Circuit panel was split, however, on the
issue of whether Texaco's photocopying of articles for researchers was fair use.
328. 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996).
329. Fair use defenses were also unsuccessful in two cases involving commercial news-
clipping services, arguably another category of institutional personal use facilitation. See,
e.g., L.A. News Serv. v. Tullo, 973 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1992); Pac. & S. Co. v. Duncan, 744
F.2d 1490 (1 1th Cir. 1984).
330. Texaco, 60 F.3d at 929-31. It is worth noting that after a storm of criticism about
the circularity of the harm analysis in Texaco (under which a use would be unfair if a
publisher wanted to license it), the Second Circuit issued an amended opinion that tried to
respond to this criticism. Compare Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 37 F.3d 891 (2d
Cir.), amended and superseded by 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994), with Texaco, 60 F.3d 913.
331. Michigan Document, 99 F.3d at 1388-91. The finding of infringement was made
easier in substantial part because the Copyright Clearance Center had established a licensing
program for such uses. Id.
332. See, e.g., Bartow, supra note 308, at 207-21.
333. The Clinton administration further contributed to this fear when its "white paper" on
intellectual property questioned the need for fair use in the future because of the rise of new
licensing models. See BRUCE LEHMAN, REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION
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would spell the end of fair use. 334 Educators and librarians also worry that
copyright owners' increased reliance upon licensing and extralegal
technical protection measures are restricting access to and certain uses of
copyrighted materials, especially those available in digital networked
environments. 335
Uncertainties about the scope of fair use for learning-related purposes
have led to some efforts to develop fair use guidelines for common
educational and research uses. 336 While guidelines negotiated between
publishers and representatives of educational, library, and research
communities have created a safe harbor for certain uses in educational and
research settings,337 negotiated guidelines have been much criticized. 338
The oft-stated danger is that what was intended to establish a safe harbor (or
floor) for fair use activities may be misinterpreted as having established a
ceiling on uses that are fair. 339 Guidelines also tend to be narrowly focused
on certain common uses as to already known technologies; hence, they may
become outmoded over time. Some educational institutions and
organizations have promulgated "best practices" guidelines for educators,
students, and staff that take a somewhat more expansive view of fair use in
educational contexts than the negotiated guidelines. 340
Because this Article principally aims to analyze clusters of decided fair
use cases, there is relatively little it can say about how courts would apply
fair use as to a wide array of educational and research uses that lie outside
the negotiated guidelines. 341 There are simply too few decisions to analyze,
and too much uncertainty about the implications of decisions such as
Williams & Wilkins, Texaco, and Michigan Document-in all of which the
judges were deeply split not only as to whether the uses in question were
INFRASTRUCTURE 82 (1995) ("[I]t may be that technological means of tracking transactions
and licensing will lead to reduced application and scope of the fair use doctrine.").
334. See, e.g., Silberberg, supra note 310, at 618 (predicting that "current trends in fair
use will eventually eliminate fair use for schools, colleges, and universities" and arguing
against this outcome).
335. Id. at 645.
336. See, e.g., Crews, supra note 303, at 614-32 (discussing various fair use guidelines).
337. Id. at 692-93.
338. See, e.g., id. at 692-97; Silberberg, supra note 310, at 637-39.
339. See, e.g., Bartow, supra note 308, at 160-63; see also supra note 307.
340. See, e.g., The University of Texas System, Fair Use Rules of Thumb,
http://www.utsystem.edu/ogc/intellectualproperty/copypol2.htm#rules (last visited Mar. 24,
2009).
341. The Google Book Search litigation would have been a major test case for library fair
uses, had the case not settled, given that Google provided its university library partners with
a database containing the full texts of the books the project copied from each library's
collection. Google had a stronger fair use case as to the scanning of these texts for purposes
of indexing them and making snippets available in response to user queries than it had for
the copies it made and delivered to the libraries. The settlement allows libraries to continue
to use the databases containing the texts of books in their collections and provides these and
other libraries with the opportunity to license the broader database of scanned books now
subject to the settlement agreement. See Google Book Search Settlement Agreement,
available at http://books.google.com/googlebooks/agreement (last visited Feb. 12, 2009).
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fair, but also as to the proper four-factor analysis-for a broader array of
learning-related uses. 34 2
It is, however, fair to observe that the small number of litigated
educational/research cases contrasts sharply with the very high volume of
everyday educational and research uses that arguably implicate copyright
(e.g., photocopying articles, scanning pictures, inserting images into
PowerPoint presentations, sending news articles to class listservs).
Learning-related uses are certainly not fair across the board, but many are
likely fair; still others have become so customary and so widely tolerated
for so long as effectively to be outside copyright boundaries. 343 In future
learning-related fair use cases, moreover, the widespread availability of
many information resources on the open Internet or in open formats seems
likely to affect the scope of fair use as to materials that are also available
through licensing. If rights holders want to restrict access and control uses,
technical protection measures now provide them a way to do this; failing to
utilize these measures may also affect the fair use calculus. 344
Proponents of broader fair use rules for learning-related uses suggest that
courts should consider "the transformative nature of education, the extent to
which instructors rely on fair use, and the reasonableness of the alleged
available license" in making fair use determinations in educational and
research use cases. 345 Perhaps courts should also presume educational and
research uses are fair because they implicate three of the six favored
statutory purposes, and require publishers to prove that the uses being
challenged are supplanting demand for the original or otherwise will bring
about a meaningful likelihood of harm to existing or foreseeable markets
for the work. 346 A well-educated public is, after all, necessary not only to
promote effective democracy, but also to create robust markets for
copyrighted works.347
IV. FORESEEABLE USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS BEYOND THE SIX
STATUTORILY FAVORED PURPOSES
Although the 1976 Act did not single them out for special consideration,
Congress seems to have foreseen that fair uses might sometimes be made of
342. See, e.g., Silberberg, supra note 310, at 646-51. She points out that instructors
transform the content of the materials they copy to prepare for their lectures, and students
further transform it in the learning process. For what it's worth, I think that both Williams &
Wilkins and Michigan Document were rightly decided, but Texaco was not. Yet, even if
Texaco was rightly decided (and I admit it was a close case), it should be construed narrowly
such that copying by research scientists of commercial firms is unfair, while most copying
done for research and educational purposes in nonprofit educational and research institutions
(apart from coursepack compilations) is fair.
343. See, e.g., Tim Wu, Tolerated Use, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTs 617, 617-18 (2008).
344. See, e.g., Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006) (copyright
owner's failure to use robot.txt instructions to stop making copies of an Internet site and
caching of those copies considered in favor of fair use).
345. Silberberg, supra note 310, at 619.
346. See, e.g., Bartow, supra note 308, at 227-29.
347. See, e.g., NETANEL, supra note 12, at 30-44.
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copyrighted works for private, noncommercial purposes, for litigation and
other legitimate government purposes, and for some commercial
advertisements. This part considers the caselaw as to these foreseen fair
uses.
A. Personal Uses
A study of fair use, prepared by Alan Latman in conjunction with the
copyright revision effort, anticipated that fair use would play a role in the
regulation of private and personal uses of copyrighted works.348 Although
there had been no litigated cases on the issue, Latman nevertheless opined
that "the purpose and nature of a private use, and in some cases the small
amount taken, might lead a court to apply the general principles of fair use
in such a way as to deny liability. '349
There is some evidence that Congress gave some consideration to the
creation of a personal use exception during the revision process leading up
to the 1976 Act.350 It ultimately decided to define several exclusive rights
narrowly so that many forms of private and personal uses of copyrighted
works were left unregulated. 351  It created personal use privileges for
certain personal uses.352 Fair use was available to regulate personal use
copying.353
There is very little caselaw on whether and to what extent personal use
copying qualifies as fair use. 354 The issue has mainly been considered in
348. LATMAN, supra note 27, at 12.
349. Id.
350. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 464-65 (1984)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Some countries have personal use exceptions in their copyright
laws, as noted in LATMAN, supra note 27, at 25. The study recommended fair use as the best
option for regulating circumstances under which personal uses should be lawful. Id. at 33.
The Register of Copyrights and the Congress seem to have adopted this recommendation.
351. Private performances and private displays of copyrighted works are not covered by
copyright, nor are private distributions. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(3)-(5) (2006). Consumers are
legally entitled to engage in these private activities. Jessica Litman has argued that the 1976
Act should be understood to leave many other personal uses, including personal use copying,
unregulated. See Jessica Litman, Lawful Personal Use, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1871 (2007).
352. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (right to resell or otherwise dispose of one's copy of
protected works); id. § 109(c) (right to display one's copy to the public), id. § 602(a) (right
to import a copy of a work purchased outside the U.S. for personal use). Congress later
added other specific personal use privileges to the statute. See id. § 110(11) (right to use
software to bypass objectionable scenes in movies); id. § 117(a) (right to make a backup
copy of purchased computer programs and adapt programs); id. § 120(a) (right to photograph
or paint architectural work); id. § 120(b) (right to alter or destroy architectural work); id. §
1008 (right to make noncommercial copies of analog or digital audio sound recordings).
353. The House and Senate reports mention personal uses for education and research
purposes as potentially fair. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 74 (1976); S. REP. No. 94-473, at 63-66
(1975). Some private and/or personal uses are likely to be de minimis uses or impliedly
licensed. Fair use is thus not the only doctrine of copyright law that limits the reproduction
right as to personal uses.
354. One individual owner and user of Betamax machines was named as a defendant in
Universal's lawsuit against Sony, but he was a client of the plaintiffs law firm and
consented to become a defendant on the understanding that no damages claim would be
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cases brought against developers of technologies or services designed to
facilitate personal uses, which defendants argued were fair uses. 355 The
principal case is Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.356
Sony persuaded the Court that it was not indirectly liable for copyright
infringement because its Betamax machines had and were capable of
substantial noninfringing uses, 357 including fair use taping of broadcast
television programs. In the course of its analysis as to whether time-shift
copying of such programs was fair use, the Court in Sony made some
influential pronouncements about personal use copying and the fair use
doctrine.
A majority of the Court regarded the purpose of consumer uses of
Betamax machines to be private and noncommercial. 358 This factor so cut
in favor of fair use that the majority directed that such uses should be
presumed fair, and this presumption should only be overcome if the
copyright owner proved a meaningful likelihood of harm would flow from
the use. 359 The Court gave little weight to the nature of the work factor,
although it regarded Universal's decision to make its movies and programs
available on broadcast television so that anyone could see the program for
free as having some significance. 360 Whole programs were taped, which
disfavored fair use, but because time-shifted copies were typically erased
after later viewing, less weight should be given to the amount.361 The
presumption of fairness was not overcome because Universal had stipulated
that it had suffered no harm as yet, even though time-shift copying of
programs had become widespread, and it had offered, in the majority's
view, only speculative evidence of harm in the future. 362 Consequently, the
Court concluded that time-shift copying of television programs was fair use.
made against him. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp., 480 F. Supp. 429, 437 (C.D.
Cal. 1979), rev'd, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 464 U.S. 417
(1984).
355. See, e.g., Sony, 464 U.S. at 454-55 (private noncommercial time-shift copying of
television programs held fair use); Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia
Sys. Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 1999) (characterizing place-shifting as
"paradigmatic noncommercial personal use"); Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am.,
964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992) (relying on Sony as to private noncommercial use of Game
Genie to change some aspects of the play of Nintendo games). But see Sega Enters. Ltd. v.
MAPHIA, 857 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (rejecting Sony private use defense by
commercial bulletin board service held as indirect infringer for facilitating uploading and
downloading of Sega games by its users); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552
(M.D. Fla. 1993) (rejecting Sony private use defense by commercial bulletin board service
held as infringer for facilitating uploading and downloading of Playboy bunny pictures by its
users).
356. 464 U.S. 417.
357. For a discussion of this aspect of Sony, see infra Part V.A.
358. Justice Stevens's fair use analysis for the majority can be found in Sony, 464 U.S. at
447-56.
359. Id. at 449-51.
360. Id. at 451-53.
361. Id. at 453-54 & n.39, 458.
362. Id. at 454.
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Justice Harry Blackmun's dissent in Sony offered a sharply contrasting
conception of fair use as applied to personal use copying.363 It perceived
the purpose of the taping to be consumptive (i.e., consuming the work as if
one had purchased a copy), not productive (i.e., there was no new work of
authorship to justify the use as fair). 364 Consumptive copying, in his view,
strongly disfavored fair use. The programs copied qualified as largely
entertainments, as to which the scope of fair use is typically narrow. 365
Whole programs were copied, which also cut strongly against fair use.366
The dissenters worried that the majority's ruling would undermine the
development of new licensing markets to allow copyright owners to recoup
their investments. 367
Not until the recording industry began suing individual peer-to-peer
(P2P) file sharers was there a direct infringement case that tested whether
personal use copying qualified as fair use. In BMG Music v. Gonzalez,36 8
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ruled that Cecilia
Gonzalez's use was unfair because she had downloaded many songs she
had not paid for, whole works had been copied, and the widespread practice
of file sharing was causing harm to the market for recorded music, thereby
proving the meaningful likelihood of harm that had been missing in
Sony.369 Gonzalez downloaded the songs for her personal use, but the scale
and scope of copying of commercial music through P2P networks
distinguishes this case from ordinary personal uses that are far more likely
to be fair. 370
The Gonzalez case involved one type of consumptive personal use
copying, but this term encompasses many types of acts. Consumptive uses
also include such things as making time-shifted copies of television
programs to watch them at a later time or loading the music from a
purchased CD onto one's computer. 371 Productive personal uses include
363. Justice Blackmun's fair use analysis can be found in Sony, 464 U.S. at 462-99
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
364. Id. at 477-80.
365. Id. at 496-97.
366. Id. at 497.
367. Id. at 483-86.
368. 430 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2005); see also A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d
1004, 1014-15 (9th Cir. 2001) (peer-to-peer file sharing for personal use was not fair use).
One Canadian court opined in BMG Canada Inc. v. Doe, however, that downloading music
for personal use did not infringe copyright. See [2004] F.C. 488, 2004 Fed. Ct. Trial LEXIS
321, at *18-19 (Fed. Ct. Can.). An appellate court agreed with the lower court judge's
ruling that the identities of file sharers did not have to be revealed, but he regarded its ruling
on the downloading issue as premature. See BMG Canada Inc. v. Doe, [2005] 4 F.C.R. 81,
2005 F.C.R. LEXIS 232, at *44-48 (Ct. Ap. Can.).
369. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d at 889-90.
370. See, e.g., John Tehranian, Infringement Nation: Copyright Reform and the
Law/Norm Gap, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 537, 537-41 (giving examples of ordinary personal uses
that are plausible prima facie infringements); Von Lohmann, supra note 21, at 830 (pointing
out that personal use copying is more common than transformative or productive uses are).
371. See, e.g., Sony, 464 U.S. at 454-55 (holding that time-shift copying was fair use).
See generally Joseph P. Liu, Copyright Law's Theory of the Consumer, 44 B.C. L. REV. 397,
402-06 (2003) (distinguishing between active and passive consumers).
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activities such as making a family video using commercial recorded music
as the soundtrack. 372 Transformative uses include such things as remixing a
song, making a mashup of clips from movies, or writing fan fiction about
one's favorite characters. 373 Personal uses may also involve such things as
backup copying of one's computer,374 or sharing an occasional copy with
family members or friends. 375
There are several reasons why private and personal uses of copyrighted
works should either be given a broad scope of fair use, or exempted from
copyright control. For one thing, personal uses of copyrighted works, such
as reading, viewing, listening, and otherwise enjoying them, generally do
not interfere with commercial exploitations of protected works. 376 Second,
personal uses are often within the sphere of reasonable and customary
activities that copyright owners should expect from consumers, especially
those who have purchased copies. 377 Third, members of the public often
express themselves through personal uses of copyrighted works, and
copyright law should accord some respect to user autonomy and self-
expression interests. 378  Fourth, personal uses typically happen in the
privacy of one's home, automobile, or other spaces as to which individuals
have reasonable expectations of privacy. Copyright has traditionally not
regulated the private sphere.379 Fifth, even leaving aside privacy concerns,
it is generally infeasible to regulate personal uses of copyrighted works
because of the difficulties and costs likely to be encountered in efforts to
enforce copyrights in spaces where personal uses so often take place. 380
Sixth, high transaction costs are likely to preclude the formation of viable
markets for regulating most personal uses of most copyrighted works. 381
Finally, ordinary people do not think copyright restrictions apply to
personal uses of copyrighted works and would not find acceptable a
copyright law that regulated all uses they might make of copyrighted
works. 382
372. See, e.g., Deborah Tussey, From Fan Sites to Filesharing: Personal Use in
Cyberspace, 35 GA. L. REV. 1129, 1134-38 (2001) (defining "personal use").
373. Id. at 1139-40.
374. See, e.g., Litman, supra note 351, at 1896.
375. Id. at 1894.
376. See, e.g., L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT:
A LAW OF USERS' RIGHTS 193 (1991).
377. See, e.g., Litman, supra note 351, at 1897-99.
378. See, e.g., Liu, supra note 371, at 406; Matthew Sag, God in the Machine: A New
Structural Analysis of Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv.
381, 431 (2005).
379. See, e.g., Gordon & Bahls, supra note 18, at 644-48 (discussing privacy as a factor
justifying limits on a copyright owner's ability to regulate personal uses); see also Cohen,
Place of User, supra note 88, at 349.
380. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE DIGITAL DILEMMA: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN
THE INFORMATION AGE 134-35 (2000) (discussing the difficulties of enforcing copyrights in
the personal sphere).
381. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 200, at 1601.
382. See, e.g., JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 194-95 (2001).
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Copyright industry groups have, however, often expressed concern that
creating a special exception for personal or private use copying or
according a broad scope for personal fair uses is unjustified because of the
potential harm it would cause to their markets. 383 They argue that, even if
each individually made copy-whether made for oneself or for one's
friends-looked at in isolation, might be commercially insignificant, the
cumulative effect of widespread personal use copying is substantial and
erodes opportunities for recouping investments in creating and
disseminating new works. 384 Copyright owners can, however, counteract
potentially harmful personal use copying by using technical protection
measures (e.g., encryption or access control technologies) to prevent
unauthorized access to or copying of their works by consumers and by
directly licensing consumers to make personal uses of their works. 385
Whatever the merits of a well-crafted statutory privilege for personal use
copying,386 fair use is the tool that the 1976 Act provides to balance
consumer and copyright owner interests in regulating personal use copying.
In my judgment, the Supreme Court got it right in Sony: private,
noncommercial copies should be presumed fair, and that presumption
should only be overcome if copyright owners bring forward proof that the
defendants' use has, in fact, harmed the market for their work or at least
poses a meaningful likelihood of such harm. Under this approach, ordinary
personal uses, such as backup copying and platform-shifting, would be fair,
but P2P file sharing would not be.
B. Uses in Litigation and for Other Government Purposes
The Latman study of fair use anticipated that some uses of copyrighted
materials for litigation and other governmental purposes would likely be
fair, although he found no cases on point.387 Under the 1976 Act, a
surprising number of fair use cases have involved uses of protected works
in investigations or adjudications of legal disputes. 388  While the
383. See, e.g., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 380, at 129-33 (2000).
384. See, e.g., id. at 132-33.
385. See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 312, at 197-236. Some commentators consider this
prospect with some trepidation. See, e.g., J. H. Reichman & Jonathan A. Franklin, Privately
Legislated Intellectual Property Rights: Reconciling Freedom of Contract with Public Good
Uses of Information, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 875, 876-78 (1999).
386. I believe the merits are considerable.
387. LATMAN, supra note 27, at 13-14. The House and Senate reports also mention uses
in judicial or legislative proceedings or reports as examples of fair uses. See H.R. REP. No.
94-1476, at 65 (1976); S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 61-62 (1975).
388. See, e.g., Moran v. deSignet Int'l, 557 F. Supp. 2d 378 (W.D.N.Y. 2008) (fair use for
plaintiff to use software provided by defendant to review digital materials produced by
defendants in discovery); Healthcare Advocates, Inc. v. Harding, Early, Follmer & Fraley,
497 F. Supp. 2d 627 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (fair use for lawyers to download images from a
website in connection with an investigation of the merits of a lawsuit); Shell v. DeVries, No.
06-cv-00318, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6967 (D. Colo. Jan. 30, 2007), affd, No. 07-1086,
2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 28317 (10th Cir. Dec. 6, 2007) (fair use for an attorney to use a
timeline from the litigant's website as an exhibit to his motion for award of attorney fees);
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investigation and litigation cases are interesting in their own right, they also
plainly demonstrate that iterative copying of the whole or substantial parts
of protected works for this kind of orthogonal use can be socially beneficial
and qualify for fair use.
1. Evidentiary Uses of Materials Not Prepared for Litigation
The boldest of the litigation-related infringement claims was that made
by William Bond in Bond v. Blum.389 Bond was the author of an
unpublished manuscript entitled Self-Portrait of a Patricide: How I Got
Away with Murder, which Bond had written in the hope it would one day be
commercially published. 390 Bond sued his wife's father, her ex-husband,.
an investigator hired to look into Bond's background, and the ex-husband's
lawyers for copyright infringement because they made copies of his memoir
and introduced it into evidence in a separate child custody lawsuit.391
Even though the defendants' copying was nontransformative, the court
decided that the purpose favored fair use because they used the copy "for
the evidentiary value of [the memoir's] content insofar as it contains
admissions that Bond may have made against his interest when he bragged
about his conduct in murdering his father, in taking advantage of the
juvenile justice system, and in benefiting from his father's estate." 392 The
unpublished status of Bond's manuscript and its stylized expression of his
Lucent Info. Mgmt., Inc. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 238 (D. Del. 1998) (fair use
for LT to send out letter similar to one previously sent by LIM to survey whether use of a
similar name would be likely to cause confusion); see also Religious Tech. Ctr. v.
Wollersheim, 971 F.2d 364, 367 (9th Cir. 1992) (fair use for a lawyer to reproduce
Scientology texts and distribute them to expert witness to prepare testimony in state court
litigation); City Consumer Servs., Inc. v. Home, 100 F.R.D. 740, 747-48 (D. Utah 1983)
(fair use to make copies of litigation documents). Because the purpose of inputting student
papers into a plagiarism detection database was investigatory in nature, A. V v. iParadigms,
Ltd. Liability Co., 544 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Va. 2008), also seems to fit within this category
of fair use cases. In A. V., the court ruled that the database provider had made fair use of the
student papers. Id. at 484.
389. 317 F.3d 385 (4th Cir. 2003). There were, however, some strong runners-up for the
boldest litigation-related infringement claim. See Tavory v. NTP, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 2d 531
(E.D. Va. 2007) (fair use for lawyers to make copies of program code in conjunction with
litigation about the code and a pertinent patent); Sturgis v. Hurst, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1444
(E.D. Mich. 2007) (fair use for guardian ad litem to copy portions of the plaintiffs book for
use in a proceeding to terminate parental rights to show the plaintiffs unfitness as a parent);
Shell v. City of Radford, 351 F. Supp. 2d 510 (W.D. Va. 2005) (fair use for a police
department to copy and publicly display photographs of a crime victim in the course of its
investigation of a murder in which the photographer was a suspect); Kulik Photography v.
Cochran, 975 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Va. 1997) (fair use for a defense lawyer to use a
copyrighted photo already admitted into evidence during the lawyer's closing arguments in a
double murder trial where the closing arguments were televised on Court TV).
390. Bond, 317 F.3dat 390.
391. Shortly before William Bond's marriage, he brazenly sent his prospective wife's
father a letter demanding "a dowry, a salary, establishment of an investment account,
purchase of a studio apartment in addition to a house, and a severance package should
Bond's marriage with [Blum] not work out." Id. at 391. Bond must have been quite a
character.
392. Id. at 395.
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feelings seemingly weighed against fair use, 393 as did the amount factor, for
nearly all of the manuscript had been admitted into evidence. 394 But there
was no evidence that the evidentiary use of the manuscript in the child
custody case had adversely affected the marketability of the memoir.395
Bond's concern that this use harmed his privacy interests was not
cognizable in a copyright case.396  Weighing the factors together, as
Campbell required, the court concluded that the defendants' use of the
Bond manuscript was fair, emphasizing that it "serve[d] the important
societal interest in having evidence before the factfinder" that was unlikely
to reduce incentives for investing in creative expression. 397
Jartech, Inc. v. Clancy398 was a more plausible infringement case than
Bond in two respects. First, the allegedly infringed works were
commercially distributed adult entertainment movies. Second, the
investigator who made the copies had surreptitiously entered a theatre with
a camcorder in order to take photographs every few seconds of the scenes
and to record the soundtrack. 399 The photographs and scripts obtained
through this process were introduced into evidence by a City of Santa Ana
attorney charged with enforcing the city's nuisance abatement ordinance
that declared cinematic depictions of certain sexual activities a nuisance.400
As in Bond, litigation uses of these copyrighted works qualified for fair
use.401 The city had used the copies as evidence in a nuisance abatement
case (that is, for an orthogonal purpose), not for the intrinsic purpose for
which the movies had been made.40 2
2. Uses of Works Specially Prepared for Litigation
Fair use may be less likely as to works specially prepared for litigation,
as in Images Audio Visual Productions, Inc. v. Perini Building Co.4 0 3
Perini had been hired to construct a casino and resort complex.404 It hired
Images AV, a professional commercial photographer, to take a series of
photographs, including aerial shots, of the firm's construction site, in case
they were needed as evidence of construction progress if a dispute arose
between Perini and its client.405 Images AV and Perini agreed on a flat fee
for photographing the site and a per-print charge for images chosen for
393. Id. at 395-96.
394. Id. at 396.
395. Id. at 396-97.
396. Id. at 395.
397. Id. at 396-97 (citing Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994)).
398. 666 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1982).
399. Id. at 405.
400. Id.
401. Id. at 406-07.
402. Id. at 407.
403. 91 F. Supp. 2d 1075 (E.D. Mich. 2000).




printing. 40 6 Images AV flew over the construction site 47 times in an
eighteen-month time period.407 Perini selected 305 photos to be printed.40 8
After Perini's client terminated the construction contract, Perini initiated
an arbitration proceeding to seek compensation for work done under the
contract. 409  It needed six copies of the selected photos so that the
arbitrators, the attorneys representing the parties, and the witnesses could
use them. Perini regarded the contract per-print price as excessive when
photocopies would do, but Images AV insisted on getting the contractual
per-print fee for each of these copies. 410 After an unsuccessful effort at a
compromise, Perini made color photocopies for the arbitrators and
lawyers. 411 Images AV then sued for infringement. 4 12 Relying on Jartech
and other cases, Perini asserted fair use.4 13
Although Perini had not made commercial use of the photos in the
ordinary sense of this word, the court regarded Perini's use to be
nontransformative, for the photocopies were virtually identical to the
prints.414 Perini had, moreover, used the photos for the very purpose for
which they had been taken, that is, as evidence of the construction site
progress over time.415 By photocopying the images, Perini had supplanted
demand for extra prints from Images AV, which cut against fair use as to
both the first and fourth factors.416 Perini argued that the photos were
evidence of historical facts, and so the scope of fair use should be broad,
but the court regarded the pictures as being "worth a thousand words" and
as creative works, so this factor also cut against fair use.417 The court
distinguished cases such as Jartech because the works in Perini had been
created with the specific intent that they would be used in litigation.418
3. Weighing Fair Use Factors in Litigation and Investigation Cases
The main focus of fair use analysis in investigation and litigation cases
has been and should be on the "salutary truth-seeking function" of the
uses. 419 Iterative copying for purposes of investigating or adjudicating
disputes are typically orthogonal to the purposes for which the works were
406. Id. The initial print charge was to be $18 with title block and $15 without title
block. Images AV subsequently agreed to reduce the print price to $10.50. Id.




411. Id. at 1078-79.
412. Id.
413. Id. at 1078-79, 1081. For a discussion of Jartech, Inc. v. Clancy, see supra text
accompanying notes 398-402.
414. Perini, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 1081-84.
415. Id. at 1081-82.
416. Id. at 1083-86.
417. Id. at 1085. The amount of photocopying also disfavored fair use because each
photo was a separate copyrighted work. Id.
418. Id. at 1082.
419. Id. at 1083.
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created or intended to be used. When copyrighted materials are used as
evidence relevant to proof of some factual assertion, the nature of the work
and amount of the taking factors should weigh less heavily than in other
kinds of fair use cases, even when the work is unpublished.420
Investigatory and litigation uses are, moreover, generally unlikely to
harm the market for a work. In view of this, courts should probably
presume that investigation and litigation uses of works are fair. This
presumption could perhaps be overcome in rare instances, such as Perini,
where parties have contracted for specific prices for additional copies.421
Courts should also be careful in litigation/investigation cases that copyright
claims are not being asserted to advance noncopyright objectives, such as
protecting privacy or thwarting efforts to determine the truth.
Although there is no caselaw involving judicial, legislative, executive, or
administrative uses of copyrighted materials, these uses should similarly be
accorded broad fair use privileges insofar as copyrighted materials are
relevant inputs to legitimate governmental decision-making and other
activities.422 Consider, for example, fair use as a justification for court and
West Publishing Co. reproductions of the texts of copyrighted works, such
as the Supreme Court's recitation of the contested song lyrics in Campbell
and the writings at issue in Harper & Row.423 Those decisions are more
informative and precise in their holdings because they reproduce the
contested uses.424
420. "[R]eproduction of a work in connection with a judicial proceeding, even where
reproduction of the work is in its entirety, serves a qualitatively different function and does
not satisfy the demand for the original." NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 212, § 13.05[D][2].
The unpublished status of some works, such as the memoir in Bond v. Blum, and the creative
and entertainment-oriented nature of other works, such as the movies in Jartech, should not
count against fair use, even if they would in more typical copyright cases.
421. In my judgment, Images Audio Visual Productions, Inc. v. Perini Building Co. was a
closer fair use case than the court perceived. Perini's purpose was noncommercial (in the
copyright sense); the photocopies were made and distributed for their value as evidence as to
historical facts, not for their artistry; and Images AV may have been unreasonable in not
agreeing to a discount for photocopies in place of prints of the photos. Perini didn't need
more prints to make its case, and photocopies were much cheaper and easier to produce. The
authors of most works prepared for litigation should anticipate that copies will be made for
lawyers, judges, arbitrators, and witnesses. Perini would thus have been more persuasive if
it had focused on the contractual agreement to a certain price for extra copies, rather than on
the fact that the photos had been specially made for litigation purposes.
422. Members of Congress, for example, sometimes read articles from the New York
Times or Washington Post into the Congressional Record. Documentary filings with
regulatory agencies may also include appendices containing copyrighted materials proffered
as evidence in support of points made in the filing. Police and prosecutors may similarly
need to make copies of photographs and the like in the course of investigations. See Shell v.
City of Radford, 351 F. Supp. 2d 510 (W.D. Va. 2005) (fair use for police department to
copy and publicly display photographs of crime victim in the course of its investigation of a
murder in which the photographer was a suspect).
423. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 594-95 (1994) (reproducing
disputed lyrics); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 570-79
(1985) (reproducing a disputed article and portions of Ford's memoirs).
424. A similar presumption should apply to copying of litigation documents such as
complaints and briefs. This issue has not yet been litigated; it raises somewhat different
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Governmental actors should not, of course, be completely immune from
infringement claims for ordinary consumptive uses of copyrighted materials
that harm the market for those works.425 U.S. government actors cannot be
enjoined from making infringing copies, but would be obliged to
compensate copyright owners for ordinary infringements.4 26
C. Uses in Advertising
Although there is little direct evidence in the legislative history of the
1976 Act that Congress contemplated that commercial advertising uses
would be fair, fair use had occasionally been asserted in cases involving
commercial advertising under the 1909 Act,42 7 and, given that the
legislative history indicated that Congress did not mean to change fair use
law by putting the doctrine in the statute, it is fair to assume that fair use
might have some role in this already well-established and thriving
enterprise. Under the 1976 Act, fair use became a significant defense in
cases involving comparative advertising, truthful advertising, and market
research.
1. Comparative Advertising
The first post-1976 Act comparative advertising case was Triangle
Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc. 42 8 Knight-Ridder
reproduced copies of covers of past issues of TV Guide in advertisements
issues than those in Bond, Jartech, and Perini. For a detailed discussion of these issues, see
Davida H. Isaacs, The Highest Form of Flattery? Application of the Fair Use Defense
Against Copyright Claims for Unauthorized Appropriation of Litigation Documents, 71 Mo.
L. REV. 391 (2006). As original works of authorship fixed in a tangible medium of
expression, litigation documents are automatically copyrighted; yet, it is socially desirable
for lawyers to be able to continue to borrow from preexisting works, as has been a long-
standing custom in this field. The design of these documents may also be constrained by
requirements of the law. They thus raise similar issues to those in the adjudication-related
fair use cases.
425. Current interpretations of the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution bar
actions for damages against state government actors. See, e.g., Chavez v. Arte Publico Press,
204 F.3d 601 (5th Cir. 2000) (dismissing an infringement claim against the University of
Houston on sovereign immunity grounds). Courts can, however, enjoin specific government
actors as to future infringements. See, e.g., Salerno v. City Univ. of N.Y., 191 F. Supp. 2d
352 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (enjoining the director of an institute from infringements). The U.S.
government could, however, have been held liable for infringement damages in the Williams
& Wilkins case under 28 U.S.C. § 1498(b).
426. See 28 U.S.C. § 1498(b) (2000).
427. Under the 1909 Act, fair use defenses as to commercial ads did not fare well. See,
e.g., Amana Refrigeration, Inc. v. Consumers Union of the U.S., Inc., 431 F. Supp. 324
(N.D. Iowa 1977) (reproducing excerpts of a favorable review of a product in an ad held
unfair); Conde Nast Publ'ns, Inc. v. Vogue Sch. of Fashion Modelling, Inc., 105 F. Supp.
325 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (using Vogue magazine covers in ads for a modeling school held
unfair); Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. Pa. 1938)
(quoting three sentences from a book in a tobacco ad held unfair). But see Keep Thomson
Governor Comm. v. Citizens for Gallen Comm., 457 F. Supp. 957 (D.N.H. 1978) (using a
rival candidate's theme song in an ad held fair use).
428. 626 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1980).
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for its launch of a new competing television programming guide.4 29
Triangle argued that Knight-Ridder's commercial purpose cut against its
fair use defense and pointed to precedents that had rejected fair use defenses
raised by advertisers. 430
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit gave little weight to the
commercial purpose in Triangle because it "occurred in the course of a
truthful comparative advertisement," 431 pointing to a Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) report on public interests served by truthful
comparative ads.432  Knight-Ridder's use of TV Guide covers was,
moreover, "done in a manner which is generally accepted in the advertising
industry." 433  As the trial court had recognized, "[t]he comparative
advertising at issue here was clearly undertaken to inform the public that
they should purchase the Miami Herald TV supplement rather than buy TV
Guide because it provides more value for the money. '434 If Knight-
Ridder's ads had in fact drawn customers away from TV Guide, the court
thought this was due to customers having been persuaded by the message in
the ads, not because TV Guide covers were used in the ads.435
Comparative advertising was also challenged as infringement in Sony
Computer Entertainment America, Inc. v. Bleem, LLC.436 Bleem had
developed a computer program that emulated the functioning of the Sony
PlayStation.437 To show that its product could be used to play games
developed for the Sony platform, Bleem included a screen shot of a Sony
game in its ads.438 The court held that Bleem's use of the Sony screen shot
was very similar to the use in Triangle, and hence it was fair.439
429. Id. at 1172.
430. Id. at 1175n.12.
431. Id. at 1176n.13.
432. Id.
433. Id. at 1176. Knight-Ridder produced evidence that many magazines had reproduced
covers of other magazines in the course of comparative ads. Id. at 1176 n. 13.
434. Triangle Publ'ns, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 875, 883
(S.D. Fla. 1978). The trial judge was not persuaded by Knight-Ridder's fair use defense
because the comparative ad was not a critical commentary on TV Guide, nor was it a
scientific or educational use such as those emphasized in the preamble of § 107. Id. at 880-
83. However, the trial judge concluded that to enforce Triangle's copyright to block this
comparative advertising would be inimical to the First Amendment and inconsistent with
Supreme Court decisions such as Bates v. Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977). Triangle, 445 F.
Supp. at 882-85.
435. Triangle, 626 F.2d at 1177. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit briefly
discussed the second and third statutory fair use factors but did not find either of them as
potent as the first and fourth factors. Id. at 1176-77. The nature of the copyrighted work
factor did not cut in favor or against fair use. Id. at 1176. Only the covers and none of the
contents were copied, which the court did not regard as substantial. Id. at 1176-77.
436. 214 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2000).
437. Id. at 1024.
438. Id.




One pre-1976 Act case held that quoting three sentences from a book
about the risks of smoking in a commercial ad for cigarettes was an unfair
use of the text because its author had not consented to this kind of use.440
Under the 1976 Act, however, quoting from another author's work in
truthful advertising has been viewed more favorably.
A case in point is Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. General
Signal Corp.441  General Signal, the manufacturer of Regina vacuum
cleaners, placed ads in magazines and other media that quoted from a
positive assessment of its machines by Consumer Reports. 442 Consumers
Union (CU) sued General Signal for infringement, in part because the firm
had an explicit policy forbidding use of Consumer Reports's product
assessments in subsequent advertising; CU was concerned that consumers
would be misled into thinking that it was endorsing Regina cleaners.443
The Second Circuit viewed the purpose of the use to be reporting of
factual information,444 invoking General Signal's First Amendment
commercial speech interests in making available factual information about
its products. 445 Because Consumer Reports produced informational works,
the court noted that the scope of fair use of these works should be broader
to promote the free flow of information. 446  The company's use of
Consumer Reports' assessment was "in the interest of accuracy, not
piracy," 447 and only a small number of words were reproduced in the ads.
As the firm was not trying to supplant demand for Consumer Reports, the
court regarded the harm factor as favoring fair use as well. 448
440. See Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp. 302, 302, 304
(E.D. Pa. 1938).
441. 724 F.2d 1044, 1046-47 (2d Cir. 1983), petition for reh'g denied, 730 F.2d 47 (2d
Cir. 1984).
442. Id. at 1047.
443. Id. at 1046.
444. Id. at 1049.
445. Id. (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748 (1976) (recognized that commercial advertisements serve the public interest by
informing the public about products)).
446. Id. at 1049-50.
447. Id. The court pointed out that copying the exact words from Consumer Reports may
be "the only valid way [to] precisely. .. report the evaluation." Id. Judge James Lowell
Oakes dissented from the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc, insisting that since the
use was commercial, the first factor weighed against fair use, as did the harm factor.
Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Gen. Signal Corp., 730 F.2d at 48-50. Consumer Reports
made substantial investments in its research, and it would undermine its incentives to make
these investments if it could not control advertising uses of its assessments. Id. at 48-49.
448. For a similar case, see Sony Computer Entertainment America, Inc. v. Bleem, LLC,
214 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2000), in which the maker of a video game platform was held to
have made fair use when it reproduced screen shots of Sony video games in its





In many fields, it is customary to do market research about the efficacy of
competitors' activities, including of advertising campaigns. Some copying
of the competitors' materials may be necessary to do market research. Only
rarely has copyright infringement been alleged to challenge such research.
One such challenge was Bruzzone v. Miller Brewing Co.449 Donald
Bruzzone's consultancy business assessed the efficacy of ads shown on
broadcast television. 450 His firm regularly developed surveys that displayed
some frames from ads shown on broadcast TV and posed questions about
them. Bruzzone mailed the surveys to thousands of households and
tabulated and assessed the responses to the surveys. Bruzzone then
published a newsletter to report on the results of his surveys.451  The
producer of Miller beer objected to the use of its ads in the surveys.
Bruzzone claimed his use of the ads was fair because it was for research
purposes; he used the "minimum necessary to stimulate recognition" of the
ad; and there was no evidence that Bruzzone's use had harmed the market
for Miller ads.452 The court noted that survey research of this sort was a
customary and accepted practice in the advertising industry and that
"reliable market research results have value for the public [and] assist in
keeping the competitive marketplace free of distortion and confusion." 453
A more systematic and ubiquitous transmission of Infinity
Broadcasting's radio programs via telephone lines to customers of
Kirkwood's DialUp service was challenged in Infinity Broadcast, Corp. v.
Kirkwood,454 even though Kirkwood sought to justify the service as an aid
to market research and as a way for advertisers to monitor whether ads for
which they had paid had, in fact, been aired on the station.
4. Product Labels
Producers of some uncopyrightable goods use images or texts on the
labels of their products and assert that copying of those images (which are
often also claimed as trademarks), even for purposes such as promoting
sales of those goods, is infringement unless specifically authorized by the
copyright owner. The caselaw on this kind of advertising-related use of
copyrighted materials is sparse, but somewhat mixed. Two recent cases
involving Interet advertisements for the resale of sun tanning products
with copyrighted product labels reached inconsistent results. 455 Similar
449. 202 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 809 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
450. Id. at 810-11.
451. Id.
452. Id.
453. Id. at 811.
454. 150 F.3d 104, 104, 106, 109 (2d Cir. 1998).
455. Compare S&L Vitamins, Inc. v. Australian Gold, Inc., 521 F. Supp. 2d 188
(E.D.N.Y. 2007) (fair use to reproduce copyrighted trademark in order to resell products),
with Designer Skin, LLC v. S&L Vitamins, 560 F. Supp. 2d 811 (D. Ariz. 2008) (posting
photograph of tanning product label by Internet reseller was unfair). These cases raise issues
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inconsistencies have arisen in two cases involving Federal Drug
Administration-approved labels explaining the effects of chemicals in the
packaged products. 456
5. Weighing Factors in Advertising Fair Use Cases
Commercial advertisements may infringe copyrights if their makers
unfairly copy expression from an earlier work.4 5 7 But courts should be
careful about infringement claims in advertising-related fair use cases
because ads play such an important role in promoting competition among
goods and services. Courts should probably not presume that a use in an ad
is unfair based on its commerciality because, generally speaking, ads are
not marketed as copyrighted products in the same manner as books,
photographs, and sound recordings. The goal of an ad is to persuade
consumers to buy some other good or service, not to buy the ad itself. So
harm from copying an ad is unlikely to affect the market for the ad. Courts
should also be wary of cases in which claims of copyright infringement are
being asserted in order to thwart effective competition. 458
Under the 1976 Act, courts have been attentive to the public interest in
access to truthful information about products and services. As the FTC
report cited in Triangle recognized, "Comparative advertising, when
truthful and nondeceptive, is a source of important information to
similar to those in Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L'Anza Research International, 523
U.S. 135 (1998) (not infringement to import lawfully acquired bottles of shampoo whose
labels were copyrighted), and Euro-Excellence Inc. v. Kraft Canada Inc., [2007] 3 S.C.R. 20,
2007 S.C.R. LEXIS 305 (Can.) (not copyright infringement to import lawfully acquired
chocolate products whose labels were copyrighted).
456. Compare FMC Corp. v. Control Solutions, Inc., 369 F. Supp. 2d 539 (E.D. Pa. 2005)
(unfair use for generic manufacturer to use federally approved text on product labels), with
SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 211 F.3d 21 (2d
Cir. 2000) (not copyright infringement to reproduce federally approved label as to generic
product). SmithKline, in my view, had the better argument. The companies in both cases
had competed in the sale of noncopyrighted goods, and the texts of labels for those goods to
inform consumers about their proper usage were highly constrained by regulatory oversight.
457. See, e.g., Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y.
1987) (movie poster infringed copyright in earlier pictorial work).
458. A good example of an erroneous fair use analysis in a comparative advertising case
is Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1490 (E.D. Pa. 2000), in which
the trial court ruled that it was unfair for competitor to use the plaintiff's parts numbering
system in comparison charts to enable prospective customers to discern which parts to order
from it as substitutes for plaintiffs hardware products. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit later ruled that Southco's parts numbering system was unprotectable by
copyright law under 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 390 F.3d 276,
278 (3d Cir. 2004). The lower court's ruling against Kanebridge's fair use defense should,
therefore, be ignored. This opinion shows how courts can be led astray in fair use cases
when they don't pay attention to the value to society in making truthful information about
uncopyrightable hardware products available to the public and give too much weight to
commerciality as a purpose. Southco wasn't selling part numbers; it was selling
noncopyrighted hardware. All Kanebridge was trying to do was compete effectively with
Southco. The product labeling cases present similar risks of thwarting competition in
secondary markets.
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consumers and assists them in making rational purchase decisions.
Comparative advertising encourages product improvement and innovation,
and can lead to lower prices in the marketplace." 459 In cases like Triangle,
where a new directly competitive entrant is comparing its product with that
offered by an established player, courts should be especially attentive to
potentially anticompetitive reasons for challenging advertisements
"quoting" from the established product. First Amendment commercial
speech interests should be weighed into the fair use balance as well, and
courts should follow Triangle's lead by citing to First Amendment caselaw
when analyzing fair use cases involving advertising.
V. UNFORESEEN USES
One of the important functions of fair use is providing a balancing
mechanism within copyright law to allow it to address questions posed by
new technologies or other developments that the legislature could not or did
not contemplate. 460 The legislative history of the 1976 Act states that
Congress did not intend to freeze the law of fair use and expected it to
continue to evolve,461 as indeed it has done. This part demonstrates that
fair use has been used to resolve numerous disputes arising from new uses
of copyrighted works enabled by advances in technology, including time-
shift copying of television programs with the aid of video tape recording
machines, reverse engineering of computer programs, and Internet search
engine web crawling. The policies underlying the uses in these cases
include promoting competition and innovation in complementary
technology industries, furthering privacy and autonomy of users of
copyrighted works, and fostering enhanced public access to information.
A. Innovative Technologies that Facilitate Personal Uses
Although Congress expected that fair use would play some role in
regulating personal uses of copyrighted works, 462 it did not anticipate that
fair use would play a significant role in regulating the development of new
technologies and services designed to facilitate personal uses of copyrighted
works. Although Congress was aware that copyright owners had
challenged research library copying on behalf of its patrons (one kind of
personal use facilitation), it did not foresee that copyright owners would sue
459. Triangle Publ'ns, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, 626 F.2d 1171, 1176 n.13 (5th
Cir. 1980) (quoting 16 C.F.R. § 14.15(c) (1980)).
460. See, e.g., Samuelson, supra note 41, at 55-56 (discussing fair use as a doctrine that
allows copyright to evolve in response to challenges posed by new technologies).
461. The House report noted,
The bill endorses the purpose and general scope of the judicial doctrine of fair use,
but there is no disposition to freeze the doctrine in the statute, especially during a
period of rapid technological change. Beyond a very broad statutory explanation
of what fair use is and some of the criteria applicable to it, the courts must be free
to adapt the doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case basis.
H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 66 (1976).
462. See supra Part IV.A.
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developers of reprography technologies as infringement-facilitators or that
fair use would play such a critical role in determining which technologies
would survive such challenges and which would not.
The issue of technology developer liability for personal fair use
facilitation was first addressed in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City
Studios, Inc.463  Universal claimed that Sony was indirectly liable for
copyright infringement because it had manufactured and distributed
Betamax video tape recorders (VTRs) that materially contributed to
widespread copying of television programs, including movies made by
Universal, that Sony knew or had reason to know was infringement.464
The Court found no precedent in the copyright caselaw for imposing
copyright liability on an equipment manufacturer based on unauthorized
copying by its customers, and nothing in the 1976 Act or its legislative
history to indicate that Congress intended to extend copyright liability to
technology development.465 It took note that Congress had, however,
decided that technology developers should only be held liable for
contributory patent infringement if the firms made and sold technologies
lacking substantial noninfringing uses. 466 Firms that sell staple articles of
commerce (that is, technologies suitable for substantial noninfringing uses)
do not contributorily infringe patents, even if they, in fact, sell their
products to someone who uses them for infringing purposes. 467 Congress
balanced the interests of patent owners and the public and decided that the
public had legitimate interests in access to such technologies for their
noninfringing uses, and unlicensed developers should be free to make these
technologies to fulfill consumer demand for them. The Court found the
policies underlying this rule to be relevant to the question in Sony.4 6 8
The Court then addressed whether Sony's VTRs were suitable for
substantial noninfringing uses. It concluded they were, relying partly on
evidence that some copyright owners had authorized VTR taping of their
programs. 469 But it went on to decide that the widespread use of Betamax
463. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
464. Sony ads encouraged prospective customers to copy their favorite programs. Id. at
489-90 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
465. Id. at 435, 440. The Court further noted,
One may search the Copyright Act in vain for any sign that the elected
representatives of the millions of people who watch television every day have
made it unlawful to copy a program for later viewing at home, or have enacted a
flat prohibition against the sale of machines that make such copying possible.
Id. at 456.
466. Id. at 440-41 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1984), invalidated by Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999)).
467. See, e.g., DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS ch. 17 (2005).
468. The Court noted,
[T]he sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other articles of commerce, does
not constitute contributory infringement if the product is widely used for
legitimate, unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it need merely be capable of
substantial noninfringing uses.
Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
469. Id. at 442-47.
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VTRs to make time-shifted copies of television programs to watch the
programs at a later time was fair use. This was a private, noncommercial
activity that had not harmed and was unlikely to harm the market for
motion pictures. 470 Consumers accordingly had legitimate interests in
access to VTRs to get better access to television programs through time-
shifting, and companies such as Sony had a legitimate interest in being able
to offer Betamax machines to customers for these uses.
Sony established a safe harbor for the development of technologies
designed to facilitate personal fair uses. 471  This rule has sometimes
benefited not only consumers and technology developers, but also copyright
owners. Consumers may initially be drawn to new technologies, such as
VTRs or iPods, because of the personal uses they facilitate (e.g., time-
shifting TV programs or place-shifting music from their CD collections), 472
but the technologies often create opportunities for new complementary
markets for copyrighted works, such as the video cassette and DVD
markets for movies and the iTunes store for music.4 73
Early on, it may be "difficult, perhaps impossible, to predict whether and
to what degree any particular technology will exhibit this complementary
character." 474  The Sony safe harbor allows personal-use-facilitating
technologies to enter the market so that there is time to see if
complementary markets will emerge. "[F]air use, insofar as it represents
legal tolerance for private copying, plays an important and underappreciated
role in U.S. technology and innovation policy, particularly in that it draws
investment to technologies that are complementary goods to copyrighted
works." 475
Sony does not always shield technologists from copyright liability.
Copyright owners have successfully sued commercial bulletin board
services that knowingly facilitated infringement by encouraging customers
470. Id. at 450-55.
471. See, e.g., Von Lohmann, supra note 21, at 833-38 (giving examples of such
technologies). The Sony safe harbor has protected the development of many personal-use-
facilitating technologies with substantial noninfringing uses. In subsequent cases, the Sony
safe harbor shielded (1) the distribution of software that facilitated backup copying of
software, see Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988); (2) add-on
software that enhanced consumer enjoyment of Nintendo video games, see Lewis Galoob
Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992); and (3) MP3 players that
allowed users to listen to music from their CDs on a portable device, which the Ninth Circuit
characterized as a paradigmatic fair use, see Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond
Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 1999).
472. See, e.g., Von Lohmann, supra note 21, at 837 ("[T]here would be no iPod if Apple
could not count on copyright law to permit iPod buyers to copy their existing CD
collections.").
473. Id. at 840-43.
474. Id. at 843. "[E]stablished, successful firms often suffer from a persistent inability to
capitalize on certain kinds of innovation that may revolutionize the marketplace but do not
have predictably high profit margins." Id. at 844-45; see also id. at 845-50 (further
discussing the impediments that established firms experience in responding to disruptive
innovations).
475. Id. at 831.
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to upload and download copies of copyrighted software and photographs.476
Developers of P2P file-sharing technologies were similarly held liable for
knowingly contributing to or actively inducing their users to infringe.477
MP3.com failed to justify as fair use making a database of recorded music
ripped from thousands of purchased CDs in connection with its planned
service to facilitate personal uses of music for customers who owned CDs
of those recordings.478 Congress has also chosen to regulate some specific
technologies that threatened to undermine the ability to recoup rights holder
investments in creative works.479
Personal use facilitation does not provide a complete defense to
copyright challenges to new technologies and services, in part because not
all personal uses are fair uses. But fair use has become the lynchpin in the
technology-developer personal use facilitation cases. 480
B. Competition- and Innovation-Promoting Uses in the Software Industry
The legislative history of the 1976 Act does not suggest that Congress
expected that the fair use doctrine would play any role in promoting
competition in the software industry, such as regulating when reverse
engineering of software for purposes of extracting information to develop
an interoperable program would or would not be lawful.481 In numerous
cases in the past three decades, however, fair use defenses have been
successful when courts perceived copyright owners to be claiming
476. See, e.g., Sega Enters. Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 857 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994); Playboy
Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993). MAPHIA and Frena had both
argued that they were merely facilitating private noncommercial uses of these works under
Sony, but these services posed the -meaningful likelihood of harm to the market that Sony
recognized should be considered as unfair. Sega, 857 F. Supp. at 689; Playboy, 839 F. Supp.
at 1557-58.
477. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); see
also Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 914 (2005)
(remanding but noting that "one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use
to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster
infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties").
478. See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 350-52 (S.D.N.Y.
2000).
479. See Von Lohmann, supra note 21, at 856 n. 114 (giving examples).
480. Some have argued that First Amendment values and precedents support allowing
firms to make and distribute personal-use-facilitating technologies, such as peer-to-peer file-
sharing technologies, insofar as they are speech-facilitating technologies akin to printing
presses to which the public should have access unless the technologies lack noninfringing
uses. See Brief for Professors Edward Lee, Peter Shane & Peter Swire as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents, Grokster, 545 U.S. 913 (No. 04-480), available at
http://www.copyright.gov/docs/mgm/law-profs-lee.pdf.
481. At a 1965 hearing on computer technology issues, one witness from the electronics
industry raised the question of whether reverse engineering of programs should be lawful,
but he did not suggest fair use as an option for making it so. See Letter from Graham W.
McGowan, Gen. Counsel, Elecs. Indus. Ass'n, to Rep. Edwin E. Willis, Subcommittee No.
3, House Committee on the Judiciary (May 8, 1965), reprinted in Copyright Law Revision:




infringement in order to exclude competitors from a market482 or to block
development and distribution of complementary noninfringing products. 483
Several of the competition-promoting fair use cases involved intermediate
copying of protected works in the course of developing noninfringing
products.484
When Congress was finalizing its revisions to U.S. copyright law, it was
too early in the history of computer programming and in the evolution of
copyright as a form of legal protection for programs for Congress to have
considered whether reverse engineering of program code should be
privileged under fair use. 485 Not until 1992, in Sega Enterprises, Ltd. v.
Accolade, Inc.,486 was this new technology issue seriously addressed. Sega
sued Accolade for infringement because Accolade's engineers had made
copies of Sega's video game programs in the course of reverse engineering
them to extract information about Sega interfaces so that Accolade could
make its video games interoperate successfully with the Sega Genesis
console. 487 Accolade's principal defense was that it had made fair use of
the Sega programs.488
Sega was initially successful in persuading a trial judge that Accolade's
fair use defense was specious. 489 Sega invoked the Sony and Harper &
Row presumptions against fair use based on the commerciality of
Accolade's purpose and its intent to develop competing products that would
adversely affect the market for Sega games. 490 Sega further argued that
Accolade's attempt to get access to unpublished source code forms of its
programs was unfair under Harper & Row.491 Accolade had, moreover,
482. See, for example, Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir.
1992), amended by 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 78 (9th Cir. Jan. 6, 1993), discussed infra in
notes 486-511 and accompanying text.
483. See, e.g., Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir.
1992) (unsuccessful challenge to "Game Genie" program that allowed users to make fair
uses by temporarily changing some aspects of the play of Nintendo games). But see Clean
Flicks of Colo., LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236 (D. Colo. 2006) (not fair use for
firm to edit DVDs to block scenes or dialogue to omit sex or violence for customers who
wanted to see "family-friendly" movies).
484. See Sega, 977 F.2d 1510; see also infra note 512 (citing relevant cases).
485. Although the CONTU report discussed copyright protection for computer programs
in some detail, it did not consider reverse engineering at all, let alone opine whether doing so
should be considered infringement. See CONTU REPORT, supra note 321, ch. 3.
486. 977 F.2d 1510.
487. Id. at 1514-16.
488. Accolade's other defenses were discussed by the Ninth Circuit. Id. at 1517-20.
489. Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 1392, 1398 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 977 F.2d 1510.
490. Sega, 785 F. Supp. at 1398.
491. Id. In response to Accolade's argument that it was necessary to make copies for
reverse engineering purposes, the trial court expressed the view that the public's need for
access to Sega programs was "fully satisfied" by Sega's distribution of its games into the
marketplace. Id. The court was also convinced that the legislative history of copyright law
did not reveal congressional intent to privilege reverse engineering of software. Id. at 1398-
99. The court drew a negative inference from the fact that there was an explicit reverse
engineering privilege in the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act, but not in the copyright act.
Id.; see also Semiconductor Chip Protection Act, 17 U.S.C. § 906(a) (2006).
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copied the whole of Sega programs not just once, but multiple times. 492 In
addition to lost sales of Sega games due to competition from the Accolade
games, Sega pointed to lost revenues from the licensing program it had
established for developers of games for the Sega platform, a program that
Accolade had declined to join.493
The Ninth Circuit reversed with respect to copyright and trademark
infringement, and held that intermediate copying of computer programs for
a legitimate purpose such as achieving interoperability was a fair use.
494
While agreeing that Accolade had a commercial purpose in making copies
of Sega games, the court thought that Sega's insistence that it must presume
unfairness was "far too simple and ignores a number of important
considerations." 495 A closer look at Accolade's purpose revealed that it had
the legitimate and nonexploitative purpose of studying the functional
requirements for achieving compatibility with the Genesis console.496 The
court was, moreover, "free to consider the public benefit resulting from a
particular use," which in Sega had "led to an increase in the number of
independently designed video game programs offered for use with the
Genesis console," 497 which was "precisely [the kind of] growth in creative
expression... that the Copyright Act was intended to promote. 498
Even if the availability of Accolade's Genesis-compatible games caused
some minor economic loss to Sega, this was the result of ordinary
competition among noninfringing works, not of Accolade's use of
expression from the Sega programs. The court regarded Sega as having
"attempt[ed] to monopolize the market by making it impossible for others
to compete," a result that "runs counter to the statutory purpose of
promoting creative expression." 499 This misuse of copyright seems to have
undercut Sega's claim and strengthened Accolade's fair use defense.
500
The Sega decision gave considerable attention to the nature of the work
factor, in part because the scope of copyright protection for computer
programs is quite thin since programs embody many functional design
elements that copyright law does not protect, including information
pertinent to achieving interoperability among programs. 50 1 The only way to
get access to unprotected aspects of programs distributed in machine-
executable forms was to decompile or disassemble them, which inevitably
492. The trial court did not emphasize the wholesale copying in its fair use analysis,
although this is apparent from reading the whole decision. See Sega, 785 F. Supp. at 1398-
99.
493. The trial court did not emphasize this latter source of lost revenues; the Ninth
Circuit's decision mentions the Sega licensing program and Accolade's decision not to
participate in it. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1514.
494. Id.
495. Id. at 1522.
496. Id.
497. Id. at 1523.
498. Id.
499. Id. at 1523-24.
500. See id.
501. Id. at 1524.
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requires making intermediate copies.502 Finally, the court recognized that
"[i]f disassembly of copyrighted object code is per se an unfair use, the
owner of the copyright gains a de facto monopoly over the functional
aspects of his work-aspects that were expressly denied copyright
protection by Congress" under 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).50 3 To obtain exclusive
rights over functional design elements of programs, "the creator of the work
must satisfy the more stringent standards imposed by the patent laws."'50 4
Thus, the nature of the work factor also cut in favor of Accolade's fair use
defense.
The one factor that weighed against Accolade's fair use defense was that
it had copied entire programs.5 05 But the Ninth Circuit invoked Sony for its
ruling that copying an entire work did not preclude fair use. 50 6 Given the
intermediate nature of the copies, the Ninth Circuit concluded that this
factor should not be given much weight. 50 7
The Ninth Circuit concluded its fair use analysis in Sega with several
observations. First, the case had presented a novel question as to a subject
matter with which courts had relatively little experience. 508 It invoked Sony
as observing that "[w]hen technological change has rendered an aspect or
application of the Copyright Act ambiguous," the law should be construed
in light of its public policies, such as the exclusion of functional designs. 509
It also responded to Sega's argument that Accolade was free riding on
Sega's substantial investment in the success of its video game system by
pointing to Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. 510
Specifically, the Feist court rejected the sweat-of-the-brow basis for
copyright claims and endorsed freedom to reuse unprotected elements in
copyrighted works as consistent with the constitutional purpose of
copyright law. 51'
Sega has been followed in a steady stream of cases involving reverse
engineering of computer software. 512 Reverse engineering fair use defenses
502. Id. at 1525-26.
503. Id. at 1526; see also 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006) (denying protection to any "idea,
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery").
504. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1526 (citing Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489
U.S. 141, 159-64 (1989)).
505. Id. at 1526.
506. Id.
507. Id. at 1526-27. For further discussion of the implications of Sony and Sega for other
new technology uses of copyrighted works, see, for example, Samuelson, supra note 41;
Samuelson, supra note 319.
508. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1527.
509. Id.
510. Id. (citing Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991)).
511. Id. (discussing Feist).
512. See, e.g., Sony Computer Entm't, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 599 (9th
Cir. 2000) (copying of program code for purposes of discerning interface information to
make a compatible platform was fair use under Sega); DSC Commc'ns Corp. v. DGI Techs.,
Inc., 81 F.3d 597, 601 (5th Cir. 1996); Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1539
(1 th Cir. 1996); see also Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 843-44
(Fed. Cir. 1992); Evolution, Inc. v. Suntrust Bank, 342 F. Supp. 2d 943, 955-56 (D. Kan.
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have, however, sometimes been unsuccessful, 513 as when defendants
obtained unlawful access to the software or copied expression from the
software being reverse engineered. 514
Fair use has also played a role in regulating the development of add-on
software and of add-on activities of licensed users of copyrighted materials.
In Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo ofAmerica, Inc.,515 for instance, the
Ninth Circuit ruled that users of Galoob's "Game Genie," which allowed
them to make temporary changes to the play of some aspects of Nintendo
games (e.g., extending the "life" of a particular character), had made fair
use of those games. 516 Galoob was consequently not an infringer either. 517
Makers of computer software that bypassed scenes of DVD movies that
involved violence, nudity, or foul language relied on Galoob in arguing that
they too should not be held liable for infringement. 518 During the pendency
2004) (intermediate copying for purposes of extracting information to develop noninfringing
interoperable products held fair use). Sega has also had some significance in cases involving
works other than computer software, which involved intermediate copying for purposes of
developing noninfringing products. See, e.g., Nautical Solutions Mktg., Inc. v. Boats.com,
No. 8:02-cv-760-T-23TGW, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6304 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 1, 2004)
(intermediate copying to extract information about boats listed for sale); Ticketmaster Corp.
v. Tickets.Com, Inc., No. CV99-7654-HLH, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6483 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7,
2003) (intermediate copying of website to extract information on tickets being sold); see also
Bellsouth Adver. & Publ'g Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Publ'g, Inc., 999 F.2d 1436 (1 1th Cir.
1993) (en banc) (intermediate copying of information from yellow pages into database for
purposes of preparing a competing yellow pages directory did not infringe copyright).
513. See DSC Commc'ns Corp. v. Pulse Commc'ns, Inc., 170 F.3d 1354, 1363 (Fed. Cir.
1999) (reverse engineering to demonstrate interchangeability of plaintiff's and defendant's
cards not fair use); Compaq Computer Corp. v. Procom Tech., Inc., 908 F. Supp. 1409, 1421
(S.D. Tex. 1995) (copying of software for purposes of duplicating prefailure warnings on
compatible hard drives held not fair use). I find DSC Communications Corp. v. Pulse
Communications, Inc. and Compaq Computer Corp. v. Procom Technology, Inc. to be
unpersuasive and incompatible with the core analysis in Sega and its progeny. I have
elsewhere argued that decompilation or disassembly of computer program code for other
legitimate purposes besides obtaining information necessary to achieve interoperability (e.g.,
to figure out how to fix malfunctioning code) is also fair use. See Pamela Samuelson,
Comparing U.S. and EC Copyright Protection for Computer Programs: Are They More
Different than They Seem?, 13 J.L. & CoM. 279,285-92 (1994).
514. See, e.g., Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003); DSMC,
Inc. v. Convera Corp., 479 F. Supp. 2d 68, 83 (D.D.C. 2007) (unfair use when the defendant
gained unlawful access to the plaintiffs program to reverse engineer it). Another factor
given weight in Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc. was that a shrinkwrap license term
forbade reverse engineering of the software at issue. 320 F.3d at 1323-24.
515. 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992).
516. Id. at 972. In keeping with Sony, the Ninth Circuit presumed that this private,
noncommercial use of Nintendo games was fair; because users had to own Nintendo games
in order to use the Game Genie, there was no risk of supplanting demand for the games. Id.
at 969-70.
517. Since there were no underlying acts of infringement, there was no basis for imposing
secondary liability. Id. at 970. But see Micro Star v. Formgen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1113 (9th
Cir. 1998) (ruling that a third-party compiler of user-generated content that built on top of a
copyrighted game made unfair use of MAP files in the underlying program).
518. See, e.g., Ashley Kerns, Note, Modified to Fit Your Screen: DVD Playback
Technology, Copyright Infringement or Fair Use?, 24 LoY. L.A. ENT. L. REv. 483, 484-85
(2004).
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of a lawsuit concerning this software, Congress enacted legislation that
specifically exempted this kind of software from infringement claims. 519
The availability of alternative means to make movies "family-friendly" was
a significant factor in defeating a fair use claim made by a firm that altered
actual DVD disks so that "harmful" content in the movies would not be
rendered when the DVD played. 520
Several lessons emerge from the competition- and innovation-promoting
fair use cases. First, the commerciality of a second comer's use should be
given relatively little weight in these cases, as competition-promoting uses
will almost always be for commercial purposes. Second, the nature of the
copyrighted work factor may be more significant in these kinds of fair use
cases than in other types of fair use cases. In software reverse engineering
cases, for example, there is no other way to get the information except by
making copies. Third, attention should be given in these kinds of cases to
the markets that the plaintiff and defendant are in, their respective market
power, whether the defendant's use is supplanting the market for the
plaintiffs work or is for legitimate competitive purposes, the impacts that
the fair use determination will have on competitive entry and effective
competition, and whether the defendant is engaged in fair follow-on
activities or market-destructive free riding.
Also important may be the intermediate nature of any copying and its
necessity, whether the plaintiff is trying to misuse or extend its copyright
beyond its proper bounds, and whether the plaintiff is trying to exercise
undue control over complementary or supplementary markets. There is a
substantial public interest in getting access to new noninfringing products
and services that should be weighed in the fair use balance. But defendants
who gain unlawful access to protected works or breach contracts as to them
should not expect that their uses will be fair, even when the uses promote
competition.
C. Access to Information-Promoting Fair Uses
One significant cluster of unanticipated use cases has involved Internet
search engine copying for the purpose of indexing or otherwise making
information about protected works more publicly accessible.521 Internet
519. Family Movie Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-9, §§ 201-202, 119 Stat. 218, 223-24
(codified at 17 U.S.C. § 110(11) (2006)).
520. Clean Flicks of Colo., LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1240 (D. Colo.
2006).
52 1. At least one fair use case predating the Internet involved access to information. In
New York Times, Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 217 (D.N.J. 1977), the
defendants had prepared a personal names index to a set of New York Times indices. In
assessing Roxbury's fair use defense to the Times' charge of infringement, the court
observed,
It seems likely that defendants' index will serve the public interest in the
dissemination of information. Without defendants' index, an individual seeking to
find articles which appeared in The New York Times on a certain person whose
career spanned, say, forty years, would be compelled to search through forty
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search engines use web crawling software to copy information posted on
the Internet; they typically cache these copies to facilitate faster access to
them, process them to index the contents and/or to create thumbnail images,
and display links to websites where the content can be found.
The first major challenge to Internet search engine copying was Kelly v.
Arriba Soft Corp.522 Leslie Kelly, a commercial photographer, had posted
his photographs of the American West on his website. 523 Arriba Soft used
web crawling software to copy images on open sites on the Internet,
including Kelly's. After inputting the copies to its database, Arriba Soft
processed the data to produce thumbnail-size images. 524 Its search engine
would then serve up thumbnails responsive to user queries (e.g., "show me
photos of the Grand Canyon"). 525 Users could decide which image best
satisfied their queries and follow the link to the site where full-size images
could be found.526 Kelly claimed that the thumbnail-size images of his
photos without a license constituted infringement. 527
volumes of the Times Index. Using defendants' index, the researcher would
discover immediately the pages and volumes of the Times Index on which the
name of his subject appears. Armed with this information, the researcher then can
proceed to a few of the forty potentially relevant volumes of the Times Index, from
which he will be directed to the pages and columns of The New York Times itself.
On its face, defendants' index appears to have the potential to save researchers a
considerable amount of time and, thus, facilitate the public interest in the
dissemination of information.
Id. at 221. The purpose of the use factor thus favored fair use, as did the nature of the
copyrighted work factor, for the Times indices were informational works that required more
diligence than creativity to produce, and the information in these works was beyond the
scope of copyright protection. Id. While Roxbury had taken a substantial amount of
information from the Times' indices, this was counterbalanced by the fact that Roxbury
could not prepare a personal name index without copying this information. Id. at 222. The
Roxbury index, moreover, did not supplant the market for the Times' indices. Id. at 223. Its
index "is not another version of plaintiffs' index, but a work with a different function and
form." Id. at 225. The fact that the Times then asserted an interest in entering the market for
creating such an index was not sufficient evidence of harm to the market to undermine
Roxbury's fair use defense. Id. at 225-26. Roxbury was not relied upon in any of the
Internet search engine cases.
Other post-1976 Act information-access fair use cases include N.A.D.A. Services
Corp. v. Business Data of Virginia, Inc., 651 F. Supp. 44, 49 (E.D. Va. 1986) (fair use to
prepare computer tape of information from compilation purchased from plaintiff to facilitate
access to the data), Dow Jones & Co. v. Board of Trade, 546 F. Supp. 113, 120 (S.D.N.Y.
1982) (fair use to reuse Dow Jones' averages), and Kipling v. G. P. Putnam's Sons, 120 F.
631, 635 (2d Cir. 1903) (preparing an index to the poets' works not infringement).
522. 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003).
523. Id. at 815.
524. Id. After creating the thumbnail images, the larger images were deleted from the
search engine database. Id.
525. Id.
526. Id. at 815-16. In the first half of 1999, the defendant's search engine created an in-
line link to the larger images, which made it appear to the user that the full-sized image was
being displayed on the search engine's site; thereafter, the results page provided links to take
the user to the source page for the image. Id.
527. Leslie Kelly apparently did not claim that the copying done by the web crawling
software or in the database prior to making thumbnail-sized images were infringements,
perhaps because these intermediate copies were likely be fair uses under Sega. Web
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The Ninth Circuit characterized Arriba Soft's thumbnails as
"transformative" of Kelly's images.528 Arriba Soft's thumbnails were, of
course, smaller in size and of lower resolution than Kelly's full-sized
images, but the thumbnails were demonstrably iterative copies of Kelly's
photos.529  The court may have felt compelled to characterize the
thumbnails as transformative to avoid the presumption of harm to the
market that Campbell endorsed when a second comer's use was both
commercial and nontransformative. 530  But it would be more
straightforward simply to say that Arriba Soft's thumbnail images "served
an entirely different function than Kelly's original images,"' 531 that is, they
had an orthogonal purpose. Arriba Soft had created the thumbnails to
"improve access to images on the internet," not to supplant the demand for
the aesthetic experience that Kelly's photos might evoke. 532 The purpose
factor thus favored Arriba Soft "due to the public benefit of the search
engine and the minimal loss of integrity to Kelly's images. '533 These
considerations should be recognized as sound bases for characterizing the
thumbnails as fair in Kelly, even if they are not really transformative.
The nature of the work factor slightly favored Kelly because his works
were quite creative; yet this was counterbalanced by Kelly's having
published the photos on the open Internet.534 The amount of the taking
factor favored neither party, for "although Arriba [Soft] did copy each of
Kelly's images as a whole, it ... was necessary for Arriba [Soft] to copy
the entire image to allow users to recognize the image and decide whether
to pursue more information about the image or the originating web site. '535
Arriba Soft's search engine helped users find Kelly's photos so that they
could buy them from him or his licensees, 536 which undercut the argument
that Arriba Soft's use would harm the market for the photos.537
Like Arriba Soft, Google creates thumbnails of images so that its search
engine can help users find relevant images on the Internet. In its lawsuit
against Google, 538 Perfect 10 sought to distinguish Kelly on two grounds:
crawling and cache copying of copyrighted works were unsuccessfully challenged as
infringements in Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006), discussed infra
notes 542-53 and accompanying text.
528. Kelly, 336 F.3d at 819.
529. Id. at 815.
530. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591 (1994).
531. Kelly, 336 F.3dat 818.
532. Id.
533. Id. at 820.
534. Id.
535. Id. at 821.
536. Id. The Ninth Circuit also considered that Arriba Soft's thumbnail images also lost
clarity if someone tried to enlarge them, Which is why they could not supplant demand for
good resolution images, an especially important feature of photographic images. Moreover,
Kelly did not license or sell thumbnails, so the Arriba Soft thumbnails were not displacing
this market. Id.
537. Id. at 821-22.
538. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007). Google
relied on Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp. not only in Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., but also
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first, because it had licensed thumbnail-sized images of its photos to a cell
phone company, thereby showing the existence of a licensing market that
Google's thumbnails might partly supplant; and second, because Google
was making money through its AdSense program when it served up
thumbnails in response to user queries.539 The Ninth Circuit ruled that
neither consideration altered the fair use calculus struck in Kelly,540 and
reversed a lower court's preliminary ruling that Google's thumbnails were
unfair.541
Field v. Google Inc.542 more directly addressed the question about
whether web crawler and cache copies of Internet content may themselves
qualify as fair use because they facilitate enhanced public access to
information. Field registered his copyright in numerous writings that he
posted on a website from which his texts could be downloaded for free. 543
As Field anticipated, Google's web crawling program visited his site, made
copies of its contents, stored those copies in a cache on its servers, and in
response to relevant queries, Google served up snippets of the site's
contents as well as a link to the host site and to its cache of the relevant
information. 544 Field charged Google with copyright infringement, alleging
that the web crawler copying, the cache copying, and the snippet copying
were copyright infringements, for which he sought $2.55 million in
statutory damages ($50,000 per infringed work).545 Google defended the
lawsuit by claiming these acts were fair use. 546
in a lawsuit that the Authors Guild and some publishers brought to challenge its Book Search
project, which scanned books from major research libraries for purposes of indexing them to
make snippets available in response to user queries. See Posting of Michael K. Dunn to
Intellectual Property Law Blog, http://www.intellectualpropertylawblog.com/archives/
copyrights-the-google-book-digitization-settlement-the-fair-use-question-remains.htmI (Dec.
8, 2008) (discussing the Google Book Search lawsuit). Drawing upon the Field case
discussed below, Google also made a market failure argument for fair use, arguing that
transaction costs for clearing all of the rights in the books being scanned were prohibitively
high. This lawsuit was recently settled. See Settlement Agreement, The Authors Guild, Inc.
v. Google Inc., No. 05 CV 8136-JES (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2008), available at
http://www.googlebooksettlement.com/r/view_settlement-agreement.
539. See Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1161-62; see also Timothy B. Lee, Google v. Perfect 10:
Appeals Court Affirms that Thumbnails Are Fair Use, ARS TECHNICA, May 17, 2007,
http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20070517-google-v-perfect- 10-appeals-court-affirms-
that-thumbnails-are-fair-use.html.
540. There was no evidence of any downloading of Google thumbnails to mobile phones,
and hence, no harm to Perfect 10's licensing market; moreover, evidence of a connection
between the AdSense program and infringement was too speculative to change the fair use
calculus. Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1165-68.
541. Id.
542. 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006). See also Parker v. Google, Inc., 422 F. Supp.
2d 492 (E.D. Pa. 2006), aff'd, 242 F. App'x 833 (3d Cir. 2007), where the Third Circuit
affirmed dismissal of direct and indirect infringement claims for Google's web crawler's
copying of writings freely available on the Internet.
543. Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1114.
544. Id.
545. Id. at 1110.
546. Id. Google also argued that there was no direct infringement by virtue of automated
copying by its web crawling and caching software and raised an implied license and an
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The factor that weighed most heavily against Field's copyright claims
was the court's perception that he had "manufacture[d]" his claims of
infringement "in the hopes of making money from Google's standard
practice." 547  But another important factor was the exceptionally high
transaction costs that Google would have incurred if it had to seek and
obtain permission for every copy its web crawlers made of Internet
content.548 There was, moreover, a simple technological fix available to
Field if he didn't want his content to be web-crawled. 549
The court considered at length the positive purposes served by Google's
web crawling and caching activities, including its enablement of searches
for access to content when the original page was inaccessible (for example,
because the website's server was down), for detecting changes in website
content over time, and for discerning why the search engine considered the
site to be responsive to the search query term. 550  As in Kelly, the
differences in function between the copies of Field's works on his website,
on the one hand, and web crawling and cache copies, on the other, caused
the court to conclude that Google's copying was transformative
(notwithstanding the fact that the Google web crawler and cache copies
were 100% identical, iterative copies of Field's content).551 Also weighing
in favor of fair use was Google's good faith in operating its system cache,
as evidenced by its practice of taking down any cached content upon receipt
of notice of objection from its owner.552 The fact that Field had posted
copies of his works on an open site on the Internet affected the court's
judgment on the nature of the work factor, the substantiality of the taking
factor, and the harm to the market factor.5 53
Among the factors highly relevant in information access cases are: (1)
whether the putative fair user is, in fact, facilitating better access to publicly
available copyrighted works; (2) whether the information-access tool is
making searches more efficient and effective; (3) whether copying is
necessary or reasonable in order to facilitate better access; (4) whether
transaction costs for seeking and obtaining permission are such that a
market cannot readily be formed; and (5) whether the information-access
tool made by the defendant is superseding or supplanting the market for the
plaintiffs work. When the defendant's information-access tool enhances
estoppel defense. Id. at 1109. The court granted Google's summary judgment motion on all
grounds. Id. at 1109.
547. Id. at 1113. Field had created all fifty-one allegedly infringed writings in a three-day
period before posting them on his website. Id. at 1114.
548. Id. at 1122 (noting that "[t]here is compelling evidence that site owners would not
demand payment for this use of their works").
549. Id. at 1113-14. Field knew that he could use a robots.txt file to signal that he did not
want data on his site to be web-crawled and that he could ask Google not to supply cached
links to his writings. Id. Indeed, he created a robots.txt file that signaled that bots were
allowed to copy his data. Id. at 1114.
550. Id. at 1118-19.
551. Id.
552. Id. at 1122-23.
553. Id. at 1120-22.
2614 [Vol. 77
UNBUNDLING FAIR USES
the market and value of the copyrighted work, this should be counted as a
positive factor for fair use, as it was in Kelly.554 The good faith of the
defendant in making the information-access tool available and its superior
insight about the market opportunity for the information-access tool should
also cut in favor of fair uses in these cases.
In Internet access cases, it should further be relevant whether the plaintiff
made its work available on open sites on the Internet and/or declined an
opportunity to opt out of the information-access tool. The commerciality of
the defendant's purpose should be given little weight because developing
useful information-access tools is sufficiently expensive that the defendant
would most likely need to recoup its expenses. Similarly, the nature of the
work-whether informational or creative-should generally be given less
weight in information-access cases because improving access to the
plaintiffs work is socially valuable regardless of its creative status. Even a
plaintiffs willingness to license the new market for information access to
its work should be given little weight, as the chance for enhancing the
market for the work by better access is a more important consideration.
Lastly, courts should recognize that iterative copying is often required in
order to make a useful information-access tool; this kind of iterative
copying should be recognized as an orthogonal use, rather than being
characterized as transformative. 555 The information-access cases support
the argument that iterative copying sometimes serves copyright values. 556
This is not to say that all information-access-promoting uses will be fair
or should be presumed fair. Peer-to-peer file sharing, for example,
promotes access to information (e.g., commercially distributed sound
recordings and music). However, if owners of copyrights in such works
have not made their works freely available on open sites on the Internet, the
risk is substantial that shared copies will supplant demand for purchased
copies. In view of this, such uses have been and should be ruled unfair.557
CONCLUSION
Given the wide array of fair use cases decided under the 1976 Act and the
many policy-relevant clusters into which they fall, one might wonder
whether it is possible to discern any fundamental principle underlying U.S.
fair use law. Over the years, commentators have proffered numerous
conceptions of the underlying principle, rationale, and/or justification for
554. Courts are generally skeptical of arguments that a second author (e.g., the producer
of a movie) should escape liability for wrongdoing merely because it enhanced the market
for the original work (e.g., a novel) because its unauthorized derivative work was successful
in the marketplace. See, e.g., Metro-Goidwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta Coop. Prods.,
Inc., 479 F. Supp. 351 (N.D. Ga. 1979). However, information-access cases may enhance
the market for the original work without superseding a foreseeable market for authorized
derivatives.
555. Tushnet, supra note 40, at 555-56 (objecting to judicial insistence on
transformativeness).
556. Id. at 590.
557. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
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fair use. Some of these seem to have fallen out of use and no longer seem
persuasive. Consider, for instance, the implied consent theory, articulated
in the Latman study, which posits that by deciding to publish her work, an
author impliedly consents to others quoting from it in a review or in some
subsequent work on the same subject. 558 A similar reasonable author
consent theory posits that fair use is a use that a reasonable author would
consent to. 559 While Justice Sandra Day O'Connor mentioned this second
conception of fair use in Harper & Row,560 it has had very little purchase in
fair use caselaw since then and is an infirm foundation for fair use because
it is too narrow and amorphous. Also outmoded is the conception of fair
use as a "subsidy" to next-generation authors or a "tax" imposed on first-
generation authors that can only be justified if the second author has made
productive uses of the first author's work by contributing new knowledge
through follow-on works. 561
More common today are justifications of fair use as an appropriate
response to market failure, 562 as a doctrine internal to copyright that
accommodates First Amendment free speech and free expression
interests, 563 as a doctrine that promotes semiotic democracy, 564 and/or as a
doctrine that prevents stifling the very creativity copyright law was
designed to foster.565 While fair use certainly serves these purposes, each
of these conceptions of fair use encompasses only some important aspects
of fair use, especially those discussed in Parts I and II, not the whole of fair
use.
Reverse engineering of computer programs to get access to interface
information is, for example, difficult to justify under these modern
conceptions of fair use, as are litigation uses. Nor can these conceptions
accommodate ordinary personal uses, such as copying music from a
purchased CD and loading it onto an iPod. The First Amendment, semiotic
democracy, and risks of stifling creativity justifications for fair use are not
really relevant to whether this type of use is fair. Platform-shifting is a
closer case; yet, it may not fit within the market failure conception insofar
as the same songs may be available on iTunes for a relatively modest fee,
which the copyright owner does not get when a person loads the songs from
her CD to her iPod. Yet, even the recording industry accepts that this type
of use is lawful. 566
558. LATMAN, supra note 27, at 2-3.
559. A third outmoded theory of fair use in the Latman study was the bargain theory,
which posited that, in exchange for a grant of exclusive rights in their works, authors granted
the public fair use privileges. Id. at 7.
560. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549-50 (1985).
561. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 478 (1984).
562. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 200, at 1620-21.
563. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003); Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at
560.
564. Fisher, supra note 297, at 1744-54.
565. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994).
566. See Von Lohmann, supra note 21, at 833 n.13.
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Is there any conception of fair use capable of encompassing the wide
array of uses discussed in this Article? I believe there is, and it can be
derived from viewing copyright as a limited monopoly, 567 the primary
purpose of which is to promote the public good, or as the U.S. Constitution
puts it, "promote the [p]rogress of Science and useful Arts. '568 Copyright
law promotes the public good by protecting authors and other rights holders
from uses of their works that unfairly appropriate the commercial value of
their work. But copyright also promotes the public good when subsequent
authors are able to draw upon existing works in making and preparing to
make new works, when members of the public are able to use copyrighted
materials in a way that allows them to make a range of reasonable uses that
pose no meaningful likelihood of harm to the markets for protected works,
and when developers of new technologies provide new opportunities for the
public to make such reasonable uses. 569
The limited monopoly conception of copyright would consider fair use as
a defense to claims of infringement insofar as the defendant must raise the
issue in its answer, but this does not mean necessarily that the defendant
should bear the burden of proving that its use was fair. Section 107, on its
face, does not require that defendants offer such proof, as it merely says that
a fair use is not an infringement.5 70  Nor does the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence resolve the burden of proof issue. 571  Very few fair use
decisions discuss burden of proof issues, for courts typically decide whether
a use is fair without saying in whose favor the issue would tip if the
evidence were perfectly in equipoise.
Courts should treat fair use as they would statute of limitations defenses,
which a defendant must raise in answering a complaint, after which the
burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the acts complained of
were recent enough to be within the limitations period. Given the important
role that fair use plays in mediating tensions between copyright law and the
First Amendment and other constitutional values, it would be appropriate
for the burden of showing unfairness to be on the copyright owner. 572
567. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429
(1984).
568. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
569. These uses may be commercial or noncommercial in nature, public or private,
transformative, productive, or iterative, within the six favored uses in § 107 or for some
other purpose, and foreseen by Congress or unforeseeable.
570. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
571. Although the Supreme Court's fair use jurisprudence in Campbell certainly spoke of
fair use as an "affirmative defense," the Court did not really consider the burden of proof
issue. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994). Campbell's
endorsement of a presumption that a use will harm the market when it is both commercial
and nontransformative demonstrates that the Court has not fully thought through burdens of
proof Id. at 591. Such a presumption would seemingly doubly burden defendants by
making them not only prove that their use was fair but also show that the presumption of
market harm was unsound.
572. This approach is consistent with that set forth in Daniel J. Gervais, Towards a New
Core International Copyright Norm: The Reverse Three-Step Test, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP.
L. REv. 1 (2005).
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When deciding whether to challenge a use as infringement, rights holders
often anticipate that fair use will be at issue in the case, and they are
typically in a better position than defendants to offer proof on key issues
pertinent to fair use, such as the likelihood of harm to the market. If
copyright owners cannot show that a use is likely to cause harm to markets
for their works, why shouldn't the use be allowed as fair? At the very least,
copyright owners should bear the burden of proving unfairness in free
speech/expression, personal use, and litigation use cases.
Fair use is an essential doctrine in U.S. copyright law that
counterbalances what would otherwise be an unreasonably broad grant of
rights to authors and an unduly narrow set of negotiated exceptions and
limitations.573 As Judge Pierre Leval once observed, "[flair use should be
perceived not as a disorderly basket of exceptions to the rules of copyright,
nor as a departure from the principles governing that body of law, but rather
as a rational, integral part of copyright, whose observance is necessary to
achieve the objectives of that law."574 As Professor Beebe has recently
noted, fair use defines "the contours of the private and public domains of
human expression and, in doing so, directly impact[s] our capability for
human flourishing." 575 It is not just an economic doctrine that calls for a
cost-benefit analysis; fair use "goes to the core of what constitutes a good
society." 576 It is in this respect a "constitutive doctrine" of copyright law
that "reduces to a nutshell the foundational assumptions of the law
itself."' 577 Although fair use began as a distinctively American copyright
doctrine, 578 commentators throughout the world have come to realize that
copyright law is incomplete when viewed only as a law of author's rights,
for the public has important interests in zones of free uses; exceptions and
limitations on author's rights, including fair use, which reflect those
interests, are an integral part of all modern copyright systems. 579
573. See, e.g., LITMAN, supra note 382, chs. 2-3 (discussing the political economy of
copyright legislation as to the grant of broad exclusive rights and narrow limitations).
574. Leval, supra note 12, at 1107.
575. Barton Beebe, Does Judicial Ideology Affect Copyright Fair Use Outcomes?:
Evidence from the Fair Use Case Law, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 517, 522 (2008).
576. Id.
577. Goldstein, supra note 27, at 434.
578. Israel has recently adopted a fair use provision in its law. See, e.g., Jonathan Band,
Editorial, Israel Now Has the Right Copyright Law, JERUSALEM POST, Mar. 26, 2008,
available at http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid = 1206446110027&pagename=JPost%
2FJPArticle%2FPrinter (discussing its fair use provision).
579. See, e.g., P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ & RUTH L. OKEDI, CONCEIVING AN
INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENT ON LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS TO COPYRIGHT, FINAL
REPORT (2008), available at http://www.soros.org/initiatives/information/
articlespublications/publications/copyright_20080506/copyright_20080506.pdf; Abraham
Drassinower, Taking Users Rights Seriously, in IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE FUTURE OF
CANADIAN COPYRIGHT LAW 462 (Michael Geist ed., 2005), available at
http://www.irwinlaw.cornPubliclnterest/three_2_drassinower.htm; Daniel Gervais, Making
Copyright Whole: A Principled Approach to Copyright Exceptions and Limitations (Feb.
I1, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Fordham Law Review).
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This Article's review of the past thirty years of fair use law should be
encouraging to those who have been concerned about the (un)predictability
of fair use. Fair use defenses are generally successful in transformative and
productive use cases as long as the defendants are careful about how much
they take in relation to their purpose for doing so. This pattern is especially
evident in the free speech/expression and authorship-promoting policy
clusters.
Even iterative copying of an earlier work has often qualified as fair use in
various situations: when it is done for a purpose orthogonal to the purpose
for which the work was originally created (e.g., to prove some point, as in
'Geis, or to compare two products, as in Triangle); when it is done as an
intermediate step in the development of a new noninfringing product (e.g.,
to reverse engineer a computer program to get access to interface
information); when it is done to enhance information access (e.g., to index
or cache web content); or when it constitutes an ordinary personal use (e.g.,
time-shift copying of television programs). Iterative copying has, in fact,
been found to be fair use in virtually all clusters of the fair use caselaw.
While most of the fair use caselaw involves one or more of the six
favored preambular uses, courts have been receptive to fair use claims
outside of those six. Congress expected fair use to evolve under the 1976
Act, and evolve it has, especially in response to challenges posed by new
technologies. Especially notable is the role that fair use has taken on in
regulating competition, promoting innovation in the technology industry,
and facilitating access to information.
This study of the fair use caselaw also shows that parody is far from the
only kind of commentary as to which copying of the whole or qualitatively
substantial parts of prior works has been deemed necessary to "conjure up"
the original. Conjuring up the original is also often necessary to prove a
point, to ground one's commentary, or to illustrate some phenomenon. But
neither is necessity really necessary. Courts are increasingly considering
whether a particular use is reasonable in light of the defendant's purpose,
not whether it is, strictly speaking, necessary. Even iterative copying of the
whole of a protected work, while it generally cuts against fair use, does not
doom the defense, as illustrated in some of the free speech cases, authorial
productive use cases, learning and personal use cases, litigation use cases,
and new technology cases.
There are relatively few clusters in which fair use defenses fail more
often than they succeed or where there appears to be a deep divide in the
caselaw. News reporting is one of the statutorily favored use categories;
yet, many news-related fair use defenses have failed because judges
believed the defendants took too much, interfered with core licensing
markets, or engaged in wrongful conduct that tainted the fair use defense.580
The scope of fair use for teaching, scholarship, and research, three others of
the statutorily favored uses, remains quite unclear. This is in part because
580. See supra Part I.D.
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the relevant caselaw is quite thin, and in part because publishers, educators,
and researchers have fundamentally different perspectives about how fair
use should be analyzed in respect of such copying. Educators and
researchers regard their copying as fair insofar as their uses advance
knowledge, while publishers regard this copying as unfair insofar as it
impedes the development of new licensing markets. Neither Congress nor
the courts have been able to definitively resolve the intense controversy
over learning-related uses, even after more than forty years of debate. 581
Yet, educational and research uses of copyrighted materials, like personal
uses more generally, have become so ubiquitous and widely tolerated that
they may have, in effect, become fair uses after all.
After the Texaco and Michigan Document decisions ruled that
photocopying of research and educational materials was unfair because of
new licensing markets, proponents of fair use worried that courts would
assume that any use that could be licensed must be licensed, which would
cause harm analysis in fair use cases to become circular.582 (That is, if a
copyright owner challenged a use, there must be a market for licensing it,
which the putative fair user is interfering with by not paying a license fee.)
After Campbell, courts have generally avoided this circularity problem,
especially in transformative and productive use cases. Two prominent
appellate courts have opined that copyright owners are not entitled to
preempt or monopolize markets for transformative or complementary uses
of their works.583 In recent years, courts have also been more demanding
about evidence of market harm, 584 more willing to consider positive
externalities of a defendant's use (e.g., the public interest in having access
to the defendant's work),585 and more cognizant that a variety of factors,
including copyright owner unwillingness to license certain kinds of uses
(e.g., criticism), may impede the successful formation of new licensing
markets. 586
It is curious, though, how reluctant courts have been to consider factors
beyond those set forth in § 107 in the fair use caselaw. One of the goals of
this Article is to embolden courts to consider additional factors, especially
those of particular salience in certain policy clusters. Also curious is the
581. See, e.g., PATRY, supra note 1, at 203-19 (discussing contentiousness about such
copying since 1961).
582. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Copyright Noncompliance (or Why We Can't "Just Say
Yes" to Licensing), 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 237 (1997); Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining
the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in an Era of Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J.
INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (1997); Silberberg, supra note 310.
583. See, e.g., Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley, Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 614-15
(2d Cir. 2006); Ty, Inc. v. Publ'ns Int'l, Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 517-18 (7th Cir. 2002).
584. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1168 (9th Cir. 2007)
(expressing skepticism about a claim of harm to the thumbnail licensing market for cell
phones).
585. See, e.g., Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 254 (2d Cir. 2006) (public interest
considered).
586. See, e.g., Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1115-16 (D. Nev. 2006); see
also Gordon & Bahls, supra note 18 (discussing various types of market failures).
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unwillingness of courts to follow the dictum in Campbell that endorsed
damage awards instead of injunctive relief in close fair use cases. 587 Courts
have also continued to presume harm when plaintiffs seek preliminary
injunctions in productive fair use cases, even though it seems difficult to
square this presumption with First Amendment jurisprudence. 588
This Article recommends that judges and commentators should stop
wringing their hands about how troublesome fair use law is 589 and look
instead for common patterns in the fair use caselaw -upon which to build a
more predictable body of fair use law. Analyzing fair uses in light of cases
previously decided within the same policy cluster will make fair use more
rule-like without a concomitant loss in its utility as a flexible standard for
balancing a wide range of interests in a wide variety of situations.
587. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 n.10 (1994). Only once did
a judge propose that a documentary should be able to use video footage subject to
compensating the rights holders, but this judge was a dissenter who could not persuade his
colleagues to follow this dictum. See Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Passport Video, 357 F.3d
896, 898-99 (9th Cir. 2004) (Noonan, J., dissenting).
588. See, e.g., Lennon v. Premise Media Corp., 556 F. Supp. 2d 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); see
also Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual
Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 229-31 (1998) (arguing that preliminary injunctions in
copyright cases are prior restraints on speech under the First Amendment).
589. See, e.g., Liu, supra note 20, at 433 & n. 19 (quoting Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc.,
104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939) (characterizing fair use as "the most troublesome [issue] in
the whole law of copyright")); Nimmer, supra note 13, at 280-83 (complaining about the
unpredictability of fair use caselaw).
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